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Dive into the research topics where Andrew Reisner is active.

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Featured researches published by Andrew Reisner.


Philosophical Explorations | 2009

Unifying the requirements of rationality

Andrew Reisner

This paper looks at the question of what form the requirements of practical rationality take. One common view is that the requirements of rationality are wide-scope, and another is that they are narrow-scope. I argue that the resolution to the question of wide-scope versus narrow-scope depends to a significant degree on what one expects a theory of rationality to do. In examining these expectations, I consider whether there might be a way to unify requirements of both forms into a single theory of rationality, and what the difficulties involved in doing so can teach us about the foundations of practical rationality.


Inquiry: Critical Thinking Across the Disciplines | 2015

A Short Refutation of Strict Normative Evidentialism

Andrew Reisner

Abstract This paper shows that strict evidentialism about normative reasons for belief is inconsistent with taking truth to be the source of normative reasons for belief. It does so by showing that there are circumstances in which one can know what truth requires one to believe, yet still lack evidence for the contents of that belief.


Archive | 2011

Immediate warrant, epistemic responsibility, and Moorean dogmatism

Adam Leite; Andrew Reisner; Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen

IMMEDIATE WARRANT, EPISTEMIC RESPONSIBILITY, AND MOOREAN DOGMATISM Adam Leite Indiana University, Bloomington December, 2008 [email protected] For Jim Pryor, with gratitude, in order to find out exactly where we disagree. Abstract: “Moorean Dogmatist” responses to external world skepticism endorse courses of reasoning that many people find objectionable. This paper seeks to locate this dissatisfaction in considerations about epistemic responsibility. I sketch a theory of immediate warrant and show how it can be combined with plausible “inferential internalist” demands arising from considerations of epistemic responsibility. The resulting view endorses immediate perceptual warrant but forbids the sort of reasoning that “Moorean Dogmatism” would allow. A surprising result is that Dogmatism’s commitment to immediate epistemic warrant isn’t enough to avoid certain standard arguments for skepticism about the external world.


Philosophical Studies | 2009

The possibility of pragmatic reasons for belief and the wrong kind of reasons problem

Andrew Reisner


Philosophical Studies | 2008

Weighing pragmatic and evidential reasons for belief

Andrew Reisner


Archive | 2011

Can reasons for belief be debunked

Nishi Shah; Andrew Reisner; Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen


Ethical Theory and Moral Practice | 2009

Abandoning the Buck Passing Analysis of Final Value

Andrew Reisner


Published in <b>2011</b> in Cambridge ;New York by Cambridge University Press | 2011

Reasons for belief

Andrew Reisner; Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen


Archive | 2011

Is there reason to be theoretically rational

Andrew Reisner


Theoria | 2008

Evidentialism and the Numbers Game

Andrew Reisner

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