Yi-min Lin

Politician Control, Agency Problems and Ownership Reform: Evidence from China

Using data from a recent national survey on the ownership reform of state-owned enterprises in China, we study the effects of reducing politician control and agency problems on the financial performance of the reformed firms. Taking into account the endogenous nature of the reforms, we find that firm performance is positively affected by the lessening of politician control by increasing the firms flexibility in labor deployment and by the mitigation of agency costs through the introduction of more effective corporate governance mechanisms such as one-share one-vote and shareholding-based board structure composition. Ownership structure also affects performance: relative to shareholding by the state, foreign ownership has a positive effect on firm performance; individual (mostly employee) shareholding has a negative effect; whereas the effect of collective and legal person shareholding is indistinguishable from that of state shareholding. Somewhat surprisingly, operating autonomy (excluding labor deployment flexibility) has a negative effect on firm performance, suggesting serious agency problems in the reformed enterprises.

Ownership restructuring in Chinese state industry: An analysis of evidence on initial organizational changes

China has now entered the third decade of its economic reform. While the sweeping decollectivization in the rural sector during the early 1980s is widely regarded as successful, reform in the urban sector has proceeded at a much slower pace and with mixed results. For overviews, see Barry Naughton, Growing Out of the Plan: Chinese Economic Reform, 1978–1993 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995); Dwight H. Perkins, “Reforming Chinas economic system,” Journal of Economic Literature , Vol. 26 (1988), pp. 601–645, and “Completing Chinas move to the market,” Journal of Economic Perspectives , Vol. 8 (1994), pp. 23–46. The main carriers of economic activities in the urban sector are state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Since 1993, the Chinese government has embarked on a major effort to shift the focus of SOE reform from delegation of decision-making authority to enterprises, which was the predominant strategy in the preceding decade, to ownership restructuring.

The 1997–1998 break in industrial statistics: Facts and appraisal

Abstract In 1998, the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) in the published industrial statistics modified the scope of enterprises covered and the enterprise classification system. This paper highlights the modifications and identifies two implications. First, the use of a proportional allocation rule in data aggregation boosts the size of “public ownership,” an important cornerstone of socialism. Second, the switch from compiling detailed statistics on enterprises identified by an administrative criterion to enterprises that exceed a fixed volume of sales revenue poses new difficulties for comparative data analysis but also represents a change in statistical practice that may yet lead to data of better quality.

Religious festivities, communal rivalry, and restructuring of authority relations in rural Chaozhou, Southeast China

The fifth day of the Lunar New Year marks the beginning of six weeks of religious festivities in the rural area of Chaozhou, a distinct dialect region in Southeast China. Scheduled on separate dates, processions of local deities are staged by different villages. On the morning of the chosen day, villagers flock to the main village temple, where wooden statues of the divine occupants are congregated with those from other local temples. Each family sets up a table in the courtyard, lights incense and candles, and presents its offerings (of chicken, duck, goose, fish, rice, wine, fruits, cakes, and candies) to the statues. With paper money set on fire, worship and prayers begin.