Xueyong Zhan

Civic Environmental NGOs, Civil Society, and Democratisation in China

Abstract This paper examines the potential role of civic environmental NGOs in Chinas democratisation. Based on interviews with 31 NGO officials, the paper examines the origins, structures, and functions of civic environmental NGOs in China. It also examines how various political and resource constraints have shaped their development. While having made progress in organising educational campaigns and specific conservation projects, civic environmental NGOs have been less successful in influencing government decisions and official behaviours. Most recently, some NGOs have made limited progress on these fronts by maintaining a largely non-oppositional stance towards government and by utilising various formal and information channels for influencing government decisions. NGO leaders will have to negotiate with different party-state entities in defining their precise roles in the political process.

Stakeholder demands and corporate environmental coping strategies in China

This paper examines how stakeholder demand and compliance capacity jointly shape corporate environmental coping strategies and subsequently environmental protection practices. A four-dimensional classification of coping strategies-formalism, accommodation, referencing, and self-determination-is conceptualized. Drawing on survey and interview data collected from manufacturing enterprises in China between 2010 and 2012, the paper shows that compared with formalism and accommodation, coping strategies of referencing and self-determination are associated with stronger environmental protection practices. Enterprises adjust their coping strategies by taking into account the constraints defined by both their internal and external environments. The results also demonstrate the potential synergetic effects of state and non-state stakeholders working together in promoting better corporate environmental coping strategies and environmental practices in China.

Regulatory Ties and Corporate Compliance Strategies

Abstract By integrating the environmental regulation literature and managerial ties theory, this research explores how regulatory ties and firm visibility shape formalism and self-determination, two distinct corporate coping strategies for complying with environmental regulatory demands. Based on survey data collected in China, our empirical results show a U-shaped relationship between firms’ regulatory ties and their strict adherence to formal rules (formalism), and an inverted U-shaped relationship between regulatory ties and firm discrepancy in complying with regulations (self-determination). Further, the inverted U-shaped relationship is stronger among firms with less organizational and environmental visibility. Additional analysis further indicates that these relationships are particularly evident in privately owned enterprises. Our study may contribute to the public performance literature by furthering our understanding of regulatory ties as a double-edged sword in corporate compliance.

Policy uncertainty and corporate performance in government-sponsored voluntary environmental programs

This study combines insights from the policy uncertainty literature and neo-institutional theory to examine corporate performance in implementing a government-sponsored voluntary environmental program (VEP) during 2004-2012 in Guangzhou, China. In this regulatory context, characterized by rapid policy changes, corporate performance in VEPs is affected by government surveillance, policy uncertainty, and peer pressures. Specifically, if VEP participants have experienced more government surveillance, they tend to perform better in program implementation. Such positive influence of government surveillance is particularly evident among those joining under high and low, rather than moderate uncertainty. Participants also perform better if they belong to an industry with more certified VEP firms, but worse if they are located in a regulatory jurisdiction with more certified VEP firms. At a moderate level of policy uncertainty, within-industry imitation is most likely to occur but within-jurisdiction imitation is least likely to occur.