Yarrow Dunham

Two Signatures of Implicit Intergroup Attitudes Developmental Invariance and Early Enculturation

Long traditions in the social sciences have emphasized the gradual internalization of intergroup attitudes and the putatively more basic tendency to prefer the groups to which one belongs. In four experiments (N = 883) spanning two cultures and two status groups within one of those cultures, we obtained new evidence that implicit intergroup attitudes emerge in young children in a form indistinguishable from adult attitudes. Strikingly, this invariance from childhood to adulthood holds for members of socially dominant majorities, who consistently favor their in-group, as well as for members of a disadvantaged minority, who, from the early moments of race-based categorization, do not show a preference for their in-group. Far from requiring a protracted period of internalization, implicit intergroup attitudes are characterized by early enculturation and developmental invariance.

Children and social groups: A developmental analysis of implicit consistency in Hispanic Americans

We investigated the development of three aspects of implicit social cognition (self-esteem, group identity, and group attitude) and their interrelationships in Hispanic American children (ages 5 to 12) and adults. Hispanic children and adults showed positive implicit self-esteem and a preference for and identification with their in-group when the comparison group was another disadvantaged minority group (African American). However, challenging the long-held view that childrens early intergroup attitudes are primarily egocentric, young Hispanic children do not show implicit preference for or identification with their in-group when the comparison was the more advantaged White majority. Results also supported predictions of cognitive-affective balance in the youngest children. Strikingly, balance was absent in adults, suggesting that in disadvantaged minority groups, cognitive-affective consistency may actually decline with age.

Of substance: the nature of language effects on entity construal.

Shown an entity (e.g., a plastic whisk) labeled by a novel noun in neutral syntax, speakers of Japanese, a classifier language, are more likely to assume the noun refers to the substance (plastic) than are speakers of English, a count/mass language, who are instead more likely to assume it refers to the object kind [whisk; Imai, M., & Gentner, D. (1997). A cross-linguistic study of early word meaning: Universal ontology and linguistic influence. Cognition, 62, 169-200]. Five experiments replicated this language type effect on entity construal, extended it to quite different stimuli from those studied before, and extended it to a comparison between Mandarin speakers and English speakers. A sixth experiment, which did not involve interpreting the meaning of a noun or a pronoun that stands for a noun, failed to find any effect of language type on entity construal. Thus, the overall pattern of findings supports a non-Whorfian, language on language account, according to which sensitivity to lexical statistics in a count/mass language leads adults to assign a novel noun in neutral syntax the status of a count noun, influencing construal of ambiguous entities. The experiments also document and explore cross-linguistically universal factors that influence entity construal, and favor Prasadas [Prasada, S. (1999). Names for things and stuff: An Aristotelian perspective. In R. Jackendoff, P. Bloom, & K. Wynn (Eds.), Language, logic, and concepts (pp. 119-146). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press] hypothesis that features indicating non-accidentalness of an entitys form lead participants to a construal of object kind rather than substance kind. Finally, the experiments document the age at which the language type effect emerges in lexical projection. The details of the developmental pattern are consistent with the lexical statistics hypothesis, along with a universal increase in sensitivity to material kind.

Judgments of the Lucky Across Development and Culture

For millennia, human beings have believed that it is morally wrong to judge others by the fortuitous or unfortunate events that befall them or by the actions of another person. Rather, an individuals own intended, deliberate actions should be the basis of his or her evaluation, reward, and punishment. In a series of studies, the authors investigated whether such rules guide the judgments of children. The first 3 studies demonstrated that children view lucky others as more likely than unlucky others to perform intentional good actions. Children similarly assess the siblings of lucky others as more likely to perform intentional good actions than the siblings of unlucky others. The next 3 studies demonstrated that children as young as 3 years believe that lucky people are nicer than unlucky people. The final 2 studies found that Japanese children also demonstrate a robust preference for the lucky and their associates. These findings are discussed in relation to M. J. Lerners (1980) just-world theory and J. Piagets (1932/1965) immanent-justice research and in relation to the development of intergroup attitudes.

Preference for High Status Predicts Implicit Outgroup Bias among Children from Low-Status Groups.

Whereas members of high-status racial groups show ingroup preference when attitudes are measured implicitly, members of low-status racial groups--both adults and children--typically show no bias, potentially reflecting awareness of the ingroups low status. We hypothesized that when status differences are especially pronounced, children from low-status groups would show an implicit outgroup bias, the strength of which might relate to attitudes toward status. We tested these predictions among 6- to 11-year-old Black and Coloured (i.e., multiracial) children from South Africa, a country marked by extreme status differentials among racial groups. As a measure of implicit intergroup bias, children (N = 78) completed an Implicit Association Test (IAT), a speeded categorization task that assesses the relative strength of association between 2 target groups (in the present study, either Whites vs. Blacks or Whites vs. Coloureds) and positive vs. negative evaluation. Children also completed explicit (i.e., self-report) measures of attitudes toward racial groups as well as toward rich and poor people (a measure of attitudes toward status). Both groups of children showed an implicit outgroup-favoring (i.e., pro-White) bias, suggesting that children were sensitive to the extent of status differences. The only instance in which implicit pro-White bias did not emerge involved Black childrens evaluations of Whites vs. Coloureds, both higher-status outgroups. Explicit preference for high status predicted implicit pro-White bias, particularly when the IAT contrasted 2 outgroups. The impact of status on the development of implicit and explicit intergroup bias is discussed.

Representing ‘Us’ and ‘Them’: Building Blocks of Intergroup Cognition

Three experiments explored whether group membership affects the acquisition of richer information about social groups. Employing a minimal-groups paradigm, 6- to 8-year-olds were randomly assigned to 1 of 2 novel social groups. Experiment 1 demonstrated that immediately following random assignment to a novel group, children were more likely to generalize negative behaviors to outgroup members and positive behaviors to ingroup members and to report a preference for ingroup members. Experiments 2 and 3 showed that this initial ingroup-favoring bias interacts with subsequent learning, thereby attenuating the effect of negative information about the ingroup and enhancing the effect of negative information about the outgroup. These effects were more powerful with respect to preferences than induction: After hearing that some ingroup members behaved badly, children predicted that ingroup members would behave more negatively than outgroup members, but they did not express preferences for the outgroup over the ingroup. Together these data shed light on the construction of social category knowledge as well as the processes underlying the absence of own-group positivity among children from lower-status social groups.

Constraints on the Acquisition of Social Category Concepts

Determining which dimensions of social classification are culturally significant is a developmental challenge. Some suggest this is accomplished by differentially privileging intrinsic visual cues over nonintrinsic cues (Atran, 1990; Gil-White, 2001), whereas others point to the role of noun labels as more general promoters of kind-based reasoning (Bigler & Liben, 2007; Gelman, 2003). A novel groups procedure was employed to examine the independent effects of noun labels and visual cues on social categorization. Experiment 1 demonstrated that in the absence of a visual cue, a noun label supported social categorization among 4-year-olds and 7-year-olds. Experiments 2 and 3 demonstrated that children and adults fail to differentiate between intrinsic and nonintrinsic visual cues to category membership, suggesting that this distinction is not central to the acquisition of social category concepts. Experiments 2 and 3 also showed that in the absence of a shared noun label, visual cues were not sufficient for younger children to form social categories. Experiment 4 ruled out a potential demand characteristic in the previous experiments. Together, these results reveal the primacy of verbal labels over visual cues for social categorization in young children and suggest a developmental change between ages 4 and 7 in the ability to construct new representations of social category concepts.

Group bias in cooperative norm enforcement.

A hallmark of human social cognition is the tendency for both adults and children to favour members of their own groups. Critically, this in-group bias exerts a strong influence on cooperative decision-making: people (i) tend to share more with members of their in-group and (ii) differentially enforce fairness norms depending on the group membership of their interaction partners. But why do people show these group biases in cooperation? One possibility is that the enforcement of cooperative norm violations is an evolved mechanism supporting within-group cooperation (Norms-Focused Hypothesis). Alternatively, group bias in cooperation could be a by-product of more general affective preferences for in-group members (Mere Preferences Hypothesis). Here, we appraise evidence from studies of both adults and children with the goal of understanding whether one of these two accounts is better supported by existing data. While the pattern of evidence is complex, much of it is broadly consistent with the Mere Preferences Hypothesis and little is uniquely supportive of the Norms-Focused Hypothesis. We highlight possible reasons for this complexity and suggest ways that future work can continue to help us understand the important relationship between group bias and cooperation.

Religion insulates ingroup evaluations : the development of intergroup attitudes in India

Research on the development of implicit intergroup attitudes has placed heavy emphasis on race, leaving open how social categories that are prominent in other cultures might operate. We investigate two of Indias primary means of social distinction, caste and religion, and explore the development of implicit and explicit attitudes towards these groups in minority-status Muslim children and majority-status Hindu children, the latter drawn from various positions in the Hindu caste system. Results from two tests of implicit attitudes find that caste attitudes parallel previous findings for race: higher-caste children as well as lower-caste children have robust high-caste preferences. However, results for religion were strikingly different: both lower-status Muslim children and higher-status Hindu children show strong implicit ingroup preferences. We suggest that religion may play a protective role in insulating children from the internalization of stigma.

The Importance of Origins: Why Cognitive Development is Central to a Mature Understanding of Social Cognition

The overwhelming majority of work in social cognition has focused on adults, what can be called end-state so- cial cognition. We argue that development (and especially cognitive development) can provide a theoretical and methodo- logical tool to advance the study of social cognition. Developmental psychology can offer unique insight into the origin of end-state processes, providing insight into how they develop from simpler components and thus serving as constraints to theoretical models of end-state social cognition. We provide examples of 1) areas where existing developmental research offers potential insight into our understanding of adult processes, 2) areas where new developmental research can directly address theoretical debates in social cognition, and 3) a case study of one successful, extant bridge between development and social cognition. Finally, we comment more generally on both the promise and potential pitfalls of an integrated so- cial-developmental approach to social cognition.