Yogesh Joshi

Indo-Japanese Strategic Partnership and Power Transition in Asia

As the U.S.-led security order in Asia gradually comes under stress, regional powers such as India and Japan are formulating a strategic partnership to hedge against the vulnerabilities accruing out of the unfolding power transition in Asia. China’s unprecedented economic and military rise coupled with America’s perceived relative decline is drawing New Delhi and Tokyo into a strategic embrace. To insure their interests in this era of great power transition, New Delhi and Tokyo are keen to hedge against America’s possible failure in containing China’s growing assertiveness in Asia. This hedging strategy is evident in their growing strategic partnership which consists of a triple hedge: increasing bilateral defense partnership against fears of American retrenchment; economic engagement against an over-dependence on China; and a multilateral hedge against China’s growing influence in international and regional institutions. However, for Asia’s two prominent middle powers, transforming these nascent attempts into an effective strategic response to Asia’s current power transition would also require cooperation in the nuclear domain, an area where their policies continue to diverge.

India’s China Challenge

The current transition of power in Asia has only intensified the protracted rivalry between New Delhi and Beijing. Buoyed by its recent growth, both economic and military, China has adopted a more aggressive posture toward India. Indian foreign policy discourse, however, remains deeply fractured on a viable strategy to manage China’s rise. Normalizing relations with Beijing has been prioritized by New Delhi and constitutes the second pillar of its hedging strategy. However, given New Delhi’s modest internal capabilities, the threat posed by China can only be managed through an external balancing strategy.

Indo-US Ties in the Age of “Pivot”

The US expects India to play a major role in its pivot strategy. Yet, India’s response has only been mixed toward the new US strategy in the Asia-Pacific. Under the UPA government, New Delhi tried to distance itself from America’s reengagement with Asia largely because it wanted to avoid the ire of Beijing. Under the Modi government, however, India appears to be a more enthusiastic strategic partner of Washington. Close strategic partnership with the US forms the first leg of India’s hedging strategy.

Power Transition in Asia and Indian Foreign Policy

Relative decline of the US and China’s rise has ushered in a transition of power in Asia. This is most evident in Beijing’s challenge to the US-led liberal security order in Asia. To arrest such a transition, Washington has declared its strategy of pivot toward the Asia-Pacific. Indian foreign policy stands at crossroads at a time when this power transition is unfolding in its vicinity.

India and Regional Balance of Power in Asia

Along with Japan, New Delhi is cooperating closely with Asia’s other powers in creating a local balance against China’s assertive behavior in the region. This is evident in India’s growing defense relationship with major states across the Asia-Pacific rim—Vietnam, Australia, Indonesia, South Korea and Singapore.

Between ‘Concern’ and ‘Opportunity’: US Pivot to Asia and Foreign Policy Debate in India

Underlined by China’s growth and the relative decline of the US, a transition of power is taking place in Asia-Pacific. To arrest its declining influence, the US has initiated a pivot to the region. India, being a regional rising power, has received special attention from the US as part of its strategy to manage Asia’s changing balance of power. On pivot, domestic foreign policy debate in India is highly fractured, however. Perceptions of the pivot in India range between viewing it as a ‘strategic concern’, on the one hand, and a ‘strategic opportunity’, on the other. This debate reflects the divide between two major schools in Indian foreign policy: Traditional Nationalists versus the Great Power Realists. Under Manmohan Singh, India foreign policy practice indicated a preference for ‘strategic autonomy’ as suggested by the Traditional Nationalists. However, Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s ascension to power suggests that India is now ready for greater engagement with the US on balancing China’s growing power in Asia, a position espoused by the Great Power Realists.

RMA and India: Nothing Revolutionary about It

The anarchic nature of international politics foments both competition and socialization among the constituent units. States in geo-strategic competition with the United States are developing asymmetric capabilities to counter American advantages; states with no major conflicts with the US are largely emulating the American model for establishing supremacy in local and regional contexts. At the same time, unlike the first two decades after the end of the Cold War when the international political structure was largely unipolar, US power is now under strain. A number of emerging powers in the world are competing with the US for economic, geo-strategic and military influence. Therefore, examining how individual states are transforming militarily is critical to understanding war and peace in the 21st century. The response of emerging powers to the changing nature of warfare also helps us understand their evolving thinking on the use of force in international and regional politics.

India's Submarine Deterrent and Asian Nuclear Proliferation

New Delhis plans for nuclear-armed submarines could undermine efforts to restrict fissile materials, and set off a naval arms race.

Lost at Sea: The Arihant in India's Quest for a Grand Strategy

Indias first nuclear-armed ballistic missile submarine, the INS Arihant, signifies a milestone in its rise to power. However, its development and supportive strategic discourse reveal the absence of an Indian grand strategy. India urgently needs a grand strategy to direct its defense policy.

Book Review: The Future of Power

Nye, Joseph S., Jr, The Future of Power (New York: Public Affairs, 2011). Pp. xviii + 300.