A.F.M. van Knippenberg

Seeing one thing and doing another : Contrast effects in automatic behavior

Research on automatic behavior demonstrates the ability of stereotypes to elicit stereotype-consistent behavior. Social judgment research proposes that whereas traits and stereotypes elicit assimilation, priming of exemplars can elicit judgmental contrast by evoking social comparisons. This research extends these findings by showing that priming exemplars can elicit behavioral contrast by evoking a social comparison. In Study 1, priming professor or supermodel stereotypes led, respectively, to more and fewer correct answers on a knowledge test (behavioral assimilation), but priming exemplars of these categories led to the reverse pattern (behavioral contrast). In Study 2, participants walked away faster after being primed with an elderly exemplar. In Study 3, the proposition that contrast effects reflect comparisons of the self with the exemplar was supported.

Literal and symbolic immortality: The effect of evidence of literal immortality on self-esteem striving in response to mortality salience

Three studies investigated the effect of encouraging participants to believe in an afterlife on the relationship between mortality salience and self-esteem striving. Participants were exposed to essays arguing either in favor of or against the existence of an afterlife, and reminded about death or a control topic. Mortality salience led to increased accuracy ratings of a positive personality description (Studies 1 and 2) and increased striving for and defense of values (Study 3) among participants who read the essay arguing against an afterlife, but not among participants who read the essay in favor of it. The implications for the terror management analysis of self-esteem, the appeal of immortality beliefs, and the interplay between self-esteem striving and spiritual pursuits are discussed.

When stereotypes get in the way: Stereotypes obstruct stereotype-inconsistent trait inferences

There is a growing body of evidence indicating that people spontaneously make trait inferences while observing the behavior of others. The present article reports a series of 5 experiments that examined the influence of stereotypes on the spontaneous inference of traits. Results consistently showed weaker spontaneous trait inferences for stereotype-inconsistent behavioral information than for stereotype-consistent and stereotype-neutral information. Taken together, the current results suggest that specific spontaneous trait inferences become obstructed by inhibitory processes when behavior is inconsistent with an already activated stereotype. These findings are discussed in relation to stereotype maintenance processes and recent models of attribution in social judgment.

Processing attitude statements from in-group and out-group members: Effects of within-group and within-person inconsistencies on reading times

The authors examined reading times of attitude statements made by group members as a function of consistency of statements with stereotypic expectancies (between-member) and consistency of statements with other statements from the same member (within-member). Stereotype-inconsistent statements were studied longer than consistent statements only when the target group was an outgroup or when subjects were instructed to focus on the group as a whole. Results suggested that the out-group was perceived as a single homogeneous whole regardless of experimental instructions. Inconsistencies within individual group members instigated the longest reading times. This effect was stronger for inconsistencies within out-group members than within in-group members, suggesting that subjects not only expected more within-group variability in in-groups than in out-groups, but they also expected more within-person variability.

Biased allocation of faces to social categories

Three studies show that social categorization is biased at the level of category allocation. In all studies, participants categorized faces. In Studies 1 and 2, participants overallocated faces with criminal features--a stereotypical negative trait--to the stigmatized Moroccan category, especially if they were prejudiced. On the contrary, the stereotype-irrelevant negative trait stupid did not lead to overallocation to the Moroccan category. In Study 3, using the stigmatized category homosexual, the previously used negative trait criminal--irrelevant to the homosexual stereotype--did not lead to overallocation, but the stereotype-relevant positive trait femininity did. These results demonstrate that normative fit is higher for faces with stereotype-relevant features regardless of valence. Moreover, individual differences in implicit prejudice predicted the extent to which stereotype-relevant traits elicited overallocation: Whereas more negatively prejudiced people showed greater overallocation of faces associated with negative stereotype-relevant traits, they showed less overallocation of faces associated with positive stereotype-relevant traits. These results support our normative fit hypothesis: In general, normative fit is better for faces with stereotypical features. Moreover, normative fit is enhanced for prejudiced individuals when these features are evaluatively congruent. Social categorization thus may be biased in itself.

Newell and Shanks' approach to psychology is a dead end

Newell & Shanks (N&S) criticize theories on decision making that include unconscious processes. To the extent that their own perspective becomes apparent, however, it is dated, implausible, and at odds with the major developments of the past decades. Their conclusions are, at least for research areas we feel entitled to evaluate, based on a biased sampling of the literature.

The effects of group membership and social context on information organization.

Self-categorization theory posits that the perception of group members is flexible and determined by the comparative social context as well as by group membership. Subjects read about either four ingroup or outgroup target persons in the context of four additional stimulus persons who were members of either the same group as the target persons (intragroup context) or the other group (intergroup context). Individualized and attribute-wise information organization was assessed on the basis of information clustering in free recall. As predicted, differential processing of ingroup information occurred as a function of the salient social context; in an intragroup context, ingroup information was organized significantly more by person than in an intergroup context. Conversely, ingroup information tended to be clustered more by attribute in an intergroup than in an intragroup context. Clustering of outgroup information was not sensitive to changes in the social context. The results indicate that the perception of group members may be based on more than group membership alone. ©1997 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

The asymmetrical perception of men and women

This study examines the individuation versus categorization of men and women. Several researchers have argued for structural status differences between men and women - men occupy societal positions of high status, and women positions of low status. This line of research predicts that male participants will individuate other men, but categorize women. Conversely, female participants will individuate men as well as women. In the present study, male and female participants were presented with eight stimulus persons, four men and four women, each described by four attributes. In addition, stimulus-category fit was manipulated such that the attributes were either stereotypical of the gender group they described or gender neutral. Information clustering in free recall and name-matching were main dependent measures. The results support the hypotheses and are discussed in terms of status differentials and contemporary theories of person perception.

Socially anxious individuals discriminate better between angry and neutral faces, particularly when using low spatial frequency information

BACKGROUND AND OBJECTIVES Social anxiety is associated with biased processing of threatening faces. Earlier research indicated that socially anxious individuals are biased towards processing low spatial frequency (LSF) information when judging facial expressions. However, it remains unclear whether this bias reflects better performance for LSF-information, worse performance for high spatial frequency (HSF) information that needs to be compensated for, or both. METHODS To answer this question, we used frequency-filtered neutral and angry face stimuli in a speeded classification task to compare the performance of socially anxious and non-anxious individuals for different spatial frequency bands. RESULTS Across all spatial frequency bands, socially anxious individuals were faster in judging facial expressions. Importantly, this performance advantage was larger for LSF-filtered stimuli and most pronounced for those stimuli with the lowest frequency band. Analyzing inverse efficiency scores showed the same pattern, ruling out speed-accuracy trade-off differences between groups. LIMITATIONS The study uses rather artificial (bandpass-filtered) stimuli and is limited towards contrasting the discrimination of neutral and angry faces. Further, only participants with subclinical anxiety were part of the study, so clinical relevance remains to be shown. CONCLUSIONS Our results show that social anxiety is not characterized by deficits in judging emotions from HSF-information, but by advantages when processing LSF-information.

Disgust and fear lower olfactory threshold

Odors provide information regarding the chemical properties of potential environment hazards. Some of this information may be disgust-related (e.g., organic decay), whereas other information may be fear-related (e.g., smoke). Many studies have focused on how disgust and fear, as prototypical avoidant emotions, facilitate the detection of possible threats, but these studies have typically confined to the visual modality. Here, we examine how disgust and fear influence olfactory detection at a particular level-the level at which a subliminal olfactory stimulus crosses into conscious perception, also known as a detection threshold. Here, using psychophysical methods that allow us to test perceptual capabilities directly, we show that one way that disgust (Experiments 1-3) and fear (Experiment 3) facilitate detection is by lowering the amount of physical input that is needed to trigger a conscious experience of that input. This effect is particularly strong among individuals with high disgust sensitivity (Experiments 2-3). Our research suggests that a fundamental way in which avoidant emotions foster threat detection is through lowering perceptual thresholds. (PsycINFO Database Record