Adolfo Henrique Coutinho e Silva

Transparência no setor público: uma análise dos relatórios de gestão anuais de entidades públicas federais no ano de 2010

The present study analyzes the level of public transparency in the annual reports of federal public bodies and the incentives (political, institutional, governmental, social and financial) which can affect the disclosure of public information. It approached the Agency Theory and the need for public accountability in the disclosure of information, since government managers may provide incomplete information (agency conflict). Accordingly a greater transparency of public information may serve as a way of approaching the principal (citizens) and the agent (public officer). We carried out an empirical research, quantitative, which analyze the level of transparency presented in the 2010´s annual reports of 115 federal public entities. For this purpose, an index of federal public transparency was constructed, based on international studies, in order to verify the level of disclosure presented on the annual reports and the incentives that affect disclosure. The results indicate a moderate level of public transparency (48%), deficiency of compliance with mandatory disclosure (80%) and low adherence to voluntary disclosure practices (19%). Regarding incentives to disclosure, a positive relationship of the entity type, accessibility and personnel demographic with the public transparency index was observed, while public bureaucracy showed a significant relationship, but negative. Meanwhile the size, size of core management, budgetary revenues and federal dependency does not influence the disclosure of public information in the annual reports.

Disclosure in public sector: an analysis of the level of disclosure in the annual reports of Brazilian federal government bodies in the year 2010

The present study analyzes the level of public transparency in the annual reports of federal public bodies and the incentives (political, institutional, governmental, social and financial) which can affect the disclosure of public information. It approached the Agency Theory and the need for public accountability in the disclosure of information, since government managers may provide incomplete information (agency conflict). Accordingly a greater transparency of public information may serve as a way of approaching the principal (citizens) and the agent (public officer). We carried out an empirical research, quantitative, which analyze the level of transparency presented in the 2010´s annual reports of 115 federal public entities. For this purpose, an index of federal public transparency was constructed, based on international studies, in order to verify the level of disclosure presented on the annual reports and the incentives that affect disclosure. The results indicate a moderate level of public transparency (48%), deficiency of compliance with mandatory disclosure (80%) and low adherence to voluntary disclosure practices (19%). Regarding incentives to disclosure, a positive relationship of the entity type, accessibility and personnel demographic with the public transparency index was observed, while public bureaucracy showed a significant relationship, but negative. Meanwhile the size, size of core management, budgetary revenues and federal dependency does not influence the disclosure of public information in the annual reports.

Transparencia en el sector público: un análisis del nivel de transparencia de los reportes anuales de las entidades públicas federales en el año de 2010

The present study analyzes the level of public transparency in the annual reports of federal public bodies and the incentives (political, institutional, governmental, social and financial) which can affect the disclosure of public information. It approached the Agency Theory and the need for public accountability in the disclosure of information, since government managers may provide incomplete information (agency conflict). Accordingly a greater transparency of public information may serve as a way of approaching the principal (citizens) and the agent (public officer). We carried out an empirical research, quantitative, which analyze the level of transparency presented in the 2010´s annual reports of 115 federal public entities. For this purpose, an index of federal public transparency was constructed, based on international studies, in order to verify the level of disclosure presented on the annual reports and the incentives that affect disclosure. The results indicate a moderate level of public transparency (48%), deficiency of compliance with mandatory disclosure (80%) and low adherence to voluntary disclosure practices (19%). Regarding incentives to disclosure, a positive relationship of the entity type, accessibility and personnel demographic with the public transparency index was observed, while public bureaucracy showed a significant relationship, but negative. Meanwhile the size, size of core management, budgetary revenues and federal dependency does not influence the disclosure of public information in the annual reports.

DEMONSTRAÇÃO DO VALOR ADICIONADO (DVA): UMA ANÁLISE DE SUA COMPARABILIDADE APÓS TORNAR-SE OBRIGATÓRIA NO BRASIL

A Demonstracao do Valor Adicionado (DVA), que visa evidenciar como e formada e distribuida a riqueza de uma entidade, revela-se como um importante instrumento de avaliacao da relacao entre a empresa e a sociedade. Devido a recente obrigatoriedade de elaboracao e publicacao da DVA no Brasil, estabelecida pela Lei n. 11.638/2007 para as companhias de capital aberto, este estudo teve por objetivo verificar a qualidade das DVAs, do ponto de vista da comparabilidade, referentes ao exercicio de 2011, elaboradas pelas companhias abertas industriais, comerciais e prestadoras de servicos. Para isso, realizou-se um estudo empirico, com abordagem qualitativa, utilizando-se o metodo de estudo de caso multiplo. Foram analisadas as DVAs de 29 empresas, publicadas no jornal Valor Economico. Os resultados demonstram a necessidade de aprimoramentos na qualidade das DVAs nao so no que tange a comparabilidade, mas tambem com relacao a confiabilidade e a compreensibilidade de suas informacoes.

Choice of Accounting Practices in Brazil: An Analysis from the Contractual Covenants Hypothesis Perspective

This paper aims to investigate whether managers of Brazilian companies registered at the Securities and Exchange Commission (CVM) which have made long-term financial borrowings (bonds and bank loans), voluntarily have changed their accounting practices in order to prevent the violation of their covenants (based on accounting numbers) specified in their lending agreements. During the analysis of this phenomenon, previous studies suggest that company managers have adopted less conservative accounting practices (increasing their earnings and equity) in order to avoid violation of financial covenants. It was possible to demonstrate by the analysis of 125 Brazilian companies (registered at the CVM), with records of long-term borrowings in the credit market via bonds and bank loans (from 2000 to 2006), and using univariate (empirical histograms and chi–square tests) and multivariate (logistic regression) statistical tests, that these companies did not fulfill voluntarily changes in accounting practices in order to avoid violation of financial covenants. Two relevant items can explain the observed results: the low costs in cases of violation of financial covenants, and the active accounting regulations and monitoring efforts of regulatory agencies for public services, especially in the electricity sector. The main contribution of the observed results is to demonstrate that, despite the existence of financial covenants in debt securities issued by the Brazilian companies analyzed, there is no significant evidence of opportunistic changes in accounting practices to avoid breaches in financial covenants.