Alberto Cassone

Tax Evasion Across Italy: Rational Noncompliance or Inadequate Civic Concern?

The paper suggests anexplanation for the geographical dimensionof tax evasion that focuses on thestructure of territorial government. Taxesadministered by the central government arenot differentiated by regions. Poor areasmay prefer a combination of lower taxes andlower levels of public services at both thecentral and the local level. This isespecially true when income and wealthlevels differ among the areas and thedemand for publicly provided goods iscorrelated to these levels. But the use ofnationally uniform tax schedules imposes awelfare burden on poorer areas. While thetax rates of local taxes can be adjusted tolocal preferences, tax evasion may betacitly accepted as a compensation for thewelfare loss deriving from too highcentrally set tax rates.

Agent's liability versus principal's liability when attitudes toward risk differ

This paper studies through an agency model the problem of concealing an illegal activity which benefits the principal. The agent can exert an effort that negatively affects the likelihood of detection. We model such behavior with the assumption that the principal is risk neutral while the agent is risk averse. Two opposite legal regimes are considered: in the first, only the principal is strictly liable; in the second, only the agent is. We show that shifting the liability upon the agent, while the monetary sanction and the probability of detection are kept constant, reduces the principals net benefit, thus favoring deterrence of wrongdoing. However, the agents effort in cheating can either increase or decrease. For a specific model we are able to characterize cases in which a reduction in cheating prevails, and shifting the liability upon the agent has clear-cut beneficial effects on compliance.

The simple economics of class action: private provision of club and public goods

This article uses economic categories to show how the reorganisation of civil procedure in the case of class action is not merely aimed at providing a more efficient litigation technology, as hierarchies (and company law) might do for other productive activities, but that it also serves to create a well defined economic organization ultimately aimed at producing a set of goods, first and foremost among which are justice and efficiency. Class action has the potential to recreate, in the judicial domain, the same effects that individual interests and motivations, governed by the perfect competition paradigm, bring to the market. Moreover, through economic analysis it is possible to rediscover not only the productive function of this legal machinery, but also that partial compensation of victims and large profits for the class counsel, far from being a side-effect, are actually a necessary condition for reallocation of the costs and risks associated with the legal action.

Tax Amnesty as Price-Discriminating Behavior by a Monopolistic Government

We consider perfectly anticipated periodic tax amnesties characterized by a tax rate lower than the ordinary one and used by a monopolistic government to maximize net fiscal revenue. We model tax amnesties as a form of intertemporal price discrimination. It turns out that, under certain conditions, discrimination secures the highest net revenue, as amnesties incorporate a self-selection mechanism that renders it possible to collect additional payments from tax evaders, without inducing honest taxpayers to join them. Optimal timing for granting tax amnesties may be calculated, but problems of time inconsistency in government behavior may arise.

Redistribution and Crime When Agents Have Limited Liability: A Note

Monetary sanctions are less effective when agents cannot afford to pay them in full. We present a simple model of a society with two types of risk averse agents, differing in terms of productivity in the legal labor market. We consider transfers from the most productive to the least productive agents, and discuss the conditions under which redistribution can reduce crime.