A. F. K. Organski

The Paradoxical Nature of State Making: The Violent Creation of Order

The central argument of this paper is developed as a criticism of a widely accepted interpretation of collective violence in new states. It is shown that instead of indicating political decay, violence in these states is an integral part of the process of accumulation of power by the national state. To the degree that this power accumulation is necessary for the imposition or maintenance of order, collective violence also indicates movement towards political order on a new scale. Admittedly, our evidence is far from definitive. Nevertheless, it consistently contradicts the interpretation of violence as political decay and supports our interpretation of violence as a usual feature of the process of primitive accumulation of power.

The end of hegemony

This study challenges the notion that the United States is a declining hegemon, or that the Western regime is in peril. Comparisons of economic output, trade, and power statistics indicate that the United States continues to hold a more favorable position than previous hegemons did at comparable periods in the trajectory of their rule in relation to both its allies and opponents. Most important, indicators of power (unlike economic indicators) suggest the power distribution in the world order has varied little since World War II and continues to insure American dominance. The preception of a withering American hegemony is a trendy but inaccurate assessment of our time.

The tug of war over the status of Jerusalem: Leaders, strategies and outcomes

This analysis of the Middle East negotiations on Jerusalem has two purposes. First it forecasts and analyzes the potential settlement over the future status of Jerusalem. Second it uses this issue to examine whether political leadership or coalitional structures play the major role in determining political outcomes. The analyses conclude that coalitional politics have a significant impact on the nature and stability of negotiated outcomes, while political leadership plays only a minor role. Specifically, under Rabin and Peres, a stable arrangement over Jerusalems future was expected. Jerusalem would remain under Israeli control, and this with the agreement of Arafat and the Palestinian National Authority. Under Netanyahu, Israel continues to control Jerusalem, but now with the bitter opposition of all Palestinian forces. Indeed, the analysis shows that even after Netanyahu and other key Israeli actors become willing to make dramatic concessions, no peaceful settlement over the citys future remains possible.

Political Determinants of Population Dynamics

The article suggests that the massive transformation of the political system often referred to as “political development” is responsible for the movement from high to low birth-and death rates in national populations. The effect of the changing political system is independent of (and in addition to) the effects of socioeconomic changes previously presented in the theory of demographic demographic transition. The article reports first the nature of the systematic connection between change in the political system on the one hand and change in vital rates on the other. Second, it presents a new empirical measure of the capacity and effectiveness of whole political systems.

Coalitions and Conflict: the Case of the Palestinian-Israeli Negotiations Over the West Bank

This paper examines the relative influence of leaders and coalitions in the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations over the West Bank. It uses an Expected Utiliiy model in conjunction with empirical analysis of the negotiations from 1993 to 2000 to consider how the leadership and coalition changes affected the potemial settlements under Rabin, Peres, Netanyahu. and Barak. It draws two important conclusions: First, negotiations are better understood as the outcome of the domestic struggles between moderates and radicals on each side than as the simple interplay between leaders and their coalitions on both sides. In the case at hand, the domestic struggle between moderate and radical Israelis over their negotiating position and the similar struggle between moderate and radical Palestinians has affected the course of negotiations more than the personal preferences and coalitions of each subsequent Israeli administration. Thus, although Barak and Rabin had very similar preferences and coalitions, the course of negotiations under these administrations differed dramatically. Second, the analysis suggests that right wing governments may make significant progress in negotiations, particularly when their negotiating partner is committed to the pracess. Ironically, had he remained in power. Netanyalru would likely have come to a settlement, gaining more Palestinian concessions than his Labor counierparts. Empirical evidence from the course of negotiations supports the models findings.

Higher Taxes, Lower Birthrates?@@@Births, Deaths and Taxes: The Demographic and Political Transitions

This book is concerned with the relationship between political change and demographic change. In particular the authors attempt to identify how political changes affect patterns of fertility and mortality and they maintain that the growth in government power as measured by increases in taxation has a direct influence on the number of children born and the number of people dying in a given population. According to this hypothesis the larger the scale of government the lower the rate of childbearing and the lower the rate of mortality. Consideration is also given to the relative capacity of different political systems to effect demographic change. The concept of the demographic transition is first outlined. Next the authors describe their theory concerning how expansion of the political system affects vital rates. The hypothesis is then tested using data for 90 underdeveloped developing and developed countries over the period 1950-1975. Consideration is given to whether countries can accelerate existing trends in fertility and whether they can raise fertility when it has fallen to undesirable levels.