Michael McFaul

Transitions from Postcommunism

The years since 2000 have seen a surprising new wave of democratic breakthroughs in the postcommunist countries of Serbia, Georgia, and Ukraine. This article compares and contrasts these three cases, naming seven common factors which made the breakthroughs in these countries possible: 1) a semi-autocratic rather than fully autocratic regime; 2) an unpopular incumbent; 3) a united and organized opposition; 4) an ability quickly to drive home the point that voting results were falsified, 5) enough independent media to inform citizens about the falsified vote, 6) a political opposition capable of mobilizing tens of thousands or more demonstrators to protest electoral fraud, and 7) divisions among the regimes coercive forces.

A tale of two worlds: core and periphery in the post-cold war era

As the world moves away from the familiar bipolar cold war era, many international relations theorists have renewed an old debate about which is more stable: a world with two great powers or a world with many great powers. Based on the chief assumptions of structural realism—namely, that the international system is characterized by anarchy and that states are unitary actors seeking to survive in this anarchic system—some security analysts are predicting that a world of several great powers will lead to a return to the shifting alliances and instabilities of the multipolar era that existed prior to World War II. For instance, John Mearsheimer argues that “prediction[s] of peace in a multipolar Europe [are] flawed.†Thomas Christensen and Jack Snyder argue that states in a multipolar world can follow either the pre-World War I or the pre-World War II alliance pattern, thus implying that a third course is improbable. They further assert that “the fundamental, invariant structural feature, international anarchy, generally selects and socializes states to form balancing alignments in order to survive in the face of threats from aggressive competitors.†The realist argument predicts that great powers in a self-help international system will balance one another through arms races and alliance formations.

State Power, Institutional Change, and the Politics of Privatization in Russia

This article reviews recent events in Russia and demonstrates that future progress in developing private property rights will require not only sound economic policies but also more robust state institutions capable of carrying out economic transformation. In January 1992 Russias first postcommunist government launched a comprehensive economic program to transform the Soviet command system into a market economy. Privatization constituted one of the key components of this program. Two years later, however, privatization in Russia had failed to create real private property rights. By the summer of 1993 insiders had acquired majority shares in two-thirds of Russias privatized and privatizing firms, state subsidies accounted for 22 percent of Russias GNP, little if any restructuring had taken place within enterprises, and few market institutions had been created. Progress toward creating private property rights in Russia was impeded by the particular constellation of political institutions in place after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. The set of political institutions comprising the first postcommunist Russian state was not capable of either dismantling Soviet institutions governing property rights or creating or supporting new market-based economic institutions regarding private property.

Democracy Promotion as a World Value

Although norms protecting the sovereignty of states still trump norms protecting the rights of individuals, the balance is shifting. Democracy promotion has become increasingly acceptable as a foreign policy goal throughout most of the international community.

Ukraine Imports Democracy: External Influences on the Orange Revolution

Can the West promote democracy? An examination of one critical case, the 2004 Orange Revolution in Ukraine, offers a unique method for generating answers to this important theoretical and policy question. Tracing the causal impact of external influences first requires a theory of democratization composed exclusively of domestic factors, specifically the changing distribution of power between the autocratic regime and democratic challengers. Once these internal factors have been identified, the extent to which external factors influenced either the strength of the autocratic regime or the democratic challengers can be measured. Domestic factors accounted for most of the drama of the Orange Revolution, but external factors did play a direct, causal role in constraining some dimensions of autocratic power and enhancing some dimensions of the oppositions power. International assistance in the form of ideas and financial resources was crucial to only one dimension of the Orange Revolution: exposing fraud. Yet significant international inputs also can be identified regarding the preservation of semi-autocracy, the nurturing of an effective political opposition, the development of independent media, and the capacity to mobilize protesters after the falsified presidential vote.

Are Russians Undemocratic

Two experts on Russian politics and government assess claims that undemocratic attitudes prevail among the Russian population. Original survey data about perceptions of democratic institutions and values as well as sociodemographic data are analyzed to gauge support for democratic ideas. Surveys comprise a three-stage panel survey in which interviews and reinterviews took place between November 1999 and May 2000, with an initial sample of 1,919 respondents. The tradeoff between order and democracy, prospects for a more autocratic future, and policy recommendations are discussed.

Explaining Party Formation and Nonformation in Russia Actors, Institutions, and Chance

A decade after the collapse of communism, Russia still lacks a robust party system. Most institutions of the state are immune from party influence. However parties play a central role in the lower house of parliament, the State Duma. Why? Why have parties been successful in organizing and influencing the work of the State Duma but enjoyed only very limited success elsewhere? This article argues that parties in Russia are weak in general because the most powerful politicians in Russia have made choices to make them weak. Cultural, historical, and socioeconomic factors play a role in impeding party emergence, but individual decisions—especially decisions about institutional design—are the more proximate and more salient causes of poor party development. The privileged position of parties in the State Duma also resulted from individual choices, but those choices had unintended consequences that did not represent the preferences of the most powerful.

A Precarious Peace: Domestic Politics in the Making of Russian Foreign Policy

I Throughout the history of the modem world, domestic regime change-be it democratization, automatization, decolonization, decommunization, federal dissolution, coups, or revolutions-has often triggered international conflict and war. When a regime changes, decaying institutions from the ancien regime compete with new rules of the game to shape political competition in ambiguous ways. This uncertain context provides opportunities for political actors, both new and old, to pursue new strategies for achieving their objectives, including belligerent policies against both domestic and international foes. In desperation, losers from regime change may resort to violence to maintain their former privileges. Such internal conflicts become international wars when these interest groups who benefited from the old order call upon their allies to intervene on their behalf or strike out against their enemies as a means to shore up their domestic legitimacy. In the name of democracy, independence, the revolution, or the nation, the beneficiaries of regime change also can resort to violence against both domestic and international opponents to secure their new gains. The protracted regime transformation under way in Russia seems like a probable precipitant of international conflict. Over the last decade, old political institutions have collapsed while new democratic institutions have yet to be consolidated. Concurrently, political figures, organizations, and interest groups that benefited from the old Soviet order have incurred heavy losses in the new Russian polity. The new, ambiguous institutional context also has allowed militant, imperialist political entrepreneurs to assume salient roles in Russian politics. Reflecting on Russia’s ongoing regime change, Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder have hypothesized that ”states like contemporary Russia that make the biggest leap in democratization-from total autocracy to extensive

After the collapse of communism : comparative lessons of transition

Contributors Introduction: the evolving social science of post Communism Michael McFaul and Kathryn Stoner-Weiss 1. The triumph of Nation-States: lessons from the collapse of the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia Philip Roeder 2. The fourth wave of democracy and dictatorship: noncooperative transitions in the post-Communist world Michael McFaul 3. Circumstances versus policy choices: why has the economic performance of the Soviet successive states been so poor? Vladimir Popov 4. Whither the Central State? The regional sources of Russias stalled reforms Kathryn Stoner-Weiss 5. Parties, citizens, and the prospects for democratic consolidation in Russia Timothy Colton 6. Comparative democratization: lessons from Russia and the post-Communist World Valerie Bunce 7. Russians as joiners: realist and liberal conceptions of post-Communist Europe James M. Goldgeier and Michael McFaul Index.

Institutional Design, Uncertainty, and Path Dependency during Transitions: Cases from Russia

During transitional moments, new leaders must design political institutions. Some of these designs succeed in establishing lasting rules of the game. Others do not. This paper analyzes those factors which either facilitate or undermine institutional persistence during transitions, focusing particularly on the role that uncertainty and path dependency play in these processes. The empirical section of the paper examines three cases of institutional design in the Soviet/Russian transition—the creation of the Russian presidency, the emergence of electoral law for Russias lower house of parliament, the State Duma, and the evolution of institutional design regarding the formation of Russias upper house, the Federal Council. This comparison shows why the first two cases of institutional design created lasting institutions—even though these new rules did not reflect precisely the interests of their creators—while the third case of institutional design did not.