Adrian Looi

Fund Size, Transaction Costs and Performance: Size Matters!

Recent studies find evidence that small funds outperform large funds. This fund size effect is commonly hypothesized to be caused by transaction costs. Due to the lack of transactions data, prior studies have investigated the transaction costs theory indirectly. Our study, however, analyses the daily transactions of active Australian equity managers and finds aggregate market impact costs incurred by large managers are significantly greater than those incurred by small managers. Furthermore, we show large managers exhibit preferences for trade package formation and portfolio characteristics consistent with transaction cost intimidation. We analyse the interaction between transaction cost intimidation and the fund size effect, and document that large managers pursuing a highly active trading strategy suffer more from fund size, than large funds following a more passive strategy. This suggests the fund size effect is related to transaction costs, as trading activity is a good proxy for expected market impact. Finally, based on a simulation experiment, we find that transaction cost intimidation is at least as important as the increase in market impact costs due to fund size.

Are active fund managers collectors of private information or fast interpreters of public information

Recent studies of fund manager performance find evidence of outperformance. However limited research exists as to whether such outperformance is because of privately collected information, or merely expedient interpretation of publicly released information. In this study, we examine the trade sequences of active Australian equity fund managers around earnings announcements to provide insights into the source of fund managers’ superior information. We document an increased occurrence of buy-sell trade sequences around good-news earnings announcements. The evidence is consistent with fund managers having both private information about forthcoming good-news earnings announcements and being ‘short-term profiteers’. We find no evidence that fund managers have private information about forthcoming bad-news earnings announcements. However, we do find an increase in the frequency of fund managers not trading before bad-news earnings announcements only to subsequently sell during announcements.