Yitzhak Shichor

China and the Middle East since Tiananmen

By the late 1980s, the Middle East had become a solid base of operations for Chinas foreign policy in political, economic, and military terms. Put to the test of the Tiananmen massacre, the reliability of this base remained unshaken while China was trying to break through the Western-imposed isolation, paving the way for an eventual international rehabilitation. This was made possible following Iraqs violent annexation of Kuwait. China used the Persian Gulf crisis to restore its position as a great power whose cooperation is essential for settling outstanding regional problems all over the world. Consequently, Chinas strained relations with the West in general and the United States in particular have been gradually improving. At the same time, by insisting on a peaceful solution to the crisis, China has managed to maintain its image as the true representative of the Third World, having easy access to all parties concerned, friends and foes alike.

China and the Role of the United Nations in the Middle East: Revised Policy

From the late 1950s to the early 1980s, the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) consistently denied the right and authority of the United Nations to take part in, let alone lead, the settlement of Middle Eastern issues, particularly in the form of sending international peacekeeping forces. This hostile attitude persisted even after the PRC had been admitted to the U.N. and was a permanent member of the Security Council. It is only since the early 1980s that Chinas post-Mao leaders began to reconsider their U.N. policy. By late 1985, a new Chinese attitude emerged that not only encouraged the U.N. to play a role in settling international conflicts but also stipulated that the PRC could and should contribute its due share, actively, in these efforts. This has been amply demonstrated during the recent Gulf crisis.

China's Upsurge: Implications for the Middle East

Until the late 1970s, China’s impact on the Middle East was negligible by almost any standard. Although the Chinese regarded the presence of foreign powers in the region as an indirect threat to their national security, there was very little they could have done to uproot such interventions. Excluded from international organizations (primarily the United Nations and its Security Council), and maintaining only a limited network of formal diplomatic relations with the region’s governments, Beijing was unable to exert any significant political influence in the Middle East. This failure derived not only from China’s political and strategic marginalization in the world but also from its relative military and economic backwardness. There was practically no way that China could have effectively competed with the Eastern bloc, led by the Soviet Union, let alone with the Western bloc, led by the US, in providing military and civilian goods to the Middle East. Crippled in diplomatic, economic and military terms, Mao’s China had no option but to cultivate nongovernmental unofficial actors, especially in the 1960s and 1970s, by backing a number of Middle Eastern national liberation and revolutionary movements. Despite its offers of ideological, doctrinal and limited material support, China was mostly an outsider in the Middle East, playing only a marginal role. Since the late 1970s, however, many if not most of these parameters have changed, some dramatically so. Obviously less concerned about revolution and ideology, the People’s Republic of China (hereafter, PRC)— now a permanent member of the UN Security Council—has managed to establish full diplomatic relations with all Middle Eastern governments without exception. Furthermore, over the last twenty-five years China’s economy has been growing at an incredible average annual rate of 9.5 percent, becoming one of the strongest in the world. Also, although officially downgraded to the fourth priority among the PRC’s Four Modernizations, China’s defence reforms have gathered momentum over

Separatism: Sino‐Muslim conflict in Xinjiang

Abstract Violent incidents between Han Chinese and Muslim, primarily Uighur, minorities in Xinjiang, have frequently erupted throughout history both before and after the communist takeover in 1949. Struggle for the control of Chinas north‐western regions, tension between religion and the state, a continuous cultural and behavioural friction, demographic change, manipulation by the Soviet Union and, last but not least, nationalist‐irredentist aspirations, are among the main reasons for these incidents. Their proliferation since the early 1980s is due to greater domestic relaxation, accelerated economic development, the breakdown of the Soviet Union and the consequent emergence of Central Asian independence, the upsurge of international Islam, and increased exposure to the outside world. A combination of negative and positive means, Beijings response to these incidents reflects its concern about the strategic importance of Xinjiang which borders on eight countries, where Chinas nuclear tests have been he...

Fundamentally Unacceptable yet Occasionally Unavoidable: China’s Options on External Interference in the Middle East

China’s ‘non-interference’ policy is not a new phenomenon. It originates in pre-modern Chinese history when the Empire had been isolated from the rest of the world, as well as in the Mao era when the Chinese–even if they had the will to interfere–did not have the capabilities. Post-Mao and post-Cold War, China has the capabilities but not yet the will to become more involved. Still, economic prosperity and growing political prominence have forced Beijing to compromise. Fundamentally, China’s first option remains ‘non-interference’ and settling of conflicts by the parties concerned. Yet if this fails, then the Chinese prefer an intervention by a regional or professional organisation. If this attempt too, fails, then, reluctantly, Beijing turns to the United Nations Security Council as an option. The worst option is external and independent intervention. All these options are evident in China’s Middle East policy.

Evil from the North: The DPRK-Syria Axis and its Strategic Dimensions

Abstract The Israeli Air Force attack on a Syrian military base reportedly containing materials of strategic value supplied by North Korea, has shed some light on the largely concealed issue of the relations between the two countries. Considered “rogue states” and a part of the alleged “axis of evil,” both the DPRK and Syria are internationally isolated, economically backward and politically oppressive. Yet, their attempts to acquire strategic weapons should not only, or necessarily, be interpreted as an indication of strength and aggressive intentions, but could and perhaps should be interpreted as a reflection of a sense of vulnerability and persecution and subjective weakness rather than strength, as well as a response to perceived threats and actual encirclement. However, whatever their motivations, these measures—explicitly or implicitly supported by Russia and China—raise security concerns that are common to both Israel and the ROK. Facing a similar threat from the north, Israel and the ROK—both eco...

China's Economic Relations with the Middle East: New Dimensions

Throughout the Mao era the contribution of the Middle East to China’s economy and vice versa was marginal at best. For domestic and international reasons, China’s economic relations with the Middle East were limited not only in form (to two main activities-trade and aid), but also in content. More important, in the fifties and sixties both were primarily motivated and manipulated more by political and strategic considerations than by economic ones, as China made efforts prepare the ground for the ultimate establishment of official diplomatic relations with as many Middle Eastern countries as possible and for enlisting Middle Eastern goodwill and support against China’s adversaries: the United States, the Soviet Union, or both. China’s trade relations with the Middle East reflected the ups and downs of its domestic politics and foreign policy: when regional governments rejected its policies, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) drastically and immediately retaliated by reducing trade, primarily its imports; when it urgently needed Arab support, it suddenly expanded commercial exchanges, especially imports, and was ready to deliberately create a negative trade balance.

Dialogue of the Deaf: The Role of Uyghur Diaspora Organizations Versus Beijing

This chapter deals with the possibilities of a dialogue between Beijing and the Uyghurs, inside and outside China. During Mao’s time, such a dialogue was impossible because isolated China was immune to outside pressures and little was known about the Uyghurs. From the early 1970s to the early 1990s, when China was more dependent on the United States against the Soviet Union and more susceptible to external pressures, the dialogue opportunity was missed because the West was not interested and because the Uyghurs were not organized. Since then, the Uyghurs became organized and China has turned into a great power. While interdependent on the global community, China warned against any intervention in its internal affairs. Cautious not to upset China, the West has sidestepped the Uyghur issue.

Gains and Losses: Historical Lessons of China’s Middle East Policy for Its OBOR Initiative

Abstract Although China’s One Belt One Road (OBOR) initiative seems to concentrate on Asia and Africa, its ultimate target is Western Europe. However, the road to Europe – either on land or at sea – has to pass through the Middle East, which is both a part of the OBOR initiative and an essential stopover on the way to Western Europe. Given China’s historical experience in the Middle East and the current Middle Eastern instability, unrest and obstacles, Beijing’s OBOR initiative is facing serious challenges. These are detailed in this article, which offers, in its conclusion, some lessons underlining Beijing’s disadvantages as well as advantages.

Artificial resuscitation: Beijing’s manipulation to pan-Turkism

ABSTRACT Pan-Turkism emerged in the middle of the 19th century as an attempt to uniting all Turkic people along the Silk Road from the Mediterranean to China. After the ascent of modern Turkey under Mustafa Kemal as well as the Soviet incorporation of Central Asia, pan-Turkism had practically withered – although apparently not as an ideology. Indeed, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the subsequent independence of the Central Asia republics have provided for the revival of the pan-Turkism vision, perceived by Beijing as a threat not only to its interests in Central Asia but, moreover, to Xinjiang’s internal stability and China’s sovereignty. While this vision could hardly be accomplished, China’s intensive preoccupation with pan-Turkism has facilitated its artificial resuscitation, though it appears already deceased. Xi Jinping’s One Belt One Road initiative aims, among other things, at blocking pan-Turkism.