Zhonglan Dai

Executive Pay-Performance-Sensitivity and Litigation

Although the standard principal-agent model predicts a negative relation between incentive strength (i.e., pay-performance-sensitivity or PPS) and firm risk, the empirical evidence is mixed (Prendergast, 2002). This study revisits this prediction. Using carefully selected litigation events to conduct a comparative static analysis, we show that firm risk, post lawsuit filing, increases by about 11% for our sample. We then document that the incremental PPS (measured by the correlation between executive’s annual compensation and shareholders’ wealth) drops after the company is sued, although the total value of compensation remains relatively unchanged. Once a lawsuit case is closed, we find that both firm risk and the incremental PPS revert back (risk goes down and incremental PPS goes up). Finally, we use the instrumental variable approach to test the relation between PPS level (measured by the sensitivity between executive’s wealth and shareholders’ wealth) and firm risk directly, and again find that, cross-sectionally, firm risk is negatively correlated with PPS level. Our evidences suggest that the standard principal-agent model prediction holds well and that executive’s incentives are indeed negatively related to firm risk.

Are U.S. Family Firms Subject to Agency Problems? Evidence from CEO Turnover and Firm Valuation

This paper investigates the impact of the founding familys presence in US public firms on the extent of agency problems related to CEO turnover decisions and on firm valuations after poor performance. In particular, we focus on three types of US public firms: family CEO firms, professional CEO family firms (family firms managed by a hired CEO outside the founding family), and non-family firms. We hypothesize that, the agency problem arising from the expropriation of small shareholders by large shareholders in family CEO firms and the agency problem arising from the separation of ownership and control in non-family firms, lead to a lower CEO turnover-performance sensitivity, compared to professional CEO family firms. Professional CEO family firms are subject to lesser agency problems due to the separation of family ownership and management as well as the founding familys effective monitoring of management. The empirical findings are consistent with our prediction. We further hypothesize and find that the more severe agency problems in both family CEO firms and non-family firms manifest themselves in lower firm value after poor performance, relative to professional CEO family firms. Overall, our results indicate that in the CEO turnover setting, family ownership, when separated from management, can mitigate agency problems as in professional CEO family firm, but when combined with management, can aggravate agency problems as in family CEO firms.

Capital Gains Taxes and the Risk-Return Tradeoff

We derive cross-sectional implications of a capital gains tax rate change on the risk-return tradeoff on stock investment and show that stocks with higher accrued capital gains experience a larger risk-return tradeoff improvement after a capital gains tax rate cut. Stocks with higher dividend yields experience a larger increase (decrease) in the risk-return tradeoff when the dividend tax penalty effect dominates (is dominated by) the effect of reduced dividend yield associated with the capital gains tax cut. Studying both the Tax Relief Act of 1997 and the Revenue Act of 1978, we find stocks with higher accrued capital gains experienced larger increases in the expected return, the systematic risk, and the risk-return tradeoff after the capital gains tax cut. Stocks with higher dividend yields experienced larger decreases in the risk-return tradeoff, suggesting that the reduction in dividend yield associated with the capital gains tax cut may have dominated the dividend tax penalty effect.