Zeno G. Swijtink

A Bayesian Argument in Favor of Randomization

Randomization is a generally accepted principle of sound experimental design and common practice among working scientists. But Bayesian statisticians reject it, most often because of decision theoretic argument against randomization. I trace it back to Abraham Walds Theory of Inductive Behavior and argue that Bayesians should concur with Ronald Fishers criticism of Walds analysis of randomization. The paper ends with a Bayesian argument in favor of randomization: randomization can lead to an increase in expected utility.

Theory of the Apparatus and Theory of the Phenomena: The Case of Low Dose Electron Microscopy

In this paper I give a Bayesian criterion for when an experiment is a test of the theory of the apparatus, rather than a test of the theory of the phenomena, and describe strategies used to ensure that tests of the theory of the phenomena are possible. I extend this framework to low dose electron microscopy which has a stochastic instrument theory and which provides an exception to a thesis by Robert Ackermann on the independence between theory and instrumentation.