Yuval Feldman

Social Norms, Self-Interest and Ambiguity of Legal Norms: An Experimental Analysis of the Rule vs. Standard Dilemma

The influence of social norms on the willingness to obey legal norms depends on contingencies that have not been investigated. Theoretical, behavioral, and experimental considerations investigated in this paper establish the differential behavioral effects of legal rules and standards. The findings of experiments conducted by us indicate that in the absence of information concerning social norms, rules and standards have similar effects on compliance. In contrast, rules and standards have differential effects on compliance when they interact with social norms. Furthermore, it was found that social norms of noncompliance had a much greater effect than social norms of compliance. A second study demonstrated a similar relationship between self-interest and legal ambiguity, corroborating the theoretical mechanisms we have argued for, based on the findings of the first study. The implications of these findings to legal policy-making are discussed.

The Misperception of Norms: The Psychology of Bias and the Economics of Equilibrium

This study combines the psychology of bias and the economics of equilibrium. We focus on two of the most discussed perceptual biases found by psychologists who studied the role social norms in ethical decision making. First, psychologists found a general tendency of people to over-estimate how many other people engage in unethical behavior. We show that this bias causes more people to violate the norm than if the bias were corrected. Second, psychologists found a general tendency of a person to over-estimate how many other people act the same as he does. We show that this bias does not change the number of people who violate the norm, contrary to the predictions of some psychologists. When a person suffers from both biases, they can augment or undermine each other. In either case, we show that supplying accurate information will cause more people to conform to the norm. In general, we show that applying the equilibrium concept to psychological studies improves public policy recommendations by increasing precision in predicting aggregate behavior over time.

Motivating Environmental Action in a Pluralistic Regulatory Environment

In designing a recycling policy, the regulator must choose between multiple instruments. Our study seeks to address the linkage between the choice of regulatory instruments and institutional frameworks, people’s intrinsic motivation, and various attitudinal measures. We examined the behavioral repercussions of several instruments that are used widely in recycling regulation, using an experimental survey on a representative sample of the Israeli population (n=1,800 participants). Our findings suggest that the design of recycling policies should be sensitive to the framing effects of varied regulatory instruments and to the interplay between intrinsic and extrinsic motivation on the desirability and efficacy of the law. In particular, we pointed out the potential regulatory advantage of using deposit schemes over other instruments and of using private organizations as regulatory agents. Drawing on these findings, we discuss the potential value of using differentiated regulatory policies to provide incentives for recycling in societies characterized by broad heterogeneity in levels of intrinsic motivation.

Individuals as Enforcers: The Design of Employee Reporting Systems

This chapter presents a unique perspective on whistleblowing, combining behavioral and organizational perspectives of employee motivation to engage in social enforcement. The chapter is based on a series of experimental studies conducted by the collaborators. In our studies, we analyze the interactions among several types of factors. First, we describe cultural differences and the ways a country’s attitude and history affect decisions to blow the whistle. Second, we systemically show complex motivations in the decision to report misconduct, including both intrinsic and extrinsic factors. Third, our experiments provide unique insights about the design of the law and the various incentives it can offer to support social enforcement. The studies improve our understanding of the costs and benefits of different regulatory systems and the inadvertent counterproductive effects of certain legal incentives. Based on these studies, the chapter explores the comparative advantages of various incentive structures and aim for a better fit between regulatory design and organizational and individual motivation, not only in compliance as many of the other chapters in this volume suggest but also in reporting the incompliance of others.

The Human Mind and Human Rights: A Call for an Integrative Study of the Mechanisms Generating Employment Discrimination Across Different Social Categories

Abstract The paper highlights how our knowledge about the manner the human mind works and people behave in social interactions may contribute to our understanding of employment discrimination and provide effective ways to address it. It calls for a rigorous empirical study of the mechanisms generating different forms of discrimination against disadvantaged groups and the implications that follow for law and policy. The paper’s focus is theoretical, criticizing the current state of research on employment discrimination and calling for an integrative approach to the research in this area. In particular, the paper criticizes the lack of mutual communication among the various disciplines that study discrimination. Over-reliance on one type of methodology limits scholars’ ability to address nuances of most discriminatory settings. We criticize the “one policy fits all” approach, in which discrimination against all types of disadvantaged groups is viewed as capturing all types of discrimination as well as the lack of truly accounting for the interplay between deliberative and automatic modes of reasoning. The paper suggests that adopting an integrative perspective would raise awareness among policy-makers and employers to variations in the effects of social categories on hiring, promotion, and firing practices.

Behavioral Trade-Offs: Beyond the Land of Nudges Spans the World of Law and Psychology

The purpose of this chapter is to illuminate the breadth and potential of behaviorally informed legal policy. We argue that currently policy approaches that encompass behavioral insights often overlook a fuller picture of psychology. A narrow approach limits the successful integration of behavioural insights into the legal system. This chapter suggests ways to move toward harmonization between the various law and psychology schools of thought. The need for such harmonization stems not only from the independent development of each strand, absent, for the most part, coherent integration and exchange, but also because this lack of awareness of the insights developed in related areas of law and psychology may lead to very limited and sometimes inadvertent policy recommendations. To meet this challenge, the paper suggests the need to balance some of the tensions which emerge from different aspects of psychology into a proposed framework of behavioural trade-offs. In particular we will focus in this chapter on taxonomy with four main trade-offs. Outcome vs. Process; Invisible vs. Expressive Law; Trusting vs. Monitoring; and Universal vs. Targeted Nudging. By demonstrating how actual policy concerns could be better understood by accounting for these trade-offs, the chapter will contribute to a more informed and nuanced path of EU behavioural-based legal policy.

Are All Types of Discrimination Created Equal

Are all types of discrimination created equal? This project takes an experimental approach to disentangle the different mechanisms generating discrimination. We let a large random sample of the Israeli Jewish population play four games with fictitious partners who belong to one of the following social groups: Women, Arabs, ultra-Orthodox Jews, Mizrahi Jews, and Ashkenazi Jews. A ‘dictator game’ was used to investigate negative emotions of dislike; a ‘trust game’ was used to explore mistrust; a ‘competence game’ was used to explore beliefs about competence and intelligence; and a ‘donation game’ was used to investigate beliefs about moral entitlement. Above and beyond of all of the other social groups, Arabs were found to be the most discriminated against group, across all of the domains measured in the different games. Ultra-Orthodox Jews were discriminated against in the dictator game, but were favored in the trust game, suggesting that they are disliked but viewed as trustworthy. Women were generally favored, compared to men, across all games. Mizrahi Jews were not discriminated against in the dictator game, but were given less money by Jewish men in the trust game. This suggests that Mizrahi Jews are not disliked, but are rather viewed as not trustworthy by Jewish men. Our findings suggest that although in many countries, anti-discrimination laws apply a unified approach to eliminate all forms of ethnic, gender, and religious-based discrimination, in reality, because each form of discrimination is generated by different mechanisms, no one policy fits all. Thus, our project makes two main contributions to the empirical study of anti-discrimination law: First, we offer an innovative methodology to disentangle the different mechanisms generating discrimination that could enable policymakers to design more accurate anti-discrimination laws. Second, we document differences in the types of discrimination targeted at different social groups in Israel – a poster child of heterogeneous and segmented societies.

An Experimental Analysis of the Effect of Specificity on Compliance and Performance

Legal directives, whether laws, regulations, or contractual provisions, can be written along a spectrum of specificity, about which behavioral and legal scholarship present conflicting views. We hypothesized that the combination of specificity and monitoring promotes compliance but harms performance and trust, whereas the combination of specificity and good faith enhances both the informative goal-setting aspects of specificity and people’s sense of commitment. To test these hypotheses, we used a 2x2x2 experimental design in which participants were instructed to edit a document, either with general or detailed instructions, either with a reference to good faith or without it, and either with monitoring or without it. Participants could engage in various levels and kinds of editing, allowing us to measure distinctly both compliance and performance. When participants require information and guidance, as in the case of editing, we found that specificity increases performance relative to the vague standard condition. We discuss the characteristics of the regulatory frameworks in which our findings are especially relevant.

Blinding the Law: The Potential Virtue of Legal Uncertainty∗

In legal scholarship, it is almost self-evident that “certainty” is an advantage for regulation. “Uncertainty,” on the other hand, is usually viewed as an inevitable by-product of vague legal standards that may be justified by the prohibitive cost of creating bright-line rules or by the inability of the legislature to account ex ante for the complexity of a particular situation. This article challenges the conventional view and proclaims the advantages of legal uncertainty.In legal scholarship, it is almost self-evident that “certainty” is an advantage for regulation. “Uncertainty,” on the other hand, is usually viewed as an inevitable by-product of vague legal standards that may be justified by the prohibitive cost of creating bright-line rules or by the inability of the legislature to account ex ante for the complexity of a particular situation. This article challenges the conventional view and proclaims the advantages of legal uncertainty. It recognizes some of the drawbacks that may arise due to uncertainty and hence illustrates several refinements and limitations regarding the use of a “veil of uncertainty” mechanism to improve its potential benefits for lawmakers.

Combating biased decisionmaking & promoting justice & equal treatment

This article draws on the behavioral science literature to offer empirically driven policy prescriptions that can reduce the effect of bias and ameliorate unequal treatment in policing, the criminal justice system, employment, and national security.