Adam Leite

Believing one’s reasons are good

Is it coherent to suppose that in order to hold a belief responsibly, one must recognize something else as a reason for it? This paper addresses this question by focusing on so-called “Inferential Internalist” principles, that is principles of the following form: in order for one to have positive epistemic status Ø in virtue of believing P on the basis of R, one must believe that R evidentially supports P, and one must have positive epistemic status Ø in relation to that latter belief as well. While such principles and their close relatives figure centrally in a wide variety of recent epistemological discussions, there is confusion in the literature about what, precisely, Inferential Internalism commits one to and whether it is so much as coherent. This paper (1) articulates a broader framework for understanding the notion of epistemic responsibility, (2) motivates Inferential Internalism on the basis of considerations about the basing relation, epistemic responsibility, and parallels with practical deliberation, (3) defends Inferential Internalism against charges of incoherence leveled by James Van Cleve and Paul Boghossian, and (4) shows that contrary to a currently widespread view, Inferential Internalism is coherent even if foundationalism and the a priori are rejected. The paper closes with a preliminary argument for an affirmative answer to the initiating question about the requirements of epistemic responsibility.

Socrates' Critique of Cognitivism

Ethics and lexicography would seem, prima facie, to have little to do with each other. Yet Aristotle testifies that Socrates pursued both: Socrates was busying himself about ethical matters and neglecting the world of nature as a whole but seeking the universal in these ethical matters, and fixed thought for the first time on definitions.1 Socrates occupied himself with the excellences of character, and in connection with them became the first to raise the problem of universal definitions.2

Immediate warrant, epistemic responsibility, and Moorean dogmatism

IMMEDIATE WARRANT, EPISTEMIC RESPONSIBILITY, AND MOOREAN DOGMATISM Adam Leite Indiana University, Bloomington December, 2008 aleite@indiana.edu For Jim Pryor, with gratitude, in order to find out exactly where we disagree. Abstract: “Moorean Dogmatist” responses to external world skepticism endorse courses of reasoning that many people find objectionable. This paper seeks to locate this dissatisfaction in considerations about epistemic responsibility. I sketch a theory of immediate warrant and show how it can be combined with plausible “inferential internalist” demands arising from considerations of epistemic responsibility. The resulting view endorses immediate perceptual warrant but forbids the sort of reasoning that “Moorean Dogmatism” would allow. A surprising result is that Dogmatism’s commitment to immediate epistemic warrant isn’t enough to avoid certain standard arguments for skepticism about the external world.

Expressivism, Psychic Health, and the First-Person Stance

This article addresses the psychotherapeutically important phenomenon of relating first-personally to ones own emotion, belief, desire, or other attitude. The fundamental theoretical challenge is to understand how one can relate to ones attitudes as ones attitudes without occupying a position that is alienated from them. Philosophical questions in this area are significantly illuminated by considering certain clinically manifested vicissitudes and pathologies of the first-person. The article interprets the first-person relation in terms of a complex set of functional capacities: the capacity to occupy the subjective perspective of the attitude as conscious subject; the capacity to both self-ascribe the attitude and articulate its content, in ways that are expressive manifestations of the attitude; and various capacities involved in relating to ones state as an attitude. The resultant conception of the first-person stance accommodates a range of clinically significant phenomena and suggests a multidimensional specification of one key aspect of psychological health.

Auto-entendimiento de la experiencia

La noción de insight es a uno y el mismo tiempo central al psicoanálisis y al auto-entendimiento que es parte de la vida diaria. Mediante material clínico y compromiso crítico con el trabajo contemporáneo filosófico sobre el auto-conocimiento, este trabajo clarifica un aspecto crucial de la noción clave. Tenemos en mente el auto-entendimiento de esta clase que por supuesto incluye los elementos cognitivos, no explica suficientemente los afectos, las motivaciones u otros aspectos de las psiquis, no por la simple conjunción de tal cognición con afecto sentido, urgencias motivacionales, etc. Tampoco está mejor modelado en términos de auto-observación interna. Más bien, es el producto de un constante proceso de articulación desplegada de nuestra propia vida psíquica. La noción de experiencia es importante aquí de tres maneras: Primero, la experiencia vivida es aquella de la que surge el auto-entendimiento. Segundo, este auto-entendimiento es un avance y articulación de estos aspectos de nuestras vidas interiores; es una parte de la misma perspectiva vivida. Y tercero, este entendimiento a su vez moldea la propia experiencia de nuestro mundo interior: como se logra, la propia experiencia así cambia. Lo central aquí es el énfasis sobre un proceso en desarrollo que incluye la habilidad de hablar desde una perspectiva subjetiva mientras se experimenta en la perspectiva subjetiva tal como lo es.

Experiential self‐understanding

Translations of summary The notion of insight is at one and the same time central to psychoanalysis and to the self‐understanding that is part of everyday life. Through clinical material and critical engagement with contemporary philosophical work on self‐knowledge, this paper clarifies one crucial aspect of this key notion. Self‐understanding of the sort we have in mind, while of course involving cognitive elements, is not sufficiently accounted for by cognition about ones affects, motivations, or other aspects of the psyche, nor by the simple conjunction of such cognition with felt affect, motivational urges, etc. Nor is it best modelled in terms of internal self‐observation. Rather, it is the product of an ongoing process of the unfolding articulation of ones psychic life. The notion of experience is important here in three ways. First, lived experience is that out of which the self‐understanding arises. Second, this self‐understanding is a development and articulation of these aspects of our inner lives; it is a part of that same lived perspective. And third, this understanding in turn shapes ones experience of ones inner world: as it is attained, ones experience of oneself thereby changes. Central here is the emphasis upon a developing process involving the ability to speak from ones subjective perspective while experiencing ones subjective perspective as the perspective that it is.

Self-hatred, Self-love, and Value

According to a time-honored tradition, love is a response to value. For some kinds of love, this view is plausible. Certain forms of other-directed love prominent in friendship and romantic contexts, for instance, are arguably a proper response to good character traits of the beloved as manifested in interaction with the lover (Abramson & Leite 2011). However, not all forms of love are responses to value in just this way. For instance, a parent’s love for a young child cannot be understood as a response to good character, since young children don’t yet have moral characters. If love is a response to value, then, it may respond to different kinds of values in different cases. And recognition of this variation raises the possibility of a deeper divergence: perhaps there are forms of love that are not responses to antecedent value at all, yet are ways of valuing the loved object.1