Abbas Milani

U.S. Foreign Policy and the Future of Democracy in Iran

The key to solving Irans nuclear problem is the fate of the countrys democratic movement. To assist this movement, a successful U.S. strategy must include these seven pillars and have the patience for the Tehran regime to collapse under its own inconsistencies.

Ending the assassination and oppression of Iranian nuclear scientists

Merely for working in their field of expertise, Iranian nuclear scientists face perils and pressures that are nothing less than Shakespearean. The question for them is, in a very real sense, “to be or not to be.” In the course of the last four decades, these scientists have faced intimidation and severe punishment, including prison terms, at the hands of their own government. In recent years, at least five Iranian nuclear scientists have been the target of assassination attempts often attributed to Israeli intelligence. Regardless of their source, all such threats against scientists are morally indefensible. They offend the scientific spirit, working against the free exchange of ideas that is necessary for humanity to advance. And in the final analysis, the authors assert, these threats against scientists in Iran undermine global peace, targeting experts whose international collaboration is required to deal effectively with the nuclear risks facing the world today. Simply put, killing nuclear scientists makes reducing the threat of nuclear war harder, not easier.

Obama's Existential Challenge to Ahmadinejad

Two countries, ‘‘both alike in dignity,’’ have for too long been the Capulets and Montagues of our days. Grudges like the 1979 hostage crisis and the U.S. role in the overthrow of the popular Mossadeq government in 1953, ill feelings stemming from the clerical regime’s nuclear program and help for organizations like Hezbollah, and the Bush administration’s ham-fisted policy of ‘‘regime change’’ have combined to make the Islamic Republic of Iran one of the most intractable challenges facing the United States. For thirty years, Iran has partially defined itself in opposition to the United States. The founder of the clerical regime, Ayatollah Rouhollah Mousavi Khomeini, called the United States the ‘‘Great Satan’’ and accused it of leading a crusade against the Islamic world. His successor, Ali Khamenei, has continued to rely on this incendiary rhetoric. For the regime, then, the presidency of Barak Hussein Obama offers something of a challenge. Barak is Arabic for Grace of God, and Hussein conjures the most important Imam of Shi‘ism, the dominant branch of Islam in Iran, and its ultimate martyr. Obama’s multi-racial, multi-cultural roots also defy the regime’s stereotypical description of the United States as an incorrigible land of racism and inequity. Long before the November election, President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad stated with his customary certitude that ‘‘they’’ will not allow a black man like Obama to become the president of the United States. A hint of Iran’s problem with the paradox of an African-American president can be found in the regime’s behavior in the first days of the 1979 hostage crisis. Khomeini tried to sell the occupation of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran as a gesture

Reading Reagan in Tehran: A Strategy of Realistic Engagement

On January 21, 2017, President Donald Trump and his new national security team will launch their foreign policy reviews. Along with China, Russia, and the Islamic State (IS), a review of U.S. policy toward Iran is sure to rank at the top of this list. Judging by what candidate Trump said, the Iran policy review could be quick and easy, and consist of one big change—tearing up the nuclear deal. On the campaign trail, Trump repeatedly called that agreement, known formally as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) between the P5+1 and Iran, “one of the worst deals ever made by any country in history.” He has promised to rip it up and return to a policy of isolation and confrontation against the Islamic Republic of Iran. Trump’s promised course of action would be a serious mistake. A return to a policy of total isolation and complete confrontation with Iran is neither wise nor possible. It is unwise because we already have witnessed the payoffs of engagement when combined with coercive diplomacy. When sanctions—including the active participation of Europe, China, and Russia—began to hurt the Iranian economy, even the most intransigent mullahs changed their minds, ignored then-President Ahmadinejad’s bombast about the insignificance of sanctions, and agreed to not only negotiate in good faith but directly with the United States. Eventually, they accepted a major rollback of their nuclear program. But pressure alone did not produce the agreement: engagement also played an essential role. If you are not talking, you cannot produce any agreements; it is just

After Khomeini: Iran under his Successor

After Khomeini: Iran under his Successor, Said Amir Arjomand, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009, ISBN 978-0-19-539179-4, 268pp. Clifford Geertz was arguably Americas most astute, acute and inf...