Vasudevi Reddy

Children's everyday deception and performance on false-belief tasks

Current theory and experimental research suggests that childrens discovery of false beliefs at around 4 years of age allows the development of intentional deception. Anecdotal evidence of earlier lies has been dismissed with the argument that they may be ‘blind’ learned strategies rather than genuine deception. This paper presents two studies of everyday deception in comparison with false-belief task performance in young children. Study 1, a longitudinal study of 24 children, shows that the variety and incidence of everyday deceptions reported by mothers did not relate to success or failure on a battery of false-belief tasks, either between different children or over time in the same children. In Study 2 the deceptions of a 21/2-year-old child over a 6-month period were shown to be varied, flexible, context appropriate and too complex to be ‘blind’ learned strategies. It is argued that childrens deceptive skills develop from pragmatic need and situational exigencies rather than from conceptual developments; they may learn to lie in the same way as they learn to speak.

Taking a closer look at functional play in children with autism

Research evidence indicates that children with autism may experience problems with functional play, in addition to their well-documented deficits in symbolic play. However, as a result of the tendency of previous studies to group all functional play into a single category, the precise nature and extent of this deficit remains unclear. The present study undertook a more refined analysis of such play, subtyping the functional acts into various categories, in terms of the developmental progression suggested by research with typical infants. The functional play of children with autism was compared to that of developmentally matched children with Down syndrome and typical infants. Although there were no group differences in overall measures of the proportion of total play time spent in functional play and in the number of functional acts performed, a closer analysis of the composition of this play did reveal striking, qualitative differences. The functional play of the autism group was less elaborated, less varied, and less integrated than that of the controls. The implications of these findings are explored in relation to current theoretical models of autism and in relation to the role of other people in mediating the appropriate use of objects.

Participants don’t need theories: knowing minds in engagement

The theory-theory is not supported by evidence in the everyday actions of infants and toddlers whose lives a Theory of Mind is meant radically to transform. This paper reviews some of these challenges to the theory-theory, particularly from communication and deception. We argue that the theory’s disconnection from action is both inevitable and paradoxical. The mind–behaviour dualism upon which it is premised requires a conceptual route to knowing minds and disallows a real test of the theory through the study of action. Taking engagement seriously avoids these problems and requires that both lay people and psychologists be participants rather than observers in order to know, and indeed to create, minds.

Coyness in early infancy

The present exploratory study reports the presence of ‘coy’ smiles beginning at 2-3 months in infancy, consisting of smiling with simultaneous gaze and head aversion and curving arm movements. Five infants were video-taped in natural interaction in their homes once a week between 7 and 20 weeks of age. These smiles were elicited in contexts of social attention, and were more likely following the renewed onset of attention. They occurred in interaction with familiar adults, with strangers and with the self in a mirror. Such expressions have previously only been reported in adults and in toddlers in the second year and have been interpreted as self-conscious emotional reactions deriving from newly developing self-conscious cognitions. The morphological and functional similarities between these early expressions and those reported in toddlers and adults suggest a developmental continuity in these reactions.

Children with autism experience problems with both objects and people.

Kanner (1943), in his classic account, described autism as a specific impairment in interpersonal relations which leaves the childs uses of objects relatively unaffected. This combination of the difficulties in relating to people and the supposedly “excellent” relations to objects figures centrally within many of the current theories of autism, which have had relatively little to say on the question of object use. This paper draws attention to evidence of widespread impairments in relating to objects, not only in interpersonal aspects of object use but also in early sensorimotor exploration and the functional and conventional uses of objects. In stressing these problems with objects, our purpose is not to downplay the social dimension of autism, but rather to highlight the reciprocal nature of the interactions between the child, other people, and objects. Given the evidence that other people play an important role in introducing objects to children, we propose that an impairment in interpersonal relations should itself lead us to expect corresponding disruption in the autistic childs use of objects. Conversely, an unusual use of objects is likely to manifest itself in disturbances in relating to other people, given the importance of a shared understanding and use of objects in facilitating interaction.

Looking Ahead: Anticipatory Gaze and Motor Ability in Infancy

The present study asks when infants are able to selectively anticipate the goals of observed actions, and how this ability relates to infants’ own abilities to produce those specific actions. Using eye-tracking technology to measure on-line anticipation, 6-, 8- and 10-month-old infants and a control group of adults were tested while observing an adult reach with a whole hand grasp, a precision grasp or a closed fist towards one of two different sized objects. The same infants were also given a comparable action production task. All infants showed proactive gaze to the whole hand grasps, with increased degrees of proactivity in the older groups. Gaze proactivity to the precision grasps, however, was present from 8 months of age. Moreover, the infants’ ability in performing precision grasping strongly predicted their ability in using the actor’s hand shape cues to differentially anticipate the goal of the observed action, even when age was partialled out. The results are discussed in terms of the specificity of action anticipation, and the fine-grained relationship between action production and action perception.

Anticipatory adjustments to being picked up in infancy.

Anticipation of the actions of others is often used as a measure of action understanding in infancy. In contrast to studies of action understanding which set infants up as observers of actions directed elsewhere, in the present study we explored anticipatory postural adjustments made by infants to one of the most common adult actions directed to them – picking them up. We observed infant behavioural changes and recorded their postural shifts on a pressure mat in three phases: (i) a prior Chat phase, (ii) from the onset of Approach of the mother’s arms, and (iii) from the onset of Contact. In Study 1, eighteen 3-month-old infants showed systematic global postural changes during Approach and Contact, but not during Chat. There was an increase in specific adjustments of the arms (widening or raising) and legs (stiffening and extending or tucking up) during Approach and a decrease in thrashing/general movements during Contact. Shifts in postural stability were evident immediately after onset of Approach and more slowly after Contact, with no regular shifts during Chat. In Study 2 we followed ten infants at 2, 3 and 4 months of age. Anticipatory behavioural adjustments during Approach were present at all ages, but with greater differentiation from a prior Chat phase only at 3 and 4 months. Global postural shifts were also more phase differentiated in older infants. Moreover, there was significantly greater gaze to the mother’s hands during Approach at 4 months. Early anticipatory adjustments to being picked up suggest that infants’ awareness of actions directed to the self may occur earlier than of those directed elsewhere, and thus enable infants’ active participation in joint actions from early in life.

Getting back to the rough ground: deception and ‘social living’

At the heart of the social intelligence hypothesis is the central role of ‘social living’. But living is messy and psychologists generally seek to avoid this mess in the interests of getting clean data and cleaner logical explanations. The study of deception as intelligent action is a good example of the dangers of such avoidance. We still do not have a full picture of the development of deceptive actions in human infants and toddlers or an explanation of why it emerges. This paper applies Byrne & Whitens functional taxonomy of tactical deception to the social behaviour of human infants and toddlers using data from three previous studies. The data include a variety of acts, such as teasing, pretending, distracting and concealing, which are not typically considered in relation to human deception. This functional analysis shows the onset of non-verbal deceptive acts to be surprisingly early. Infants and toddlers seem to be able to communicate false information (about themselves, about shared meanings and about events) as early as true information. It is argued that the development of deception must be a fundamentally social and communicative process and that if we are to understand why deception emerges at all, the scientist needs to get ‘back to the rough ground’ as Wittgenstein called it and explore the messy social lives in which it develops.

The relationship between auditory processing and restricted, repetitive behaviors in adults with autism spectrum disorders

Current views suggest that autism spectrum disorders (ASDs) are characterised by enhanced low-level auditory discrimination abilities. Little is known, however, about whether enhanced abilities are universal in ASD and how they relate to symptomatology. We tested auditory discrimination for intensity, frequency and duration in 21 adults with ASD and 21 IQ and age-matched controls. Contrary to predictions, there were significant deficits in ASD on all acoustic parameters. The findings suggest that low-level auditory discrimination ability varies widely within ASD and this variability relates to IQ level, and influences the severity of restricted and repetitive behaviours (RRBs). We suggest that it is essential to further our understanding of the potential contributing role of sensory perception ability on the emergence of RRBs.

A second-person neuroscience in interaction

In this response we address additions to as well as criticisms and possible misinterpretations of our proposal for a second-person neuroscience. We map out the most crucial aspects of our approach by (1) acknowledging that second-person engaged interaction is not the only way to understand others, although we claim that it is ontogenetically prior; (2) claiming that spectatorial paradigms need to be complemented in order to enable a full understanding of social interactions; and (3) restating that our theoretical proposal not only questions the mechanism by which a cognitive process comes into being, but asks whether it is at all meaningful to speak of a mechanism and a cognitive process when it is confined to intra-agent space. We address theoretical criticisms of our approach by pointing out that while a second-person social understanding may not be the only mechanism, alternative approaches cannot hold their ground without resorting to second-person concepts, if not in the expression, certainly in the development of social understanding. In this context, we also address issues of agency and intentionality, theoretical alternatives, and clinical implications of our approach.