Abram Chayes

Compliance Without Enforcement: State Behavior Under Regulatory Treaties

ConclusionThe common conception is that treaties are not complied with because they are unenforceable, and that the cure for this condition is treaties “with teeth.” Our study shows that there are good reasons why states resist formal enforcement measures in treaties and are likely to continue to do so.On the other hand, negotiation, which is the principal method for dealing with compliance problems, has had a significant measure of success. This should not surprise us. Negotiation often produces agreements between parties who are not bound to agree to anything. In the context of a set of treaty norms accepted by the parties and acknowledged as having binding force, bargaining takes place “in the shadow of the law” as surely as when there is a possibility of ultimate recourse to coercive sanctions.In this article, we suggest some approaches that appear to enhance the effectiveness of this process. Some have close links to general negotiating theory, such as the importance of transparency between the parties and the need for careful attention to the possibilities for non-binding third party involvement. Others are more closely related to the structural features of national and international decision-making. It remains to elaborate on these themes and integrate them with others in a comprehensive account of how and why states comply with treaties.

From Law Enforcement to Dispute Settlement: A New Approach to Arms Control Verification and Compliance

I A principal obstacle to American acceptance of nuclear arms control agreements has been the difficulty of ensuring compliance. Substantive issues have taken a back seat while U.S. negotiators have expended vast intellectual and political energies negotiating verification measures that would reduce uncertainties about Soviet compliance. Now the Soviets, in a dramatic reversal of position, have agreed to farreaching and intrusive verification measures. In the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty negotiations, the Soviet Union was prepared to go even further than the United States in accepting various forms of on-site inspection. This is an extraordinarily hopeful development, but not, as its proponents seem to argue, because on-site inspection would permit the United States to prove violations of treaty norms. Instead, if the climate of openness in U.S.Soviet relations continues, inspection measures can be focused on the real problem of living under a complex treaty regime: the management of a continuing stream of disputes about the interpretation and application of its rules and practices. The argument requires a review and reassessment of U.S. policy and attitudes towards arms control verification and compliance. Antonia Handler Chayes and Abrarn Chayes

International arrangements for nuclear fuel reprocessing

This meeting was organized by the Canadian and U.S. Pugwash Groups. The main subject is placing reprocessing facilities under international or multinational control. Sixteen chapters are arranged under the following headings: general considerations, technical aspects, institutional arrangements, and political setting. Separate abstracts were prepared for ERA for all the chapters; no individual chapters were processed for EAPA. (DLC)