Wolfgang Kowalsky

REFIT – a breakthrough towards a strengthened and more encompassing deregulatory agenda?

On 2 October 2013 we had a glimpse of the ambiguous and shifting stance towards Social Europe that is certain to colour the coming decade: a period of attempts at social deregulation. On the same day two Communications were published, one clearly opposing social regulation, the other more cautiously in favour of auxiliary social indicators and social partner involvement in the European Semester. On the one hand, the European Commission Communication ‘Refit – fit for growth’, published on 2 October 2013, just a few weeks after a staff working document (dated 1 August 2013) stressed that there would be no new programme on health and safety and that the Commission wants to merge legislation on the information and consultation of workers and make it more favourable to business. In addition, the Commission has decided not to table proposals in the area of occupational safety and health for hairdressers pending ongoing evaluations, as well as on muscular skeletal disorders, screen displays and environmental tobacco smoke. Furthermore, the Commission announced a review of legislation on part-time work, and fixed-term contracts, which are the result of negotiations among the social partners. Also under scrutiny for downsizing is legislation on information regarding employment contracts and temporary agency work. With the publication of REFIT, the Commission has taken another step along the path towards deregulating Europe, dismantling legislation that protects workers’ rights and weakening social dialogue. On the other hand, on the same day Commissioner László Andor presented a Communication proposing additional social and employment indicators aimed at improving the monitoring of social and employment developments, as well as better involvement of the social partners in the European Semester. Issuing two communications simultaneously, each with a different approach to the Social Dimension, is by now a familiar story: it started with the Lisbon European Council which, on the one hand, approved the Lisbon strategy to open the road to full employment, intended for the ‘leftwing public’, while, on the other hand, approving the ‘better regulation’ agenda for the benefit of the business community.

Past and future of the EU single market - the Monti Report1

How should one view the single market in the midst of the worst financial, economic and social crisis since 1929? Some advocate a simple relaunch and declare it to be the most efficient tool against protectionism and nationalism; others are becoming more and more critical of a neoliberal and unilateral interpretation of single market rules by the Commission and the Court of Justice – which regards these rules as being superior to fundamental rights – and are therefore asking for a strategic reorientation; and some even take a hostile stance, regarding the single market as an ‘aggressor’ against national structures and practices, and therefore conclude that the European powers have to be curtailed or given back to the Member States. These new trends ranging from unconditional support to total opposition are already reflected in European election results and could continue to transform radically political landscapes. The crisis could have major effects on electorates, strengthening both absenteeism due to disillusionment and lack of interest as well as parties preaching open rejection and disempowerment of the Union. The ‘better regulation’ agenda defended by the Commission, and now renamed ‘smart regulation’, was at the source of the indefensible abstention from any action to regulate financial markets – until the system of financial ‘weapons of mass destruction’ crashed and led to the worst global crisis since 1929. The Member States saved the unregulated financial system, but then the rating agencies – after having given top ratings to toxic products – turned against the weakest links in the euro area chain and helped to speculate against the euro. Instead of debt conversion, yet another package to support the financial system, and in particular the banks, was agreed upon – and the question of who had to pay the bill became more crucial than ever. One effect of the lack of tax harmonization and the political backing given to tax competition was one of the highest discrepancies in income and wealth distribution and social inequalities Europe has ever seen. Instead of pushing for more and sustainable growth, the Barroso II Commission has called for cuts in public expenditure and tough austerity measures. While growth prospects are relatively good in the US and China, these measures could plunge Europe into a long period of stagnation. Barroso’s ‘EU 2020’ proposals are on the side of ‘business as usual’. In the original Lisbon strategy, the EU set out to make Europe the world’s most competitive, knowledge-based economy by 2010. Now in 2010 Barroso simply reiterates the same ambition for 2020 – though the growth rate looks like being well below that of competitors and the problems associated with an ageing and shrinking population are increasing. The intergovernmental approach to the crisis showed again the limits of that method compared to the community method. The reaction to the Greek crisis

The ‘Better Regulation’ agenda - a critical view

Based on a recent publication on the EU’s ‘Better Regulation’ agenda, this article provides a commentary both on the publication and on the ‘Better Regulation’ agenda. The author of the study under discussion is an expert on internal market issues who works as a researcher at the University of Mons-Hainaut. He starts his short study by describing the early beginnings of the better regulation agenda: in the 1970s/19880s under Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher the issue of quality of legislation was used to enhance the competitiveness of enterprises through deregulation. The European Council of Edinburgh 1992 recognised simplification as a political objective of the EU and this leitmotiv became a strategic objective of the EU at the Lisbon European Council in 2000. The mandate for better regulation was confirmed by other European Councils (Stockholm 2001, Laeken 2001 and Barcelona 2001). It is interesting to note that the Lisbon European Council launched not only the ‘social democratic project’ of the Lisbon strategy with ambitious goals in terms of employment, which was later hijacked and placed under the absolute pre-eminence of the economic constraints and competitiveness. This was also the start of the better regulation agenda which was shifted incrementally from a neutral approach to reduce unnecessary administration to a biased approach to reduce ‘burdens’ on enterprises. The parallels between the better regulation agenda and the Lisbon strategy are revealing. The ‘better regulation’ agenda was originally intended to simplify the acquis communautaire and to contribute to a better regulation. The better regulation agenda started as a legitimate and well intended exercise to reduce unnecessary bureaucracy. Nobody is in favour of unnecessary regulation. The first Barroso Commission (2004-09) gave a new orientation to the exercise, adding a hidden agenda. The report of Wim Kok denounced excessive regulation in rigorous terms. The publication under discussion explains that the Commission distinguished two dimensions of better regulation, the simplification and the modification of regulatory approaches. The Commission evaluated the pertinence of regulation via a permanent screening process. The instruments of simplification are: abrogation, codification, consolidation, recast (refonte) and regulation (règlement). The following are considered as alternatives to legislation: self-regulation, for instance codes of conduct, and co-regulation, for instance standardisation. In November 2006 the Commission accelerated the agenda by presenting a programme with the objective of reducing administrative burdens by 25% by 2012 and by announcing a programme to simplify more than 100 legislative initiatives. In 2007 the Commission opened a new line of attack

ETUC perspective on public services in the light of the new Treaty of Lisbon

The Treaty of Lisbon is a step forward in the direction of the ETUC’s demands. Therefore, the ETUC recognises that the Treaty of Lisbon contains major innovations compared to the present situation, with a legal base for services of general economic interest (SGEI) anchored in Article 14 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU) (former Article 16 EC), the Charter of Fundamental Rights and – totally unexpectedly – a protocol annexed to the treaties. The logic of the Treaty of Lisbon is one of greater openness towards the debate on services of general interest (SGI) and SGEI – the European Union jargon for ‘public services’ – linked to a democratisation of the decision-making process at the European level: the generalisation of co-decision with regard to legislation related to public services. This new situation raises the question of why the European Parliament decided to avoid a public debate on the issue.

CEEP-ETUC proposal for the structure of a framework directive establishing a legal framework for services of general interest in the European Union

The following proposal for the structure of a framework directive was elaborated jointly by CEEP and the ETUC. Following internal consultations it was presented publicly in October 2001 at a conference in the European Parliament, as an input into the debate on establishing a framework for a regulated liberalisation and negotiated modernisation of services of general interest. The complete text, including an explanatory statement, can be found at: http:// www.etuc.org/en/dossiers/sgi/dirpropo.cfm. A French version is also available.