Giorgio Brosio

Handbook of Fiscal Federalism

Contents:Foreword Introduction: Fiscal Federalism - A Review of Developments in the Literature and PolicyEhtisham Ahmad and Giorgio BrosioPART I: APPROACHES TO FISCAL FEDERALISM1. The Political Economy of DecentralizationBen Lockwood2. Horizontal Competition Among GovernmentsPierre Salmon3. Modelling Vertical CompetitionAlbert Breton4. Spatial Interactions Among GovernmentsFrederico Revelli5. Asymmetric Federalism and the Political Economy of DecentralizationRoger D. Congleton6. Functional, Overlapping and Competing Jurisdictions (FOCJ): A Complement and Alternative to Today?s FederalismReiner Eichenberger and Bruno S. Frey7. Contract FederalismPaul Bernd SpahnPART II: DECENTRALIZATION AND DEVELOPMENT8. Decentralization and DevelopmentPranab Bardhan9. Fiscal Federalism in Planned EconomiesGovinda Rao 10. Decentralization and Service DeliveryJunaid Ahmad, Shantayanan Devarajan, Stuti Khemani and Shekhar ShahPART III: IMPLEMENTING MULTILEVEL FISCAL SYSTEMS11. The Assignment of Functions to Decentralized Government: From Theory to Practice Bernard Dafflon12. Normative Versus Positive Theories of Revenue Assignments in Federations Maria Flavia Ambrosiano and Massimo Bordignon13. Tax Competition in a Federal SettingJohn D. Wilson14. Intergovernmental Redistributive Transfers: Efficiency and EquityRobin Boadway15. On the Implementation of Transfers to Subnational GovernmentsEhtisham Ahmad and Bob Searle16. Subnational Public Financial Management: Institutions and Macroeconomic Considerations Ehtisham Ahmad, Maria Albino-War and Raju SinghPART IV: EMERGING ISSUES17. The Assignment of Revenue from Natural ResourcesGiorgio Brosio18. Decentralization and the EnvironmentSilvana Dalmazzone19. Corruption and Decentralized Public GovernanceAnwar Shah20. Fiscal Federalism and National UnityRichard M. Bird and Robert D. Ebel21. Institutions of Federalism and Decentralized GovernmentBrian GalliganIndex

Does Decentralization Enhance Service Delivery and Poverty Reduction

Does decentralization enhance service delivery and poverty reduction? Drawing on cutting edge research, expert contributors address this fundamental question facing policy-makers in developing as well as advanced countries. This timely book builds upon insights on the recent developments in the intergovernmental literature first outlined in the Handbook of Fiscal Federalism. New empirical evidence from across the globe is presented: policy-oriented chapters evaluate fiscal federalism with an emphasis on the effectiveness of decentralized service delivery, the decentralization process in different parts of the world is appraised, and specially commissioned research focuses on the political economy process and the outcomes of the decentralization process. The role of international agencies, as explicit donors, is examined in several chapters.

Local Service Provision in Selected OECD Countries: Do Decentralized Operations Work Better?

There is a widespread presumption that decentralization improves public service provision. This has led to policy prescriptions that are assiduously adhered to by countries and international. This paper reviews the recent evidence from OECD countries - which is seen to be inconclusive. This suggests the need for a careful design of programs that take into account the political economy constraints and incentives, as well as more systematic and thorough evaluations of outcomes.

Tax Evasion Across Italy: Rational Noncompliance or Inadequate Civic Concern?

The paper suggests anexplanation for the geographical dimensionof tax evasion that focuses on thestructure of territorial government. Taxesadministered by the central government arenot differentiated by regions. Poor areasmay prefer a combination of lower taxes andlower levels of public services at both thecentral and the local level. This isespecially true when income and wealthlevels differ among the areas and thedemand for publicly provided goods iscorrelated to these levels. But the use ofnationally uniform tax schedules imposes awelfare burden on poorer areas. While thetax rates of local taxes can be adjusted tolocal preferences, tax evasion may betacitly accepted as a compensation for thewelfare loss deriving from too highcentrally set tax rates.

Handbook of Multilevel Finance

This Handbook explores and explains new developments in the “second generation” theory of public finance, in which benevolent rulers and governments have been replaced by personally motivated politicians and the associated institutions. Following a comprehensive introduction by the editors, the renowned contributors present fresh and original perspectives on the key multi-level issues, along with recent developments in theory and practice, as they relate to taxes, budget systems, the management of liabilities and macroeconomic stability. The book also explores special issues concerning the poor and marginalized, structural change and the environment, natural disasters, and the task of overcoming conflicts whilst keeping countries together.

Political Economy of Multi-Level Tax Assignments in Latin American Countries: Earmarked Revenue Versus Tax Autonomy

A weakness of decentralization and overall tax reforms in Latin America is the lack of attention to adequate taxation at the subnational government. A reliance on shared taxes with extensive earmarking leads to weak subnational accountability and soft budget constraints. The paper explores the options for expanding subnational taxation in Latin America. A range of subnational tax instruments might be considered, but interactions between new tax assignments and the system of transfers is important from a political economy perspective.

The Impact of Gender Quotas on Votes for Women Candidates: Evidence from Italy

To explore the impact of quotas on womens political representation, this study estimates a conditional multinomial logit for the probability of voting for men and women, utilizing data that includes all regional candidates in four Italian regions in 1995 and 2000. This regional electoral system allows voters to choose both the party and the specific candidate (open-list proportional system). The results show that the introduction of a 50 percent gender quota in candidate lists leads to a substantial increase in the probability that voters will choose women candidates, from 12 to 36 percent. Nevertheless, the probability of voting for women (36 percent) is lower than the probability for men (64 percent). Voters have a male bias in Italy. Both the district size and the political party have an effect on the probability of voting for women versus men. The more liberal the party is, the higher the probability that women receive votes.

The intergovernmental allocation of revenue from natural resources: finding a balance between centripetal and centrifugal pressure

Decentralisation and Reform in Latin America analyses the process of intergovernmental reform in Latin America in the last two decades and presents a number of emerging issues. These include the impacts of decentralization and the response of countries in the region to challenge such as social cohesion, interregional and interpersonal disparities, the assignment of social and infrastructure expenditure, macrofinancial shocks, fiscal rules and the sharing of natural resources revenue. The main aim of the book is to assess the effective working of decentralized arrangements and institutions, with a view of suggesting corrections and reforms where the system is not working according to expectations.

The Growth of Government under Different Redistributive Rules: A Long Term Study of the Italian Case

This article is a study of the long-term growth of public expenditure. Starting from the hypothesis that the public budget always has a strong redistributive content, the authors aim to verify the influence of different types of redistributive policies (such as vertical and horizontal) on public expenditure evolution. Two alternative sets of redistributive policies (vertical bottom-up and fragmented horizontal) form the basis for the building of two models which are then tested with reference to long-term Italian public expenditure evolution.

Why Focus on Spending Needs Factors? The Political Economy of Fiscal Transfer Reforms in Mexico

An equalization system ensures that subnational governments can provide similar level of public services at a comparable level of own tax-effort. This paper focuses on the importance of spending needs factors in the design of equalization transfers as well as special purpose transfers-and the role that this could have in setting the agenda for better accountability for recipient governments, illustrating both design and implementation questions with examples from Mexico. The paper also takes into account the difficult political economy constraints to reforming any system of transfers.