Jon Robson

A Mereological Challenge to Endurantism

In this paper, we argue that time travel is problematic for the endurantist. For it appears to be possible, given time travel, to construct a wall out of a single time travelling brick. This commits the endurantist to one of the following: (a) the wall is composed of the time travelling brick many times over; (b) the wall does not in fact exist at all; (c) the wall is identical to the brick. We argue that each of these options is unsatisfactory.

A social epistemology of aesthetics: : belief polarization, echo chambers and aesthetic judgement

How do we form aesthetic judgements? And how should we do so? According to a very prominent tradition in aesthetics it would be wrong to form our aesthetic judgements about a particular object on the basis of anything other than first-hand acquaintance with the object itself (or some very close surrogate) and, in particular, it would be wrong to form such judgements merely on the basis of testimony. Further this tradition presupposes that our actual practice of forming aesthetic judgements typically meets, or at least approximates, this ideal. In this paper I target this descriptive claim and argue—by appeal to some empirical work concerning belief polarization and echo chambers in aesthetics—that our actual practice of forming aesthetic judgements is heavily dependent on social sources such as testimony. I then briefly consider what normative implications this descriptive claim may have.

Fiction and Fictional Worlds in Videogames

Are videogames fictions? Kendall Walton’s detailed account of fiction in Mimesis as Make-Believe is the most influential extant account of that category, and we begin this paper by arguing that it should be non-controversial that videogames count as fictions on Walton’s view. However, Grant Tavinor has recently argued that although videogames are fictions, the important Waltonian distinction between work worlds and game worlds breaks down in the case of videogames. We reject Tavinor’s claim and argue that the game/work world distinction is just as robust in the case of videogames as it is in other fictions. To show this we draw attention to two important ontological distinctions and use these to diagnose the errors we think Tavinor is making. Finally, we highlight some cases where there is a clear divergence between what is fictional in the work worlds and game worlds associated with particular videogames.

Do possible worlds compromise God's beauty? A reply to Mark Ian Thomas Robson

In a recent article Mark Ian Thomas Robson argues that there is a clear contradiction between the view that possible worlds are a part of God’s nature and the theologically pivotal, but philosophically neglected, claim that God is perfectly beautiful. In this paper I show that Robson’s argument depends on several key assumptions which he fails to justify and as such that there is reason to doubt the soundness of his argument. I also demonstrate that if Robson’s argument were sound then this would be a problem for all classical theists and not just those who hold the possible worlds view.

Philosophical aesthetics and cognitive science

Philosophical aesthetics is the branch of philosophy which explores issues having to do with art, beauty, and related phenomena. Philosophers have often been skeptical about the place of empirical investigation in aesthetics. However, in recent years many philosophical aestheticians have turned to cognitive science to enrich their understanding of their subject matter. Cognitive scientists have, in turn, been inspired by work in philosophical aesthetics. This essay focuses on a representative subset of the areas in which there has been fruitful dialog between philosophical aestheticians and cognitive scientists. We start with some general topics in philosophical aesthetics-the definition of art and the epistemic status of aesthetic judgments. We then move on to discussing research concerning the roles that imagination and perception play in our aesthetic engagement. We conclude with a discussion of the emerging field of experimental philosophical aesthetics. WIREs Cogn Sci 2018, 9:e1445. doi: 10.1002/wcs.1445 This article is categorized under: Philosophy > Value.

Is Perception the Canonical Route to Aesthetic Judgment

ABSTRACT It is commonplace amongst philosophers of art to make claims that postulate important links between aesthetics and perception. In this paper, I focus on one such claim—that perception is the canonical route to aesthetic judgment. I consider a range of prima facie plausible interpretations of this claim, and argue that each fails to identify any important link between aesthetic judgment and perception. Given this, I conclude that we have good reason to be sceptical of the claim that perception is in any way privileged as a source of aesthetic judgment.

Religious fictionalism and the problem of evil

The problem of evil is typically presented as a problem – sometimes the problem – facing theistic realists. This article takes no stance on what effect (if any) the existence of evil has on the rationality of theistic belief. Instead, it explores the possibility of using the problem of evil to generate worries for some of those who reject theistic realism. Although this article focuses on the consequences for a particular kind of religious fictionalist, the lessons adduced are intended to have more general application.

Heidegger and Analytic Philosophy: Together at Last?

Heidegger has never been the darling of analytic philosophy. From Carnap’s (1931) dismissal of ‘the nothing noths’ and other remarks of Heidegger’s as paradigmatic examples of the kind of nonsense produced by disreputable metaphysicians to Simon Blackburn’s (2000) endorsement of, or at least sympathy for, the view of Heidegger as ‘a dismal windbag, whose influence has been completely disastrous, and whose affinity with the Nazis merely indicates the vacuum where, in most other philosophers, there would have been a combination of common sense and common decency’. Of course there are exceptions to this trend, Ryle’s (2009[1928]) review of Being and Time whilst frequently critical was also surprisingly sympathetic in places, and more recently a number of analytic metaphysicians – perhaps most prominently Kris McDaniel (2009, 2013) – have defended views with a distinctly Heideggerian flavour. Still, though, the prevailing attitude towards both the man and his work amongst those bearing the ‘analytic’ label has – on those rare occasions when they are considered at all – been one of either suspicion or outright hostility. It is no small task, then, which Joshua Tepley sets himself in his paper ‘Properties of Being in Heidegger’s Being and Time’ when he aims to remove ‘an impediment standing in the way of analytic philosophers taking Heidegger’s philosophy more seriously’ (2014, p. 477) and provide ‘a new opportunity for dialogue between Heideggerians and analytic philosophers’ (p. 462). In this paper I will briefly ask both whether he succeeds in this task and whether it is, ultimately, a task worth succeeding in. The majority of Tepley’s paper is spent outlining and defending a view which he terms ‘the Property Thesis’ according to which Heidegger’s talk of different kinds of being (or at least different ‘thick’ kinds of being) is best interpreted as being about different properties possessed by ‘the entities that have those kinds of being’ (p. 463). Tepley’s paper raises a number of interesting and important questions; most obviously the exegetical question of whether Tepley’s ‘Property Thesis’ is a correct interpretation of Heidegger’s view and the metaphysical question of whether, interpretive issues aside, the property view is an independently plausible account of the nature of the different kinds International Journal of Philosophical Studies, 2014 Vol. 22, No. 3, 482–487, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09672559.2014.913893