A.P.M. Krouwel

A Good Sport? Research into the Capacity of Recreational Sport to Integrate Dutch Minorities

Since the rise of a right-wing populist movement in 2002, the issue of the ‘unsuccessful’ integration of ethnic minorities is at the centre of Dutch public debate. The quest for promising social spheres to bridge gaps between the autochthonous Dutch population and minority groups has brought recreational sport to the political agenda. Sport participation is widely advocated as an effective and unproblematic way for interethnic contact and socialization. In this article we report on two studies conducted in the city of Rotterdam to test these assumptions. One study, focusing on motivations to participate in sport, showed that among participants meeting different people is less valued than expected, especially among marginalized migrant-groups who primarily want to confirm their ethnic identity through homogeneous sport activities. Further research on sport encounters between different ethnic groups made it clear that, particularly in soccer, these encounters frequently result in aggression and can seldom be labelled as trouble-free contact. This can be explained as much by the aggressive elements of the game itself as by the fact that inter-ethnic tensions from other social spheres are imported and even magnified in these sports activities. In sum, although recreational sport (such as soccer) might seem ideal for meaningful cultural crossovers, in practice ethnic differences are reinforced in this sphere instead of bridged.

Political extremism predicts belief in conspiracy theories

Historical records suggest that the political extremes—at both the “left” and the “right”—substantially endorsed conspiracy beliefs about other-minded groups. The present contribution empirically tests whether extreme political ideologies, at either side of the political spectrum, are positively associated with an increased tendency to believe in conspiracy theories. Four studies conducted in the United States and the Netherlands revealed a quadratic relationship between strength of political ideology and conspiracy beliefs about various political issues. Moreover, participants’ belief in simple political solutions to societal problems mediated conspiracy beliefs among both left- and right-wing extremists. Finally, the effects described here were not attributable to general attitude extremity. Our conclusion is that political extremism and conspiracy beliefs are strongly associated due to a highly structured thinking style that is aimed at making sense of societal events.

A double-edged sword!: The Dutch centre-right and the 'foreigners issue'

We study the impact of the ‘foreigners issue’ on centre-right politics in the Netherlands. This issue concerns a complex of problems related to migration, asylum-seekers, nationalism, multiculturalism and European integration. The Dutch centre-right has moved towards hard-line and restrictive policies in these areas. By connecting issues of immigration to right-wing core issues of law and order, centre-right parties hope to win an electoral advantage and to find an answer to populist political entrepreneurs. However, the politicization of immigration issues is a double-edged sword. Centre-right parties can benefit since they own the law and order and nationalist issues. But hard-line right-wing stances on immigration and multiculturalism also go against core centre-right values and may scare away voters. Too harsh a law and order, nationalistic and anti-foreigner profile can rip the centre-right apart. The direction of Dutch immigration and integration policies partly depends on the type of solution the centre-right finds for this dilemma.

Do voters follow the recommendations of voter advice application websites? A study of the effects of kieskompas.nl on its users’ vote choices in the 2010 Dutch legislative elections:

In this article we investigate the electoral effects of a prominent Dutch Voter Advice Application site (www.kieskompas.nl). Our research design combines factual data on the recommendations received by users from the site’s log files with users’ responses to pre-advice and post-election survey items. We find that the effects of online recommendations on vote choice depend on the congruence of the recommended party with the users’ pre-existing preferences. When the site recommended a party that was being seriously contemplated by the user, the user was demonstrably more likely to go on to vote for the recommended party. We find that this effect was not visible among voters who indicated that they were only seriously considering one party for their vote choice when they visited the site.

Otto Kirchheimer and the catch-all party

Otto Kirchheimers conception of the catch-all party was part of his more comprehensive theory of party transformation, encompassing four interrelated political processes. By tracing the development of the catch-all thesis and placing it within the wider context of Kirchheimers complete work, it is possible to reconstruct a more precise understanding of what Kirchheimer meant by the catch-all concept, which itself remains highly contested. Kirchheimers anxiety about modern democracy originated with what he saw as the vanishing of principled opposition within parliament and society, and the reduction of politics to the mere management of the state. This leads to collusion of political parties and the state, severing of the societal links of party organisations, and erosion of the classic separation of powers. Vanishing opposition, cartelisation and professionalisation of politics pits citizens against a powerful state, which increases political cynicism and apathy. Kirchheimers comprehensive approach remains relevant to much of the contemporary debate about the transformation of Western political systems.

Fear Among the Extremes How Political Ideology Predicts Negative Emotions and Outgroup Derogation

The “rigidity of the right” hypothesis predicts that particularly the political right experiences fear and derogates outgroups. We propose that above and beyond that, the political extremes (at both sides of the spectrum) are more likely to display these responses than political moderates. Results of a large-scale sample reveal the predicted quadratic term on socio-economic fear. Moreover, although the political right is more likely to derogate the specific category of immigrants, we find a quadratic effect on derogation of a broad range of societal categories. Both extremes also experience stronger negative emotions about politics than politically moderate respondents. Finally, the quadratic effects on derogation of societal groups and negative political emotions were mediated by socio-economic fear, particularly among left- and right-wing extremists. It is concluded that negative emotions and outgroup derogation flourish among the extremes.

Beyond young, highly educated males: A typology of VAA users

Voting Advice Applications (VAAs) are Web tools that are used to inform increasing numbers of voters during elections. This increasing usage indicates that VAAs fulfill voters’ needs, but what these needs are is unknown. Previous research has shown that such tools are primarily used by young males and highly educated citizens. This suggests that VAAs are generally used by citizens who are already well-informed about politics and may not need the assistance of a VAA to make voting decisions. To analyze the functions that VAAs have for their users, this study utilizes unique user data from a popular Dutch VAA to identify different user types according to their cognitive characteristics and motivations. A latent class analysis (LCA) resulted in three distinct user types that vary in efficacy, vote certainty, and interest: doubters, checkers, and seekers. Each group uses the VAA for different reasons at different points in time. Seekers’ use of VAAs increases as Election Day approaches; less efficacious and less certain voters are more likely to use the tool to become informed.

The malaise of the squeezed middle: Challenging the narrative of the ‘left behind’ Brexiter:

The result of the referendum in the United Kingdom in 2016 to leave the European Union sparked much interest on the socio-economic characteristics of ‘Brexiters’. In this article, we challenge the popularized view of the Leave voter as an outsider and find that individuals from an intermediate class, whose malaise is due to a declining financial position, represent an important segment of the Brexit vote. We use individual-level data from a post-Brexit survey based on the British Election Study. Our analysis tests three predictive models. First, although our analysis confirms the negative association between education and Leave vote, we find that voting Leave is associated more with intermediate levels of education than with low or absent education, in particular in the presence of a perceived declining economic position. Secondly, we find that Brexiters hold distinct psycho-social features of malaise due to declining economic conditions, rather than anxiety or anger. Thirdly, our exploratory model finds voting Leave associated with self-identification as middle class, rather than with working class. We also find that intermediate levels of income were not more likely to vote for remain than low income groups. Overall our analysis of the Brexit vote underlines the importance of considering the political behaviour of the declining middle.

Power to the People? Rule Configurations and Power Games in Interactive Governance

Local public policymaking in the Netherlands is in a state of flux. After a historically low level of voter turnout in the local elections in 1990, numerous initiatives for policy renewal have emerged in an attempt to diminish the (perceived) legitimacy gap between local politicians and the electorate at large. One initiative, following a broader international trend (Dryzek, 1990; Mayer, 1997; Renn et al., 1995), is the introduction of new forms of public participation in public policymaking (Veldboer, 1996; Edelenbos and Monnikhof, 1998; 2001). Such new forms of citizen participation aim to involve citizens and other stakeholders in the early stages of policy development, where they can have an input into the problem defining process and the development of policy proposals. In earlier participation procedures, citizens were usually only involved after a decision was formally made.

Extreme Political Beliefs Predict Dogmatic Intolerance

Dogmatic intolerance—defined as a tendency to reject, and consider as inferior, any ideological belief that differs from one’s own—is often assumed to be more prominent at the political right than at the political left. In the present study, we make two novel contributions to this perspective. First, we show that dogmatic intolerance is stronger among left- and right-wing extremists than moderates in both the European Union (Study 1) as well as the United States (Study 2). Second, in Study 3, participants were randomly assigned to describe a strong or a weak political belief that they hold. Results revealed that compared to weak beliefs, strong beliefs elicited stronger dogmatic intolerance, which in turn was associated with willingness to protest, denial of free speech, and support for antisocial behavior. We conclude that independent of content, extreme political beliefs predict dogmatic intolerance.