Yemima Ben-Menahem

The inference to the best explanation

In a situation in which several explanations compete, is the one that is better qua explanation also the one we should regard as the more likely to be true? Realists usually answer in the affirmative. They then go on to argue that since realism provides the best explanation for the success of science, realism can be inferred to. Nonrealists, on the other hand, answer the above question in the negative, thereby renouncing the inference to realism. In this paper I separate the two issues. In the first section it is argued that a rationale can be provided for the inference to the best explanation; in the second, that this rationale cannot justify an inference to realism. The defence of the inference rests on the claim that our standards of explanatory power are subject to critical examination, which, in turn, should be informed by empirical considerations. By means of a comparison of the realists explanation for the success of science with that of conventionalism and instrumentalism it is then shown that realism does not offer a superior explanation and should not, therefore, be inferred to.

Convention: Poincaré and Some of His Critics

This paper offers an interpretation of Poincarés conventionalism, distinguishing it from the Duhem–Quine thesis, on the one hand, and, on the other, from the logical positivist understanding of conventionalism as a general account of necessary truth. It also confronts Poincarés conventionalism with some counter‐arguments that have been influential: Einsteins (general) relativistic argument, and the linguistic rejoinders of Quine and Davidson. In the first section, the distinct roles played by the inter‐translatability of different geometries, the inaccessibility of space to direct observation, and general holistic considerations are identified. Together, they form a constructive argument for conventionalism that underscores the impact of fact on convention. The second section traces Poincarés influence on the general theory of relativity and Einsteins ensuing ambivalence toward Poincaré. Lastly, it is argued that neither Quine nor Davidson has met the conventionalist challenge.

Probability in physics

Introduction.- Physics and Chance.- Typicality and the Role of the Lebesgue Measure in Statistical Mechanics.- Typicality and Notions of Probability in Physics.- Deterministic Laws and Epistemic Chances.- Measures over Initial Conditions.- A New Approach to the Approach to Equilibrium.- Revising Statistical Mechanics - Probability, Typicality and Closure Time.- How Many Maxwells Demons and Where?.- Locality and Determinism: the Odd Couple.- Why the Tsirelson Bound?.- Three Attempts at Two Axioms for Quantum Mechanics.- Generalized Probability Measures and the Framework of Effects.- Infinitely Challenging: Pitowskys Subjective Interpretation and the Physics of Infinite Systems.- Bayesian Conditioning, the Reflection Principle, and Quantum Decoherence.- The World According to de Finetti.- Four and a Half Axioms for Finite-Dimensional Quantum Probability.- Probability in the Many-Worlds Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics.

Black, White and Gray: Quine on Convention

This paper examines Quine’s web of belief metaphor and its role in his various responses to conventionalism. Distinguishing between two versions of conventionalism, one based on the under-determination of theory, the other associated with a linguistic account of necessary truth, I show how Quine plays the two versions of conventionalism against each other. Some of Quine’s reservations about conventionalism are traced back to his 1934 lectures on Carnap. Although these lectures appear to endorse Carnap’s conventionalism, in exposing Carnap’s failure to provide an explanatory account of analytic truth, they in fact anticipate Quine’s later critique of conventionalism. I further argue that Quine eventually deconstructs both his own metaphor and the thesis of under-determination it serves to illustrate. This enables him to hold onto under-determination, but at the cost of depleting it of any real epistemic significance. Lastly, I explore the implications of this deconstruction for Quine’s indeterminacy of translation thesis.

Direction and Description

Abstract This paper deals with the dependence of directionality in the course of events—or our claims concerning such directionality—on the modes of description we use in speaking of the events in question. I argue that criteria of similarity and individuation play a crucial role in assessments of directionality. This is an extension of Davidsons claim regarding the difference between causal and explanatory contexts. The argument is based on a characterisation of notions of necessity and contingency that differ from their modal logic counterparts on the one hand, and from causality and chance on the other. I show that some types of directionality are perfectly compatible with both determinism and indeterminism at the microscopic level, and that there is no likelihood of, or advantage to, reducing such directionality to other laws or causal processes.

Dummett vs Bell on quantum mechanics

Abstract The purpose of this paper is to cast doubt on the common allegation that quantum mechanics (QM) is incompatible with realism. I argue that the results usually considered inimical to realism, notably the violation of Bells inequality, in fact play the opposite role—they support realism. The argument is not intended, however, to demonstrate realism or refute its alternatives as general metaphysical positions. It is directed specifically at the view that QM differs from classical mechanics in that, unlike classical mechanics, it is not amenable to a realist interpretation.

If Counterfactuals Were Excluded from Historical Reasoning . . .

The argument of this paper is that counterfactuals are indispensable in reasoning in general and historical reasoning in particular. It illustrates the role of counterfactuals in the study of history and explores the connection between counterfactuals and the notions of historical necessity and contingency. Entertaining alternatives to the actual course of events is conducive to the assessment of the relative weight and impact of the various factors that combine to bring about a certain result. Counterfactuals are essentially involved in understanding what it means for an event, an action, or an individual to make a difference. Making a difference, in turn, is shown to be a central category of historical reasoning. Counterfactuals, though sensitive to the description they use, make objective claims that can be confirmed or disconfirmed by evidence.

Locality and Determinism: The Odd Couple

This paper examines the conceptual relations between the notions of determinism and locality. From a purely conceptual point of view, determinism does not appear to imply locality, nor (contrapositively) does nonlocality appear to imply indeterminism. The example of Newtonian mechanics strengthens this impression. It turns out, however, that in the context of quantum mechanics, a more complex connection between determinism and locality emerges. The connection becomes crucial when nonlocality is distinguished from no signaling. I argue that it is indeterminism that allows nonlocal theories such as quantum mechanics to comply with the no signaling constraint. I examine a number of interpretations of quantum mechanics, among them that of Schrodinger, Pitowsky and Popescu and Rohrlich, to support this claim.

Models of Critique: Introduction

Critique involves reflection, specifically self-reflection, and as such it is inherently linked with philosophy. Critique calls for change, awareness, liberation from false conceptions, and reshaping of spheres of action and belief. Consequently it is closely linked with the moral and the political. Critique aspires to enhance truth, beauty, and justice and is thus an integral part of science, art, and social action. The present volume tackles issues of critique through a selection of papers originally presented at the workshop on “Models of Critique in the Sciences, Society, and the Arts,” held in Jerusalem and Tel Aviv during May 1996. As the full program indicates, this selection provides only a partial picture of the topics discussed at the workshop. A major consideration has been the publication policy of Science in Context , with its emphasis on science, which is reflected here. We wish to express our gratitude to all the participants for their presentations and contributions to a stimulating exchange of ideas.

Pragmatism and revisionism: James's conception of truth

Abstract The paper argues that Jamess conception of truth is non‐revisionist, that is, it sanctions common use of the notion of truth, but criticizes foundation‐alist philosophical accounts of that notion. This interpretation conflicts with traditional interpretations of James such as Russells and Moores, and contemporary interpretations such as Dummetts, all of which are revisionist. To the extent that objections raised against Jamess pragmatism depend on such revisionist reading, this paper constitutes a defence of James. The paper argues, further, that non‐revisionism distinguishes James from logical positivism and contemporary verificationism, and that James seeks to defend rather than renounce metaphysics. On this issue the paper disagrees with Rorty, who ascribes to James an extreme anti‐metaphysical stance.