Alan Costall

Taking a closer look at functional play in children with autism

Research evidence indicates that children with autism may experience problems with functional play, in addition to their well-documented deficits in symbolic play. However, as a result of the tendency of previous studies to group all functional play into a single category, the precise nature and extent of this deficit remains unclear. The present study undertook a more refined analysis of such play, subtyping the functional acts into various categories, in terms of the developmental progression suggested by research with typical infants. The functional play of children with autism was compared to that of developmentally matched children with Down syndrome and typical infants. Although there were no group differences in overall measures of the proportion of total play time spent in functional play and in the number of functional acts performed, a closer analysis of the composition of this play did reveal striking, qualitative differences. The functional play of the autism group was less elaborated, less varied, and less integrated than that of the controls. The implications of these findings are explored in relation to current theoretical models of autism and in relation to the role of other people in mediating the appropriate use of objects.

Group differences in the mutual gaze of chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes).

A comparative developmental framework was used to determine whether mutual gaze is unique to humans and, if not, whether common mechanisms support the development of mutual gaze in chimpanzees and humans. Mother-infant chimpanzees engaged in approximately 17 instances of mutual gaze per hour. Mutual gaze occurred in positive, nonagonistic contexts. Mother-infant chimpanzees at a Japanese center exhibited significantly more mutual gaze than those at a center in the United States. Cradling and motor stimulation varied across groups. Time spent cradling infants was inversely related to mutual gaze. It is suggested that in primates, mutual engagement is supported via an interchangeability of tactile and visual modalities. The importance of mutual gaze is best understood within a perspective that embraces both cross-species and cross-cultural data.

Children with autism experience problems with both objects and people.

Kanner (1943), in his classic account, described autism as a specific impairment in interpersonal relations which leaves the childs uses of objects relatively unaffected. This combination of the difficulties in relating to people and the supposedly “excellent” relations to objects figures centrally within many of the current theories of autism, which have had relatively little to say on the question of object use. This paper draws attention to evidence of widespread impairments in relating to objects, not only in interpersonal aspects of object use but also in early sensorimotor exploration and the functional and conventional uses of objects. In stressing these problems with objects, our purpose is not to downplay the social dimension of autism, but rather to highlight the reciprocal nature of the interactions between the child, other people, and objects. Given the evidence that other people play an important role in introducing objects to children, we propose that an impairment in interpersonal relations should itself lead us to expect corresponding disruption in the autistic childs use of objects. Conversely, an unusual use of objects is likely to manifest itself in disturbances in relating to other people, given the importance of a shared understanding and use of objects in facilitating interaction.

Theory of Mind A Critical Assessment

The ‘Theory of Mind’ approach has been associated with probably the fastest-growing body of empirical research in psychology over the last 25 years, and has given rise to a range of different theoretical positions and elaborations within those positions. The basic idea is that understanding other people involves bridging a gulf between observed ‘behaviour’ and hidden mental states by means of a theory. The articles in this Special Issue subject ‘Theory of Mind’ to sustained critical scrutiny, and also present alternative accounts of how we make sense of—and make sense to—other people. They trace the historical sources of ‘Theory of Mind’, criticize its fundamental assumptions and favoured methods, and examine its applications to child development and the explanation of schizophrenia and autism.

A kinematic analysis of hand selection in a reaching task

A group of left- and right-handers was tested on a task requiring them to reach out and pick up an object with either the left or the right hand. We varied the eccentricity of the target object (a small glass) and the required accuracy level, by filling the glass with liquid. We recorded (a) frequency of left or right hand use, (b) hand preference using a handedness questionnaire, and (c) the trajectories of the reaches using a movement registration system. It was found that the stronger the hand preference, the further in contralateral space the shift occurred between left and right hand use. Not only did the transition point corresponding to the shift between the two hands correlate with the point where their deceleration times were equal, but these locations closely coincided. These findings suggest that people are highly skilled perceivers of their own action capabilities, and that they are able to select the action mode that is most suited to perform a given task. We argue that laterality should be understood in terms of asymmetries in action modes.

On the persistence of the 'problem of other minds' in Psychology: Chomsky, Grice and 'Theory of mind'

In this paper we discuss the historical origins and conceptual debts of the Theory of Mind framework (ToM). We investigate its affinities to Chomsky’s psychology, and Paul Grice’s work on meaning. We find that the ToM framework is resourced by the ideas found in Chomsky and Grice, adding very little new to them, and suffering from the same problems of dualism. ToM inherits the traditional dualistic problem of other minds, tries to solve it, and ends up profoundly intellectualizing social interactions.

Parents' experiences of introducing everyday object use to their children with autism

A semi-structured interview study, investigating the acquisition of everyday object use in children with autism and developmentally matched controls, is presented. Parents were asked to describe how their child currently used various everyday objects during mealtime and washing routines, the process by which this came about, and any problems encountered in attempting to introduce appropriate object use. Following transcription, the interviews were treated using a method combining phenomenological and content analysis. The statements generated were condensed, using progressive categorization, into three tables of summary statements. These represented the different sources of influence on the childrens object use and the problems parents experienced in attempting to guide their childs actions. Relative to comparison groups, parents of children with autism reported that they experienced more problems and used more intensive teaching methods, and that their children were less actively involved. The findings are discussed in relation to the influence of other people in shaping object use and implications for intervention programmes.

A second-person neuroscience in interaction

In this response we address additions to as well as criticisms and possible misinterpretations of our proposal for a second-person neuroscience. We map out the most crucial aspects of our approach by (1) acknowledging that second-person engaged interaction is not the only way to understand others, although we claim that it is ontogenetically prior; (2) claiming that spectatorial paradigms need to be complemented in order to enable a full understanding of social interactions; and (3) restating that our theoretical proposal not only questions the mechanism by which a cognitive process comes into being, but asks whether it is at all meaningful to speak of a mechanism and a cognitive process when it is confined to intra-agent space. We address theoretical criticisms of our approach by pointing out that while a second-person social understanding may not be the only mechanism, alternative approaches cannot hold their ground without resorting to second-person concepts, if not in the expression, certainly in the development of social understanding. In this context, we also address issues of agency and intentionality, theoretical alternatives, and clinical implications of our approach.

Misremembering Bartlett: a study in serial reproduction

According to much of the recent psychological literature on memory, Bartlett should be credited with the insight that remembering can never be accurate but is, instead, more or less of a distortion (a view to which many modern authors themselves seem to subscribe). In the present paper, we argue that Bartlett did not himself provide such an unqualified account of remembering. Although he sought to challenge the idea that remembering is largely an accurate record of past events, he did not maintain that it is always inaccurate. Despite unqualified claims by Bartlett to the contrary, neither his own experiments nor his theoretical position warrant the conclusion that remembering is inherently unreliable. Indeed, as we explain, Bartlett himself provides several examples of impressively detailed and accurate recall, and sought to explain them within the framework of his schema theory.

Where is the ‘Theory’ in Theory of Mind?

Why did ‘Theory of Mind’ take off when it did, and what, if anything, holds this very diverse approach together? The focus of research within developmental psychology since the 1960s had been the examination of Piaget’s claims about cognitive development. The agenda had quickly become to demonstrate, primarily through experiments, that young children could (contrary to Piaget’s claims) succeed on various ‘cognitive’ tasks given the right context. Yet, by the 1980s, the research had still neither undermined Piagetian theory, nor opened up any radical alternative. Theory of Mind was conveniently to hand to provide another ‘grand’ theory to subject to experimental test, and in many ways business continued as usual. However, ‘context’ came to be regarded as no longer an important issue for research but a contaminant, and the experiments became stipulative rather than exploratory. In the attempt to eliminate context in order to test children’s real understanding of other people, the experiments themselves have come to constitute the largely implicit ‘theory’ behind Theory of Mind. The experiments presuppose that making sense of other people is essentially about making indirect inferences from the apparent (observable behaviour) to the real (hidden mental structures). It is this experimental paradigm of signification—of an indirect or ‘round-about’ relation between observations and the object of study—that ultimately holds the Theory of Mind approach together.