Yoram Margalioth

The Straight-Line Depreciation is Wanted, Dead or Alive

We propose a simple axiomatic system that any depreciation methodÂiÂacomplying with the core of the accounting of depreciationÂiÂamust obey. We show that, while none of the prevalent depreciation methods (e.g., straight-line) ex ante conforms to these principles, the accredited proportional depreciation method not only maintains the axiomatic system, but also, for a plausible family of depreciation methods, is the unique method that complies with the axiomatic system. We further propose two consistency requirements of a depreciation methodÂiÂapartition consistency and dynamic consistencyÂiÂaand show that, in contrast to the commonly used methods, the proportional depreciation method is the only one to always sustain both. Our analysis may provide further resolution to the arguable evidence on the dominance of Funds From Operations over net income in measuring performance in the real estate industry.

The Social Norm of Tipping, Its Correlation with Inequality, and Differences in Tax Treatment Across Countries

In a previous article I argued that tipping facilitates tax evasion, hurts employees’ financial security in the long run, and is a form of negative externality imposed by wealthy people on the rest of society. In this Article I try to understand the reasons for the greater popularity of the norm in the U.S. compared to other countries, suggesting it may be related to the U.S. cultural preference for linking redistribution with work requirements, relatively high income inequality and consumerism. To that end, I further develop the negative externality argument suggested in the previous article by looking at trends in income inequality in the U.S. and by interpreting the global distribution of the norm through the prism of my inequality/negative externality argument. I then look at the tax treatment of tips in various countries in search of a pattern that supports the differences in social norms.

Close Examination of the Principle of Global Per-Capita Allocation of the Earth’s Ability to Absorb Greenhouse Gas

In this Article we attempt to narrow the gap between developed and developing countries’ respective perceptions of justice in the context of climate change. We show that, in spite of its intuitive appeal, the equal per-capita argument is not grounded in any general moral principle and therefore cannot provide an answer to the question regarding what would be a fair allocation of emission rights. We argue that the underlying moral theory is global distributive justice theory, which unfortunately can only be of very limited help. We briefly discuss the various particular principles/considerations that are offered in the literature either in support or in criticism of the equal percapita allocation and find that upon close analysis they generally support the developing countries’ view, but not a per-capita allocation of emission rights. We conclude with a practical suggestion.

A Cost of Tax Planning

Tax planning is an area of growing interest and this paper is an attempt to contribute to the small formal literature on this topic. The paper analyzes the case of tax planning that manipulates the tax system to impose lower effective tax rates on gains than on losses, and proves that such tax planning may provide firms with an incentive to produce more than the social optimum. This inefficiency is different from the general inefficiency entailed by income taxation, captured by the conventional notion of excess burden. A low asymmetric tax may be more distortive than a high symmetric tax rate.