Jacek Kugler

Power Parity, Democracy, and the Severity of Internal Violence:

This study applies insights from the power parity and the democratic peace perspectives to the issue of internal political violence. These two international relations perspectives translate well to the domain of domestic politics. Relative parity of resources between the government and the opposition are shown to lead to higher levels of violence. Democratic countries with highly competitive and participatory institutions are able to mitigate violent conflict within their borders. Efficient governments preserve domestic peace regardless of institutional format. Results of the study suggest that violence is generated by similar changes in both domestic and world politics.

Political Capacity and Economic Behavior

* Introduction Marina Arbetman and Jacek Kugler. The Concept Of Political Capacity * Relative Political Capacity: Political Extraction and Political Reach J. Kugler and M. Arbetman. * Theoretical Link of Political Capacity to Development A.F.K. Organski. Economic Applications * Political Capacity and Economic Determinants of Inflation Fahim Al-Marhubi. * Political Capacity and the Use of Seigniorage Lorena Alcazar. * Political Capacity and Private Investment Yi Feng and Baizhu Chen. * Political Capacity and Economic Growth David A. Leblang. * Political Capacity, Macroeconomic Factors, and Capital Flows Slamet Seno Adji, Y. S. Ahn, Cheryl M. Holsey, and Thomas D. Willett. * Political Capacity and Black Market Premiums M. Arbetman and Dipak Ghosh. Political Applications * Political Capacity and Government Resource Transfers Daniel E. Ponder. * Political Capacity and Demographic Change M. Arbetman, J. Kugler, and A.F.K. Organski. * Political Capacity and Violence J. Kugler, Michelle Benson, Andy Hira, and Dimitry Panasevich. * Political Capacity, Growth, and Distributive Commitments Lewis W. Snider. Extending Political Capacity * Political Capacity and the Economic Frontier John H.Y. Edwards. * New Estimates of Political Capacity C. M. Holsey and Ling Cao. * Alternative Approaches to Estimating Political Capacity T. D. Willett. * The Unfinished Agenda J. Kugler and M. Arbetman.

The Politics of Fertility and Economic Development

This paper presents a formal model that characterizes the two faces of development—persistent poverty, and industrialization and rising incomes—and establishes that the interaction between politics and economics determines which path a nation travels. We demonstrate that political factors affect fertility decisions so that a one-time disturbance compounds across generations, impacting a countrys entire development trajectory. Modeling strategic multiobjective policy-setting by the government, we derive a new concept of political capacity and prove that a sufficient amount of political capacity is necessary to escape a poverty trap and develop the economy. Empirical tests for a sample of 100 countries from 1960 to 1990 provide strong support for the predictions of the formal model. In particular, we show that both political stability and political capacity significantly influence birth rates. We conclude that politics can be either a stimulant or a barrier to economic development.

Comparing the Strength of Nations

The political capacity of advanced societies is measured. We show that politically capable governments can mobilize vast resources from the society under the stress of war, but totalitarian, democratic and authoritarian regimes do not determine the level of performance. The absolute political capacity of rich nations is higher than that of poorer ones, but surprisingly, poor nations can increase their political capacity more effectively under stress. Finally, Power, constructed by combining total resources with the political capacity of governments, is used to postdict accurately the outcome of major wars since 1900.

Terror without Deterrence

Nuclear deterrence may be a useful political strategy, but it may not provide an effective empirical description of the behavior of nations faced with the prospect of major war. This evaluation is based on two tests. Empirical analysis of extreme crises since 1945 fails to detect substantial changes in interaction between nuclear and non-nuclear nations. Further, there is no evidence that nuclear weapons have added stability to the relation between the three nuclear giants. The terror created by nuclear devastation cannot, in sum, be directly linked to the preservation of peace.

Politics and Power

P in PMESII stands for Political. Perhaps P was placed first merely to make the acronym easier to pronounce. However, more likely P’s position of prominence was intended to signify its relative importance in international affairs.

From War to Integration: Generalizing Power Transition Theory

Generalizing the dynamics implied by power transition theory, we characterize the structural conditions that lead nations to initiate conflict or choose to integrate. The relationship between changes in relative power, hierarchical structures, and joint satisfaction are used to identify the structural conditions for conflict and cooperation. Empirical tests for the last two centuries confirm the strength and robustness of this characterization. In addition, long term assessments of Pax Britannica, the Cold War, and Chinas potential challenge to the United States in this century are used to illustrate the precision of these findings. The fundamental implication is that structural conditions provide the preconditions for conflict and cooperation, but decision makers have leeway in advancing policies that eventually lead to either war or peace.

Immigration, fertility, and growth

Abstract This paper develops an open economy theory of endogenous growth in which agents make fertility and migration choices that affect the rate of transmission of human capital from parents to children. The model produces both a poverty trap as well as a common balanced growth path, and shows that immigration has quite different implications for developing and developed countries. Developing countries may undergo a temporary or permanent output contraction and a widening of the income distribution due to immigration. Developed countries receiving immigrants may have a temporary drop in wages for native workers, but then return to balanced growth.

The long‐term stability of deterrence

In this article, we construct a model of deterrence that specifically integrates both systemic and decision‐making variables. After contrasting its underlying structure with more standard views of the deterrence relationship, we demonstrate the logical consistency of the power transition model with the expected utility framework. The model we develop combines and extends the insights of each of these two approaches, thereby permitting us to develop a theory of the necessary and sufficient conditions of major power war and conflict initiation. In other words, for the first time, we are able to specify, precisely, the theoretical consequences of variations in power dynamics, evaluations of the status quo, salience, and attitudes toward risk. As theories of the necessary conditions for international conflict, neither the power transition theory nor the expected utility model provide this information. Thus, by combining and then extending these two frameworks, we merely refine propositions implicit in each of...

Exploring the “Phoenix Factor†with the Collective Goods Perspective

This inquiry explores whether domestic political and economic levels of destruction account for the ability of developed nations to recover within two decades from the massive economic losses they suffer in the wake of a war. We test Olsons collective goods argument that nations defeated in war, the political structures and distributional coalitions of which are also devastated, will thereby increase economic competition and accelerate economic recovery. We also tangentially explore the impact of the economic devastation on postwar recovery. Our results show that economic destruction has a positive impact on the rates of recovery, but that the destruction of political structures does not add to that explanation. We conclude, somewhat reluctantly, that Olsons persuasive collective goods argument does not explain the well-established difference in the postwar recovery among victors and vanquished.