YiLi Chien

Is the Volatility of the Market Price of Risk Due to Intermittent Portfolio Re-Balancing?

Our paper examines whether the well-documented failure of unsophisticated investors to rebalance their portfolios can help to explain the enormous counter-cyclical volatility of aggregate risk compensation in financial markets. To answer this question, we set up a model in which CRRA-utility investors have heterogeneous trading technologies. In our model, a large mass of investors do not re-balance their portfolio shares in response to aggregate shocks, while a smaller mass of active investors adjust their portfolio each period to respond to changes in the investment opportunity set. We find that these intermittent re-balancers more than double the effect of aggregate shocks on the time variation in risk premia by forcing active traders to sell more shares in good times and buy more shares in bad times.

The risk premium and long-run global imbalances

This study proposes that heterogeneous household portfolio choices within a country and across countries offer an explanation for global imbalances. We construct a stochastic growth multi-country model in which heterogeneous agents face the following restrictions on asset trade. First, the degree of US equity market participation is higher than that of the rest of the world. Second, a fraction of households in each country maintains a fixed share of equity in its portfolios. In our calibrated model, which matches the US net foreign asset position and the equity premium, the average US household loads up more aggregate risk than the average foreign household by investing in risky assets abroad and issuing risk-free assets. As a result, the US is compensated by a high risk premium and runs trade deficits even as a debtor country. The long-run average trade deficit in our model accounts for 50% of the observed US trade deficit.

Aiyagari Meets Ramsey: Optimal Capital Taxation with Incomplete Markets

What is the prescription of Ramsey capital taxes for the heterogeneous-agent incomplete-market economy in the long run? Aiyagari (1995) addressed the question, showing that a positive capital tax should be imposed to implement the steady-state allocation that satisfies the so-called modified golden rule. In his analysis of the Ramsey problem, a critical assumption implicitly made is the existence of steady-state allocations at the optimum. This paper revisits the issue and finds sharply different results. We demonstrate that the optimal Ramsey allocation may feature no steady state. The key to our results is embedded in the hallmark of incomplete-market models that the risk-free rate is lower than the time discount rate at the steady state in competitive equilibrium.

Does a State’s Political Stance Impact its Government Revenues and Spending?

limited size and advocate for reductions in taxes and government spending, while liberals favor a larger, more active government. A larger government requires a higher level of public spending, which necessitates higher revenue to avoid increasing the deficit. Hence, it is reasonable to expect that largely conservative states collect less revenue and spend less than largely liberal states. Could a long-standing conservative (liberal) state effectively implement its political agenda and reduce (increase) the size of the government? We examine whether the political leaning in each state influences its state and local government revenues and expenditures. To gauge each state’s government finances, we calculate state and local government revenues and expenditures as a percentage of state-level gross domestic product (GDP).1 In 2014, revenue ranged from 12.6 percent of state-level Does a State’s Political Stance Impact Its Government Revenues and Spending?

State Variation of Tax Deductions

The impact of proposed tax code changes will vary significantly across states.

Optimal Ramsey Capital Taxation with Endogenous Government Spending

The authors study optimal capital income taxation in heterogeneous agent economies featuring endogenous government spending. Similar to Aiyagari (1995), they find that the long-run optimal capital tax rate should not be zero as long as the competitive equilibrium risk-free interest rate differs from the subjective time discount rate. The authors first argue that this result holds in a wide range of economic environments and is not limited to only the standard incomplete market model with heterogeneous agents. As an example, a decentralized economy with limited commitment is considered. Second, they show that this result critically depends on the assumption of endogenous government spending. Within the same limited commitment environment, they show that the long-run capital taxation becomes zero with exogenous government spending. The authors conclude that the optimal Ramsey taxation in heterogeneous agent economies with exogenous government spending and various frictions is still an open question.

Why Are Exchange Rates So Smooth? A Segmented Asset Markets Explanation

Empirical work on asset prices suggests that pricing kernels have to be almost perfectly correlated across countries. If they are not, real exchange rates are too smooth to be consistent with high Sharpe ratios in asset markets. However, the cross-country correlation of macro fundamentals is far from perfect. We reconcile these empirical facts in a two-country stochastic growth model with segmented markets. A large fraction of households either do not participate in the equity market or hold few equities, and these households drive down the cross-country correlation in aggregate consumption. Only a small fraction of households participate in international risk sharing by frequently trading domestic and foreign equities. These active traders are the marginal investors, who impute the almost perfect correlation in pricing kernels. In our calibrated economy, we show that this mechanism can quantitatively account for the excess smoothness of exchange rates in the presence of highly volatile stochastic discount factors.

Implications of Heterogeneity in Preferences, Beliefs and Asset Trading Technologies for the Macroeconomy

This paper analyzes and computes the equilibria of economies with large numbers of heterogeneous agents who have different asset trading technologies, preferences, and beliefs. We illustrate the value of our method by using it to evaluate the implications of these heterogeneities through several quantitative exercises.

A NOTE ON USING EXCESSIVE PERKS TO RESTRAIN THE HIDDEN SAVING PROBLEM

We offer an explanation for why perks are overprovided to high-profile CEOs. Hidden saving by an agent makes it difficult for a principal to control the agents moral hazard problem. However, an agent typically cannot save perks; for example, a CEO who owns the right to use a private jet for personal use cannot bank the unused airplane hours. Thus, the principal may oversupply the agent perks to avoid the hidden saving problem. When the agent can both exert lower effort and save wage income, i.e., in the presence of the double deviation problem, we show that the principal supplies more perks than the agent would have purchased on his own (i.e., excessive perks).

Two monetary models with alternating markets

We present a thought-provoking study of two monetary models: the cash-in-advance and the Lagos and Wright (2005) models. We report that the different approach to modeling money - reduced-form vs. explicit role - neither induces theoretical nor quantitative differences in results. Given conformity of preferences, technologies and shocks, both models reduce to one difference equation. The equations do not coincide only if price distortions are differentially imposed across models. To illustrate, when cash prices are equally distorted in both models equally large welfare costs of inflation are obtained in each model. Our insight is that if results differ, then this is due to differential assumptions about the pricing mechanism that governs cash transactions, not the explicit microfoundation of money.