Adrian Vatter

Consensus and direct democracy: Conceptual and empirical linkages

The first part of this paper draws a number oftheoretical connections between various forms ofdirect democracy and the two types of democracyoutlined by Lijphart. Plebiscites and mandatoryreferendums without quorums of consent are shown tocorrespond to majoritarian forms of democracy, whilstoptional referendums and initiatives with quorums ofconsent are shown to share similarities withpower-sharing forms. The second part of the paperoffers an empirical analysis of the different use ofcitizen-initiated referendums (optional referendumsand initiatives) in Switzerlands consensual systems(i.e., cantons) by examining to what extent the variouselements of power-sharing are developed. It is arguedthat referendums and initiatives are used lessfrequently when government coalitions have greaterstrength and local autonomy is more developed.

Do Political Factors Matter for Health Care Expenditure? A Comparative Study of Swiss Cantons

This study presents an empirical investigation of differences in health care expenditure between the 26 federal entities of Switzerland in the 1990s. So far, demand and supply-related factors have dominated the debate, while political determinants have largely been neglected. Here, they will be assessed together with the usual indicators on the basis of a cross-sectional analysis of both public and private health care spending. It will be shown that no approach represents the whole truth, but each one a grain of it. Demand for health care is clearly a function of socio-economic factors. On the supply side, it is mainly the number of practitioners and the overall level of provision that drive costs. Finally, from the political factors, general state interventionism is decisive – though only so far as public spending is concerned.

Legislative Party Fragmentation in Swiss Cantons A Function of Cleavage Structures or Electoral Institutions

The determinants of party fragmentation in the two dozen cantonal parliaments of Switzerland are examined. Empirically, it is shown that the number of legislative parties in the Swiss member states is on the one hand a function of the religious heterogeneity of the cantons, and on the other a function of the effective threshold. Finally, socio-structural characteristics (urbanization, population density) are linked to the number of legislative parties in Swiss cantons.

Das politische System der Schweiz

Das politische System der Schweiz gilt mit seiner ausgebauten Konkordanz, der direkten Demokratie und seinen foderativen Strukturen in vielerlei Hinsicht sowohl als Vorzeige- als auch als Sonderfall einer funktionierenden Demokratie des 21. Jahrhunderts. Das vorliegende Lehrbuch behandelt die wichtigsten politischen Institutionen und Akteure des schweizerischen politischen Systems, setzt sie in einen internationalen Vergleich und zeigt den betrachtlichen Wandel der schweizerischen Politik in den letzten 20 Jahre auf. Besonderes Gewicht wird dabei auf die Darstellung der Funktions- und Wirkungsweise der fur die Schweiz typischen Institutionen wie die direktdemokratischen Volksrechte, die breit abgestutzte Konkordanzregierung und die vielfaltigen foderativen Institutionen gelegt.

Institutional Design and the Use of Direct Democracy: Evidence from the German Länder

Despite growing interest in direct democratic institutions, the empirical evidence on the relationship between institutional design and the actual use of popular rights remains rather sparse. The authors use a novel data set on institutional openness and test its link to the number of popular initiatives in the German Länder for the period of 1997–2005. Their empirical analysis reveals a strong and robust negative effect of higher institutional requirements on the number of popular initiatives in the 16 German Länder; whereas other factors appear to be of minor importance. They thus come to the conclusion that the comparatively high institutional hurdles in the Länder impose costs of initiation, thereby limiting the number of popular initiatives.

The Missing Dimension of Democracy Institutional Patterns in 25 EU Member States between 1997 and 2006

By compiling data on 12 politico-institutional variables for 25 member states of the European Union over the years 1997—2006, we were able to investigate the emerging patterns of democracy in the European Union. The study addresses the questions of how direct democracy can be incorporated into Lijphart’s (1999) typology of consensus and majoritarian democracy and how empirical democratic patterns are affected by this extension. For the western democracies, three dimensions of democracy were extracted using principal component analysis, with two resembling those found by Lijphart (1999) and a third one being shaped by the interplay between direct democracy and cabinet type. East European democracies tend to have a lower degree of interest group corporatism, weaker central banks, stronger judicial review and stronger direct democracy.

The Contradictory Effects of Consensus Democracy on the Size of Government: Evidence from the Swiss Cantons

In this research note we have set ourselves the following three principal objectives. First, we show that the well-known concept of consensus democracy, which covers various forms of the division of power, involves analytical problems. Confusion may arise when relating consensus democracy to government action, because the institutions subsumed under the broad concept of consensus democracy, such as executive power-sharing, the multiparty system and federalism, are likely to have different and contradictory effects on the size of government. In this vein, we provide considerable evidence that different aspects of consensus democracy have contradictory effects on government size. In doing so, we endorse the view that it is only variance in the type of democracy (majoritarian versus consensus democracy) that causes systematic differences in government action. Secondly, in scrutinizing the contradictory effects of various aspects of consensus democracy on government size, we distinguish and operationalize the three different analytical views of Crepaz, Lijphart and Tsebelis on how political institutions may be distinguished with regard to their veto nature. Thirdly, we try to close a gap in understanding comparative politics, by quantifying and comparing the veto potential of direct democracy. International comparative investigations of the effects of direct democracy on public policy are hardly possible. The Swiss cantons present themselves as a suitable alternative source of evidence, given that they vary considerably with respect to their plebiscitary elements.To understand why consensus democracies have a contradictory effect on government size, it is crucial to bear in mind that there are two separate dimensions of the majoritarian–consensual contrast.

Initiatives, referendums, and the tax state

Abstract This article examines the impact of different forms of direct democracy on the tax state in the Swiss cantons in economically difficult times, i.e. between 1990 and 2000. The analysis distinguishes between the fiscal referendum and the popular initiative, since theoretical arguments suggest that these two instruments of direct citizen participation have contrary effects on the tax state. Specifically, the fiscal referendum is expected to act as a brake on tax interventionism, the popular initiative rather as an accelerator. However, pooled time-series analyses show that the initiative has no bearing on the tax state. What counts is the extent to which citizens are granted the right of fiscal referendum. More precisely, of all the different features of direct citizen participation in fiscal matters, the mandatory referendum turns out to be the most essential.

The transformation of access and veto points in swiss federalism

This article aims to delineate changes in the institutions of Swiss federalism. It shows that that the ‘old’ instruments of federalism, established in the nineteenth century, still represent strong veto points which enable the small, conservative and rural cantons to block national policy decisions. Urban cantons, on the other hand, resort to the ‘new’ institutions of federalism, developed in the course of the twentieth century, in order to influence the federal policy formulation process. Furthermore, cantonal governments have opened up informal channels of influence in order to compensate for their loss of power in the course of the strengthening of direct democracy.

A Global Trend Toward Democratic Convergence? A Lijphartian Analysis of Advanced Democracies

The article offers a systematic analysis of the comparative trajectory of international democratic change. In particular, it focuses on the resulting convergence or divergence of political systems, borrowing from the literatures on institutional change and policy convergence. To this end, political-institutional data in line with Arend Lijphart’s (1999, 2012) empirical theory of democracy for 24 developed democracies between 1945 and 2010 are analyzed. Heteroscedastic multilevel models allow for directly modeling the development of the variance of types of democracy over time, revealing information about convergence, and adding substantial explanations. The findings indicate that there has been a trend away from extreme types of democracy in single cases, but no unconditional trend of convergence can be observed. However, there are conditional processes of convergence. In particular, economic globalization and the domestic veto structure interactively influence democratic convergence.