Yusufcan Masatlioglu

Rational choice with status quo bias

Abstract Motivated by the empirical findings concerning the importance of ones current situation on her choice behavior, the main objective of this paper is to propose a rational choice theory that allows for the presence of a status quo bias, and that incorporates the standard choice theory as a special case. We follow a revealed preference approach, and obtain two nested models of rational choice that allow phenomena like the status quo bias and the endowment effect, and that are applicable in any choice situation to which the standard (static) choice model applies.

A theory of (relative) discounting

Abstract We derive a representation theorem for time preferences (on the prize-time space) which identifies a novel notion of relative discounting as the key ingredient. This representation covers a variety of time preference models, including the standard exponential and hyperbolic discounting models and certain non-transitive time preferences, such as the similarity-based and subadditive discounting models. Our axiomatic work thus unifies a number of seemingly disparate time preference structures, thereby providing a tractable mathematical format that allows for investigating certain economic environments without subscribing to a particular time preference model. This point is illustrated by means of an application to sequential bargaining theory.

Choice by iterative search

When making choices, decision makers often either lack information about alternatives or lack the cognitive capacity to analyze every alternative. To capture these situations, we formulate a framework to study behavioral search by utilizing the idea of consideration sets. Consumers engage in a dynamic search process. At each stage, they consider only those options in the current consideration set. We provide behavioral postulates that characterize this model. We illustrate how one can identify both search paths and preferences.

When more is less: Limited consideration

There is well-established evidence that decision makers consistently fail to consider all available options. Instead, they restrict attention to only a subset of alternatives and then undertake a more detailed analysis of this reduced set. This systematic lack of consideration of available options can lead to a “more is less” effect, where excess of options can be welfare-reducing for a decision-maker (DM). Building on this idea, we model individuals who might pay attention to only a subset of the choice problem presented to them. Within this smaller set, a DM is rational in the standard sense, and she chooses the maximal element with respect to her preference. We provide a choice theoretical foundation for our model. In addition, we show which alternatives are revealed preferred to which and discuss welfare implications.

A Foundation for Strategic Agenda Voting

We offer complete characterizations of the equilibrium outcomes of two prominent agenda voting institutions that are widely used in the democratic world: the amendment, also known as the Anglo-American procedure, and the successive, or equivalently the Euro-Latin procedure. Our axiomatic approach provides a proper understanding of these voting institutions, and allows comparisons between them, and with other voting procedures.

Limited attention and status quo bias

We introduce and axiomatically characterize a model of status quo bias in which the status quo affects choices by both imposing psychological constraints and focusing attention. The resulting Limited Attention Status Quo Bias model can explain both the findings that status quo bias is more prevalent in larger choice sets and that the introduction of a status quo can change choices between non-status quo alternatives. Existing models of status quo bias are inconsistent with the former finding while models of decision avoidance are inconsistent with the latter. We show that the interaction of the two effects has important economic implications, and report the results of laboratory experiments which show that both attention and psychological constraints are necessary to explain the impact of status quo on choice.

Understanding the reference effect

This paper explores how a change in a default—specifically, an exogenously given reference point—affects individual preferences. While reference dependence is extensively studied, very little is known regarding the impact of reference points on individual choice behavior when the reference points themselves are not chosen (Reference Effect). We identify critical properties that differentiate between classes of reference-dependent models and test them. We find that the reference effect exists for asymmetrically dominated reference points, but we do not see any evidence of a reference effect for symmetrically dominated reference points. Some of the existing models are mostly consistent with our data but lack predictive power. None of the models offers the particular predictions that our experiment suggests. Finally, we also tease apart the differences between the reference effect and the asymmetric dominance effect (decoy effect), a well-known phenomenon observed in the literature on context-dependent choice.