Aaron Meskin

An objective counterfactual theory of information

We offer a novel theory of information that differs from traditional accounts in two respects: (i) it explains information in terms of counterfactuals rather than conditional probabilities, and (ii) it does not make essential reference to doxastic states of subjects, and consequently allows for the sort of objective, reductive explanations of various notions in epistemology and philosophy of mind that many have wanted from an account of information.

Aesthetic adjectives lack uniform behavior

Abstract The goal of this short paper is to show that esthetic adjectives—exemplified by “beautiful” and “elegant”—do not pattern stably on a range of linguistic diagnostics that have been used to taxonomize the gradability properties of adjectives. We argue that a plausible explanation for this puzzling data involves distinguishing two properties of gradable adjectives that have been frequently conflated: whether an adjective’s applicability is sensitive to a comparison class, and whether an adjective’s applicability is context-dependent.

Counterfactuals, Probabilities, and Information: Response to Critics

In earlier work we proposed an account of information grounded in counterfactual conditionals rather than probabilities, and argued that it might serve philosophical needs that more familiar probabilistic alternatives do not. Demir [2008] and Scarantino [2008] criticize the counterfactual approach by contending that its alleged advantages are illusory and that it fails to secure attractive desiderata. In this paper we defend the counterfactual account from these criticisms, and suggest that it remains a useful account of information.

Fiction and Fictional Worlds in Videogames

Are videogames fictions? Kendall Walton’s detailed account of fiction in Mimesis as Make-Believe is the most influential extant account of that category, and we begin this paper by arguing that it should be non-controversial that videogames count as fictions on Walton’s view. However, Grant Tavinor has recently argued that although videogames are fictions, the important Waltonian distinction between work worlds and game worlds breaks down in the case of videogames. We reject Tavinor’s claim and argue that the game/work world distinction is just as robust in the case of videogames as it is in other fictions. To show this we draw attention to two important ontological distinctions and use these to diagnose the errors we think Tavinor is making. Finally, we highlight some cases where there is a clear divergence between what is fictional in the work worlds and game worlds associated with particular videogames.

Philosophical aesthetics and cognitive science

Philosophical aesthetics is the branch of philosophy which explores issues having to do with art, beauty, and related phenomena. Philosophers have often been skeptical about the place of empirical investigation in aesthetics. However, in recent years many philosophical aestheticians have turned to cognitive science to enrich their understanding of their subject matter. Cognitive scientists have, in turn, been inspired by work in philosophical aesthetics. This essay focuses on a representative subset of the areas in which there has been fruitful dialog between philosophical aestheticians and cognitive scientists. We start with some general topics in philosophical aesthetics-the definition of art and the epistemic status of aesthetic judgments. We then move on to discussing research concerning the roles that imagination and perception play in our aesthetic engagement. We conclude with a discussion of the emerging field of experimental philosophical aesthetics. WIREs Cogn Sci 2018, 9:e1445. doi: 10.1002/wcs.1445 This article is categorized under: Philosophy > Value.