Wouter van der Brug

Issue ownership and party choice

This study presents an empirical test of the extent to which the “issue ownership” model explains the electoral decisions of individual voters. The model has been tested mainly by its ability to predict aggregate election results by issue salience (e.g., Budge and Farlie, 1983 and Petrocik, 1996). Applications of the theory for explaining individual voting behavior were restricted to two-party systems. This study makes use of innovative survey questions contained in the Dutch Parliamentary Elections Study 1998, which allow for appropriate tests of the model in the context of multi-party systems. The results show that issue voting — indicated by the direct effect of issues salience on party preferences — occurs only to a very limited extent. However, evidence is found for an indirect effect of issue priorities on party preferences, which is mediated by ideology. By selectively emphasizing issues, a party may alter its ideological position. Since ideological proximity is the main determinant of party choice, changes in ideological positions make a party more attractive to some voters and less attractive to others. In the conclusions it is thus argued that the issue ownership model — which is mainly a model of party behavior — is compatible with ideological voting as conceptualized by Downs (1957) and which provides a good explanation of the behavior of voters.

How the LPF Fuelled Discontent: Empirical tests of explanations of LPF support

In this article, three models to explain the LPF vote are tested; the socio-structural model, the protest vote model, and the policy voting model. Popular explanations of the success of the LPF in 2002 consist of mixtures of the socio-structural and the protest vote model. Votes for the LPF are described as protest votes, mainly from low-educated ‘angry white men’, who are sociologically expected to feel mostly attracted to the simple populist message of a charismatic politician. The results from this study show, however, that these explanations are not valid. LPF voters hardly fit the sociological profile proposed in this literature. Moreover, general feelings of discontent towards parties and politicians (political cynicism and lack of political efficacy) did not affect the LPF vote. Instead, the effect was the other way around: preferences for the LPF fuelled political cynicism, and reduced political efficacy. This study provides firm support for the policy voting model. In 2002, LPF voters evaluated the LPF on the basis of its policies, mainly its fierce position on refugees. So, votes for the LPF were based on the same kind of reasoning that voters for other parties make: voters vote for the party they agree with the most on those issues they consider important. In conclusion, implications of these findings are discussed for (1) theories of voters for right-wing populist parties in general, (2) explanations of LPF support in particular, and (3) the strategies employed to treat such parties (accommodation versus the cordon sanitair).

A populist Zeitgeist? Programmatic contagion by populist parties in Western Europe

In this article, we examine the programmatic reactions to the rise of populist parties. It has been argued that populism is not necessarily the prerogative of populist parties; it has been adopted by mainstream parties as well. The article investigates whether populism is contagious. On the basis of the results of a content analysis of election manifestos of parties in five Western European countries (France, Germany, Italy, The Netherlands and the United Kingdom), we conclude that the programmes of mainstream parties have not become more populist in recent years. We find no evidence that mainstream parties change their programmes when confronted with electoral losses or successful populist challengers. Yet, we do find that populist parties change their own programmes when they have been successful: Their initial success makes them tone down their populism.

Charisma, Leader Effects and Support for Right-Wing Populist Parties:

One of the ways in which support for right-wing populist parties is held to be distinctive from that for other kinds of political parties is that their leaders are alleged to be ‘charismatic’ figures who play a crucial role in the electoral success their parties have enjoyed. Focusing on three Dutch elections, this article tests the charismatic leadership hypothesis, asking whether leader effects are stronger for populist than for established parties and whether they are stronger for populist leaders who are widely held to be more rather than less charismatic. The results indicate that if, following Weber, charisma is seen as an intimate and direct bond between leaders and followers, there is in fact little support for the charismatic leadership hypothesis, at least in the context of leaders shaping electoral outcomes. While recognizing that charisma may manifest itself in other, perhaps indirect, ways, there would seem to us at the very least to be a need for the notion of charisma to be conceptualized more rigorously if it is to continue to be used as an explanation of right-wing populist party success.

The Party as Pariah: The Exclusion of Anti-Immigration Parties and its Effect on their Ideological Positions

During the past three decades, anti-immigration parties have emerged all over Western Europe. Some of them have been treated like any other party by their mainstream opponents and a few have even become members of governing coalitions (e.g., the Austrian FPO). Other such parties have been politically excluded: established parties have refrained from any cooperation with them and in some cases even refused to enter into a political debate with their politicians. This article investigates how the strategy of ostracising anti-immigration parties affects the internal dynamics within these parties. In particular, we assess whether these parties radicalise as a result of this strategy, and, conversely whether it has a moderating effect when these parties are approached more pragmatically. Our analyses, regarding ten parties at several moments in time, show that anti-immigration parties that were not ostracised became more moderate, whereas those that were treated as outcasts continued to be extremist.During the past three decades, anti-immigration parties have emerged all over Western Europe. Some of them have been treated like any other party by their mainstream opponents and a few have even become members of governing coalitions (e.g., the Austrian FPÖ). Other such parties have been politically excluded: established parties have refrained from any cooperation with them and in some cases even refused to enter into a political debate with their politicians. This article investigates how the strategy of ostracising anti-immigration parties affects the internal dynamics within these parties. In particular, we assess whether these parties radicalise as a result of this strategy, and, conversely whether it has a moderating effect when these parties are approached more pragmatically. Our analyses, regarding ten parties at several moments in time, show that anti-immigration parties that were not ostracised became more moderate, whereas those that were treated as outcasts continued to be extremist.

Religion and party choice in Europe

This paper investigates religiosity in relation to party choice in European Parliament elections. Conventional wisdom tells us that as Europe has secularised, the effect of religion on party choice should also have diminished. Yet, this cross-national and cross-temporal study of religious voting in European elections from 1989 to 2004 paints a more nuanced picture. It shows that a) the effect of religion has been declining, but has increased in recent years, b) religion matters in particular for voting for Christian Democratic parties and Conservative parties, c) while generational replacement reduces the overall effect of religion on electoral decisions, the effect of religion has recently increased within each generation, and d) the impact of religion depends on the religious context in which citizens live so that religion plays a bigger role in fractionalised societies. These findings are discussed in the light of a revived importance of religion for European politics.This paper investigates religiosity in relation to party choice in European Parliament elections. Conventional wisdom tells us that as Europe has secularised, the effect of religion on party choice should also have diminished. Yet, this cross-national and cross-temporal study of religious voting in European elections from 1989 to 2004 paints a more nuanced picture. It shows that a) the effect of religion has been declining, but has increased in recent years, b) religion matters in particular for voting for Christian Democratic parties and Conservative parties, c) while generational replacement reduces the overall effect of religion on electoral decisions, the effect of religion has recently increased within each generation, and d) the impact of religion depends on the religious context in which citizens live so that religion plays a bigger role in fractionalised societies. These findings are discussed in the light of a revived importance of religion for European politics.

Euroscepticism and education: A longitudinal study of 12 EU member states, 1973–2010:

This study examines the relationship between educational attainment and euroscepticism from 1973 to 2010. Existing research has shown that, driven by utilitarian considerations, political cues and questions of collective identity, education and euroscepticism are negatively related. However, as the process of European unification has progressed, all three factors have become more salient, so we expect an increasing effect of education on euroscepticism over time. Using 81 waves of the Eurobarometer survey in 12 European Union (EU) member states, our results show that the impact of education on euroscepticism has indeed increased, particularly after the signing of the Maastricht Treaty.

Are volatile voters erratic, whimsical or seriously picky? A panel study of 58 waves into the nature of electoral volatility (The Netherlands 2006–2010)

Electorates appear to be adrift. Across Western Europe electoral volatility is increasing. But are volatile voters whimsical? Do they behave randomly, like drift sand, or are they emancipated, not committed to a single political party but loyal to their own preferences? To answer these questions this study focuses on the Dutch electorate, which has become the most volatile in Western Europe. We analyse the extensive 1Vandaag Opinion Panel (1VOP) dataset, which covers 55,847 adult respondents who participated in at least 2 of the 58 waves between November 2006 and June 2010. 1VOP allows us to break down electoral volatility by type, direction (intra-bloc versus inter-bloc) and time span. We conclude that volatility reflects voter emancipation rather than disengagement. Although more than half of the respondents (55 percent) change party preference at least once, they mostly stick to one of two ideologically coherent party blocs. Especially middle groups are volatile: people with modal income, with average levels of education and who position themselves in the political centre. However, the lower educated are more likely to switch between dissimilar parties. Our findings question the socialization model: although older voters are relatively loyal when they cast their ballots, they are the most volatile in the years in between.

Public images of leaders of anti-immigration parties: Perceptions of legitimacy and effectiveness

In the last two decades several anti-immigration parties have risen in Western Europe. Some of these parties have been very successful in elections, whereas others have been rather unsuccessful. Some scholars have argued that this success depends in part on the extent to which voters perceive these parties (and their leaders) as legitimate (not violent or undemocratic) and as effective. However, no studies exist that test the effect of these public perceptions on electoral support. We fill this void by proposing operationalizations of voters’ perceptions of parties in terms of legitimacy and effectiveness. These operationalizations were employed to measure public perceptions of leaders of two anti-immigration parties and leaders of four established parties that participated in the Dutch national parliamentary elections of 2006. The analyses of these data (n = 382) demonstrate the significance of measuring public images directly and show that legitimacy and effectiveness are important predictors of support for anti-immigration parties. Prior research showed that voters evaluate anti-immigration parties largely by the same criteria as they use to evaluate other parties. Our study demonstrates that this is only true when voters consider an anti-immigration party as effective and legitimate.

The Influence of Political Events on Attitudes Towards the European Union

This two-wave panel study was designed to investigate the effects of the media coverage leading up to and including an important European Union event (a summit meeting of EU leaders) on citizens’ attitudes towards the EU and European integration. A random sample of 817 citizens in the Netherlands was surveyed one month before the Amsterdam Summit in June 1997 and three days after it had ended. Two types of attitudes towards Europe were distinguished by scaling analysis: (a) national–pragmatic attitudes towards the EU and (b) supranational–idealistic attitudes towards the EU. Results indicated that supranational–idealistic attitudes were influenced positively as a result of the media coverage related to the summit, whereas national–pragmatic attitudes did not show a significant change. A control variable, attitudes towards immigrants, which was included to detect possible testing effects, showed no change. Effects of the summit’s media coverage were in the same direction across all levels of political knowledge and political attentiveness. When predicting change in supranational–idealistic attitudes, controlling for the original attitude and political knowledge, those who were most attentive to politics were more strongly influenced. These findings challenge traditional views of the impact of knowledge, attention and interest on attitude change.