Yechiel Klar

The paradox of group-based guilt : Modes of national identification, conflict vehemence, and reactions to the in-Group's moral violations

The authors examined the relationships between 2 modes of national identification (attachment to the in-group and the in-groups glorification) and reactions to the in-groups moral violations among Israeli students. Data were collected during a period of relative calm in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as well as during a period of great intensification of this conflict. As expected, in Study 1, the 2 modes of identification had contrasting relationships with group-based guilt: Attachment was positively related whereas glorification was negatively related to group-based guilt for in-groups past infractions. Glorification suppressed the attachment effect but not vice versa. Both relationships were mediated by the use of exonerating cognitions. In Study 2, group-based guilt for the in-groups current wrongdoings was increased by priming critical rather than conventional attachment to the in-group, suggesting a causal effect of mode of identification on the experience of negative group-based emotions.

Collective guilt: Emotional reactions when one's group has done wrong or been wronged

We examine the conditions that facilitate feelings of collective guilt, and consider the prevalent historial and contemporary conditions that inhibit such guilt. Specifically, we outline the important role that self-categorisation as a member of a group that is responsible for illegitimately harming another group plays in inducing collective guilt. We also consider strategies that legitimise the harm done, along with how the costs of creating a more just relationship with the harmed group can affect the extent to which collective guilt is experienced. The ease of undermining the necessary antecedents for feeling collective guilt suggests that it may be a relatively rare emotional experience, particularly during ongoing intergroup hostilities. We present studies illustrating the important role that categorisation plays in both collective guilt acceptance and its assignment to members of other social groups who have harmed the ingroup. We illustrate the consequences for social change processes when the necessary conditions for collective guilt to be experienced are met.

Are Most People Happier than their Peers, or Are They Just Happy?

Most people judge themselves to be content with their lives. However, they also judge themselves to be more content than the others in their group, which is a logical impossibility. In line with previous speculations, the authors found in two studies that comparative contentment judgments were highly related to judgments of one’s own contentment but entirely unrelated to judgments of comparison of others’ contentment. That is, comparative contentment judgments are predominantly self-focused. Researchers asking the question, “How content are you relative to your peers?” should be aware that the response might well be to the question “How content are you?”

Hypothesis Testing in Wason's Selection Task: Social Exchange Cheating Detection or Task Understanding.

Abstract Recently, an evolutionary view of performance in the Wason selection task was proposed, according to which people successfully solve tasks involving social exchange situations, or cheating detection content and perspective, but fail to do so in other domains. Alternatively, we propose that performance in the Wason problem largely depends on three aspects related to how people understand the task: (1) the clarity of the rule in terms of determination and direction; (2) the nature of the alternative to the tested rule and the falsifying instance it entails; (3) the perceived relevance of looking for violation strategy. We show that Gigerenzer and Hugs improvement in performance with “cheating” compared to “no-cheating” versions can be explained by these elements of task understanding rather than by cheating. In Study 1 facilitative understanding features were removed from the cheating versions and were introduced into the no-cheating versions, without affecting the cheating (or the no-cheating) nature of the task or changing perspective. Performance levels in the original cheating and the unconfounded no-cheating versions were found to be equally high (71%), whereas the unconfounded cheating and the original no-cheating versions yielded equally low performance (30–32%). Study 2 showed that the reversal in choice patterns obtained by Gigerenzer and Hug by changing perspectives in bilateral cheating option rules can be achieved without changing perspectives. Moreover, this reversal fails to occur when perspective change does not accompany change in task understanding.

Way beyond compare: Nonselective superiority and inferiority biases in judging randomly assigned group members relative to their peers

Abstract Can almost all members of a group be judged as better (or worse) than the other people in the same group? Apparently yes. In Studies 1–4, members of small intact groups systematically judged their group members as above the group average and above the median on a variety of social traits, even when all group members were judged consecutively. In Studies 5–7, participants judged members of a given positive group as systematically better than the others in the same positive group and members of a given negative group—as worse than the others in the same negative group. This was found in judgments of groups of liked and disliked acquaintances, attractive and unattractive faces, and high- and low-skilled students. The Singular-Target-Focus theory, arguing failure of contrast in member-to-group comparisons, is presented to account for these findings.

Conflict termination: an epistemological analysis of international cases

Analysant les conflits internationaux en terme de schema de conflit, les auteurs decrivent les processus epistemiques qui caracterisent deux modes de cessation du conflit: resolution ou dissolution de ce conflit

‘If I don't get blown up ...’: realism in face of terrorism in an Israeli nationwide sample

In a nationwide study, we explored how Israelis, currently stricken by an intense wave of terrorism, perceive the risk of being the victim of a terrorist attack. We studied both absolute and comparative (i.e., vis-a-vis other people at the area of residence) perceived controllability and vulnerability. The picture that emerges is one of realism. We found no evidence of the comparative optimistic illusions, which characterizes the risk-perception literature. Most participants report some level of behavior change and precautions against the threat of terrorism, but most of them were doubtful about the effectiveness of these precautionary attempts. Perceived absolute vulnerability was the only risk perception variable related to precautionary behaviors. We discuss the disappearance of comparative optimistic biases when the threat is clearly realistic.

Knowing What to Do: On the Epistemology of Actions

Do people know what they are doing? This admittedly simplistic phrasing conceals some questions of fundamental significance to a psychological theory of actions: Are human actions thoughtful and rational or are they often mindless and automatic? Are they consciously determined or do they frequently stem from unconscious forces inaccessible to human cognizance? In the present chapter we deal with some of the foregoing problems using as our frame of reference a theory of lay epistemology developed recently by Kruglanski and his colleagues (see, Kruglanski, 1980; Kruglanski & Ajzen, 1983; Kruglanski, Baldwin, & Towson, in press; Kruglanski & Klar, 1982, Bar-Tal, Yarkin, & Bar-Tal, 1982). Our central thesis will be that voluntary actions by definition are based on intentions which essentially are types of knowledge about what it is that a person wishes to do. Thus, a general theory about the acquisition of all knowledge should be of help in elucidating how a particular knowledge is acquired, in this instance, the knowledge of one’s intentions.

Conflict as a Cognitive Schema: Toward a Social Cognitive Analysis of Conflict and Conflict Termination

An essential element in the make-up of conflicts is the subjective knowledge the parties hold concerning their relation. Such knowledge determines, first, whether the situation is characterized as a conflict, and, second, how the conflict is reacted to, affectively and behaviorally. This chapter looks at intergroup and international conflicts from the perspective of a theory of lay epistemology (cf. Bar-Tal & Bar-Tal, in press; Kruglanski, 1980; Kruglanski & Ajzen, 1983; Kruglanski & Jaffe, 1986; Kruglanski & Klar, 1985) dealing with the process of knowledge acquisition. According to this perspective, conflict is viewed as a specific content of knowledge, or as a specific cognitive schema. The specific content of knowledge contained in a conflict schema refers to incompatibility of goals between parties. A conflict situation is said to occur when at least one of the parties subscribes to the conflict schema. Thus, the retention or modification of the conflict schema may determine whether conflict is maintained or resolved.

Maladjustment implications of self and group gender–role discrepancies: An ordered-discrepancy model

Deviation from personal ideals and group standards has maladaptive consequences. Using insights from self-categorization and social identity theories, an ordered-discrepancy model of maladjustment was proposed in which simultaneously deviating from both types of standards is associated with increased maladjustment for members of high status groups, except when such dual discrepancies imply that one is closer to ones ideals than is ones group. In the latter case, decreased maladjustment can be expected. For members of low status groups, discrepancies from ideals, but not from ones group, were expected to predict maladjustment. Patterns of deviations on dimensions of masculinity and femininity predicted maladjustment among men, a high status group, and women, a low status group, as hypothesized. Implications for social identity and self-categorization theories, and for gender–role research, are discussed.