Yael Ecker

Goal-Directed Allostasis: The Unique Challenge of Keeping Things as They Are and Strategies to Overcome It.

We introduce the concept of goal-directed allostasis (GDA), the mental process that underlies individuals’ deliberate and proactive attempts to maintain the current state of affairs. GDA is distinct from goal-directed progress (GDP), the mental process that underlies the pursuit of change in the current state of affairs. We argue that GDA plays a crucial role in human life but that it has been largely overlooked in psychological research. We discuss the unique cognitive and motivational challenges that arise during GDA and suggest strategies to overcome these challenges. Finally, we outline how acknowledging the distinction between GDA and GDP might contribute to the study and treatment of mental illness and highlight several directions for future research.

Not Our Fault: Judgments of Apathy Versus Harm Toward Socially Proximal Versus Distant Others

The current research aimed to delineate the moral intuitions that underlie apathy toward the suffering of socially distant others. Past research has shown that people endorse in-group-focused morality, according to which the fate of socially distant others is discounted, and harm-focused morality, according to which the omission of care is viewed less negatively as compared to the commission of harm. In the current study, we investigated how these two moral principles interact, by examining whether increased social distance differentially attenuates the severity of moral judgments concerning acts of apathy and harm. The results of five studies show that judgments concerning the omission of care are dependent on social distance, whereas judgments concerning the commission of harm are not. The findings challenge normative theories of morality that deny the legitimacy of “positive rights” and positive theories of morality that see harm and care as two end points of the same psychological continuum.

Applicability increases the effect of misattribution on judgment

ABSTRACT Feelings and cognitions influence judgment through attribution. For instance, the attribution of positive feelings and cognitions to a stimulus leads to a positive judgment of that stimulus. We examined whether misattribution is moderated by the applicability of a distractor to the judgment question. For instance, when are people more likely to attribute to a target person the affective and cognitive experiences triggered by a kitten – when trying to judge the person’s cuteness or trustworthiness? The kitten triggers experiences specifically relevant to cuteness, but people might more easily suspect the kitten’s potential influence when judging cuteness rather than trustworthiness. Using the Affect Misattribution Procedure, we found that applicability increases the effect of misattribution on valenced judgments. The results emphasise the importance of specific information (rather than only general valence) in attribution and suggest that high applicability of distractors to the judgment question does not elicit effective correction.