Williamson Murray

The past as prologue: The importance of history to the military profession

1. Introduction Williamson Murray and Richard Hart Sinnreich 2. Military history and the history of war Sir Michael Howard Part I. History and the Military Profession: 3. The relevance of military history to the military profession: a British view John Kiszely 4. The relevance of military history to the military profession: a US marines view Paul Van Riper 5. Awkward partners: military history and American military education Richard Hart Sinnreich 6. Thoughts on military history and the profession of arms Williamson Murray Part II. The Influences of History on the Military Profession: 7. Thucydides as educator Paul Rahe 8. Clausewitz, history, and the future strategic world Colin Gray 9. History and the nature of strategy John Gooch 10. Military transformation in long periods of peace Andrew Gordon 11. Military history and the pathology of lessons learned: the Russo-Japanese War Jonathan Bailey 12. Obstacles to innovation and readiness: the British Armys experience, 1919-39 13. What history suggests about terrorism and its future Christopher Harmon 14. Civil-military relations and the future Frank Hoffman.

The dynamics of military revolution 1300—2050: Thinking about revolutions in warfare

The term “revolution in military affairs” (RMA) became decidedly fashionable in the course of the 1990s. It lies at the heart of debates within the Pentagon over future strategy and has gained increasing prominence in Washingtons byzantine budgetary and procurement struggles. Yet few works throw light on the concepts past, help situate it or the phenomena it claims to describe within a sophisticated historical framework, or offer much guidance in understanding the potential magnitude and direction of future changes in warfare. This book is an effort to answer those needs. CONCEPTUAL ROOTS Current notions of revolutions in military affairs derive from two principal sources: early modern historians and Soviet military theorists. The closely related concept of “military revolution” emerged in 1955 in an inaugural lecture by the British historian Michael Roberts. Roberts argued that in the early seventeenth century, under the leadership of the warrior-king Gustavus Adolphus, Sweden had embarked on a military revolution that had swept away traditional approaches to military organization and tactics throughout the West. That claim provoked several decades of furious debate over the extent and nature of the changes in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century warfare. In the end, most specialists came to agree that Roberts had been correct in suggesting that European warfare in this period had undergone fundamental systemic changes. But until the 1990s, military historians focused on other periods of Western history had largely ignored the concepts developed in the debate that Roberts had opened.

The dynamics of military revolution 1300—2050: Conclusion: The future behind us

The early Greek imagination envisaged the past and the present as in front of us – we can see them. The future, invisible, is behind us. … Paradoxical though it may sound to the modern ear, this image of our journey through time may be truer to reality than the medieval and modern feeling that we face the future as we make our way forward into it. The essays in this volume have focused on the transformations in the art of war that have marked the rise of the West. The purpose of this final chapter is entirely different. It is to draw general conclusions about the nature of military revolutions and of revolutions in military affairs, and to explore what that past might suggest about the potential for such revolutions in the future. In view of the claims of the enthusiasts that the United States is riding the crest of an American revolution in military affairs, these are intriguing questions indeed. The pace of technological and social change and the continuing antagonisms between states make it highly probable that war, military revolutions, and revolutions in military affairs will play a central role in the century that has just begun.

Giraldus Cambrensis, Edward I, and the conquest of Wales

In 1063, Harold Godwineson, heir to the English throne, launched a major invasion of Wales. His forces spread fire and slaughter through the rough Welsh terrain, killing so many men, Gerald of Wales tells us, that he “left not one that pisseth against a wall.” Such large-scale campaigns of devastation were typical of medieval warfare, and the result was also typical, at least for the early and high Middle Ages: the numerous Welsh “princes,” who independently governed their own mini-states, “submitted” to the English and acknowledged their over-lordship in a loose way. Harold and his men then went home with their booty (mostly cattle, no doubt), confident they had both weakened the Welsh and taught them a lesson, so that they would make little trouble for years to come. Harold did not, so far as our limited sources indicate, annex any territory, or depose and replace any Welsh ruler, or hold and garrison outposts within Wales. Having succeeded by the standards of the day, Harold found himself on the defensive in England three years later against two foreign attackers, first Norway’s Harald Hardrada, then William of Normandy. Against the Norwegians, who fought in the same style as the English, he won a decisive battle, but the Normans defeated him at Hastings. The result was the Norman Conquest of England, an extremely thorough occupation and domination vastly different from the loose subordination Harold had imposed on Wales. A French-speaking aristocracy of knights, barons, and counts supplanted the thegns and ealdormen who had been the principal landholders and political elite of the Anglo-Saxon realm. French replaced English as the language of the royal court and of law-courts, and as the second language (after Latin) for writing history or literary works. Although William retained some elements of the old system, broad aspects of Norman military and political organization arrived with the conquerors. For more than two centuries, the dominant form of Anglo-Norman armies was the armored cavalry rather than heavy infantry.

The Iran–Iraq War: 1980: The Iraqi invasion begins

We have to stick their nose in the mud so we can impose our political will over them. This cannot take place except militarily . – Saddam Hussein Oh great people of Iraq … We thought the Iranian government was going to learn from the previous lessons after our valiant troops liberated our extorted land on the eastern borders [the two towns the Iranians were supposed to return after the signing of the 1975 Accords], and after we reinstated Iraqi sovereignty in Shatt al-Arab. But the grandsons of the magi who have [a] deep grudge against Iraq and the Arab nation, and who are strong in setting suspicious plans continued in their errors and counter military actions … Oh … sons of Iran of all nationalities, religions and sects … we do not want to inflict any damage on you or seek your land, but the tyrant charlatan Khomeini and his aides want to be in an unfaithful war against us, motivated by an unjustified … grudge against Iraq … They wanted to deceive Iraq and [the] Ummah, and the backward … Khomeini gang committed massacres and caused the Iranian people a blood bath . – Saddam Hussein Despite the momentous changes occurring in Iran during early 1979, Saddam was still looking west. At the end of March, a meeting and discussions between the Ba’ath Revolutionary Command Council and members of the PLO, chaired by then-vice president Saddam Hussein, focused on Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat’s defection from the Arab hardline states. Saddam was clear on the policies he believed the Arab world should pursue: We stated that there would be traitors, and we would deal with them on that basis by [encouraging] the people to [do] all they can to topple the regime for treason. We said it publicly … We repeated it today, the same words. I fear they think that those are just words for the public, but that it is not for them also.

Failed, broken, or galvanized?

Prussia’s experience is sui generis in the context of this project. The other contributions feature discussions of strategies with positive starting points. Prussia’s strategy of recovery involved the reconstitution of, if not a “failed state” in the contemporary sense, then arguably a broken state. A military system considered formidable even after the French Revolution’s innovations found itself overthrown in a single campaign. Its disintegration in the aftermath of the Battle of Jena-Auerstadt was comprehensive and immediate, almost literally a matter of the marching speeds of French armies. As Joachim Murat allegedly reported to Napoleon, the fighting was over because there was no enemy left. Prussia’s collapse was humiliating. Fifty-one of the 60 infantry regiments, the army’s backbone, many with over a century of victory to their names, disappeared. Strongly garrisoned, well-provisioned fortresses surrendered at the first challenge. With no hope of relief from a broken field army, resistance appeared futile and pointless. The few last stands and hold-outs only highlighted a wasteland of senescence and incompetence. The familiar jest that Prussia was an army with its own country became grim reality as the state’s social and political fabric unraveled. The royal family fled Berlin, leaving their capital open to French occupation and looting. The Berliners for their part greeted their French conquerors with applause, while other Prussian cities greeted the French with wine and flowers. What remained of the army attached itself to a Russian ally more embarrassed than gratified by the connection. King Frederick William III focused on the surrenders when denouncing humiliations “without precedent” in his public pronouncement after the collapse. He concluded by declaring that, in the future, any soldier who distinguished himself was to be made an officer regardless of social standing.

The Iran–Iraq War: 1981–1982: Stalemate

If they had stood firm for just [a few] minutes, had they opened fire … and shot just one round off of each tank and then retreated, that would have been bad but they could have hit at least a percentage of the enemy forces coming [at] them. The force that stands firm does not give up losses; I wish to know the reason for this so I can punish them . – Saddam Hussein In his decision to invade Iran in September 1980, Saddam Hussein failed to understand his army’s limited capabilities and tried to do too many things at once. The Iraqis lost valuable time and surprise with the distractions of attacking Khorramshahr, Abadan, and Susangard. And if Saddam had intended to deprive Iran of Khuzestani oil to protect his gains, then the failure to capture Ahvaz, the crucial pipeline junction east of Dezful, and its associated road and rail infrastructure, all within reach, was a serious mistake. (For the extent of the southern, central, and northern battlefields in 1981 and 1982, see Figures 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3.) Instead, the invading Iraqi forces focused on the port cities – where the majority of the Arabic-speaking population resided – largely because Saddam’s intelligence services had reported those Arabs would rally to the Iraqi cause. But that decision did not pan out when the locals were less than receptive to Saddam’s message. To make matters worse, a handful of atrocities by the Iraqis had turned otherwise neutral Arabs in the area into supporters of the regime in Tehran. In fact, the 9th Division commander, Major General Tala al-Duri, admired by Saddam and despised by fellow officers, had ordered the summary execution of locals suspected of supporting Iranians.

War, Strategy, and Military Effectiveness by Williamson Murray

1. History and the future 2. Thucydides and Clausewitz 3. Clausewitz out, computers in, military culture and technological hubris 4. Changing the principles of war 5. Military culture does matter 6. History and strategic planning, from Rome to 1945 7. Thoughts on red teaming 8. The distant framework of war 9. The problem of German military effectiveness, 1900-45 10. Reflections on the combined bomber offensive 11. The air war in the Gulf, the limits of air power 12. Thoughts on British intelligence in WWII and the implications for intelligence in the twenty-first century 13. The meaning of World War II.

History, War, and the Future

Abstract This article aims to delineate several issues raised by an historically based approach to understanding the present and the future. Beginning with a discussion of the profound impact that drastic changes have had on the international environment, the article then outlines what history suggests about human natures influence on the course of future events; the future of war; the nature of governance and the United States. This essay does not attempt to provide answers, but rather suggests how policy makers, strategists, and military leaders might think through the complex political and cultural questions they need to be asking in the making of strategy. This is the essential first step for Americans. If they fail to ask the right questions, most answers will prove irrelevant to the challenges of the future.

The past as prologue: The influence of history on the military profession

1. Introduction Williamson Murray and Richard Hart Sinnreich 2. Military history and the history of war Sir Michael Howard Part I. History and the Military Profession: 3. The relevance of military history to the military profession: a British view John Kiszely 4. The relevance of military history to the military profession: a US marines view Paul Van Riper 5. Awkward partners: military history and American military education Richard Hart Sinnreich 6. Thoughts on military history and the profession of arms Williamson Murray Part II. The Influences of History on the Military Profession: 7. Thucydides as educator Paul Rahe 8. Clausewitz, history, and the future strategic world Colin Gray 9. History and the nature of strategy John Gooch 10. Military transformation in long periods of peace Andrew Gordon 11. Military history and the pathology of lessons learned: the Russo-Japanese War Jonathan Bailey 12. Obstacles to innovation and readiness: the British Armys experience, 1919-39 13. What history suggests about terrorism and its future Christopher Harmon 14. Civil-military relations and the future Frank Hoffman.