Yanbo Wang

Matthew: Effect or Fable?

In a market context, a status effect occurs when actors are accorded differential recognition for their efforts depending on their location in a status ordering, holding constant the quality of these efforts. In practice, because it is very difficult to measure quality, this ceteris paribus proviso often precludes convincing empirical assessments of the magnitude of status effects. We address this problem by examining the impact of a major status-conferring prize that shifts actors positions in a prestige ordering. Specifically, using a precisely constructed matched sample, we estimate the effect of a scientist becoming a Howard Hughes Medical Institute HHMI Investigator on citations to articles the scientist published before the prize was awarded. We do find evidence of a postappointment citation boost, but the effect is small and limited to a short window of time. Consistent with theories of status, however, the effect of the prize is significantly larger when there is uncertainty about article quality, and when prize winners are of relatively low status at the time of election to the HHMI Investigator Program. n nThis paper was accepted by David Hsu, entrepreneurship and innovation.

Firm Performance and State Innovation Funding: Evidence from China's Innofund Program

Can firms leverage public entrepreneurship investments to improve innovation and financial performance? Analysis of this question is frustrated by the difficulty of distinguishing treatment from selection effects. We take advantage of internal administrative data on applications to China’s Innofund program in order (a) to identify which application features are associated with higher chances of obtaining grants and (b) to evaluate the causal impact of receiving a grant on firm performance using a regression discontinuity (RD) design. With regards to grant receipt, we find that firms possessing observable merits and political connections are more likely to receive Innofund grants. We also find evidence of bureaucratic intervention, as applicants’ evaluation scores are non-randomly missing and that some firms whose scores did not meet funding standards nonetheless received grants. With regards to post-grant performance, we find that firms receiving high project evaluation scores and Innofund grants perform better than those that do not receive grants and have lower scores. These do not appear to be causal effects, however. Applying Fuzzy RD methods, we find no evidence that receiving an Innofund grant boosts survival, patenting, or venture funding. Our analysis demonstrates the value of administrative data for causal analysis and for uncovering evidence regarding the possibility that bureaucratic intervention affects firm and program outcomes.