Alberto Diaz-Cayeros

Patrons, Clients, and Policies: Clientelism and portfolio diversification: a model of electoral investment with applications to Mexico

Interest in the study of clientelism has reawakened in recent years. While the sociological and anthropological frameworks developed in the 1960s and 1970s still provide important insights into the logic of patron–client exchanges, a reckoning with the underlying political process that makes those forms of political linkage so prevalent is in order. Clientelism was then viewed as a phenomenon typical of underdeveloped political systems, usually at early phases of institutionalization, often under authoritarian or colonial regimes. Indeed, the literature suggested that clientelism was the most characteristic form of political exchange occurring in backward agrarian societies. Presumably, as societies became more developed, social structures more differentiated, and political systems more institutionalized, clientelism was bound to disappear. Yet it has not. Throughout most of the developing world and even in many parts of the developed one, clientelism remains a political and electoral fact of life. The defining trait of clientelism is that it involves direct exchanges between patrons and clients in which political support is traded for excludable benefits and services. Under what conditions do politicians attempt to buy votes through the provision of particularistic, excludable private goods, rather than through universalistic, non-excludable public goods? To answer this question, this chapter develops a portfolio theory of electoral investment and demonstrates its usefulness in the context of the erosion of hegemonic party rule in Mexico. Our theory proposes that the relative importance of clientelism vis-a-vis public goods provision depends upon the extent of poverty, political competition, and the level of electoral risk.

Party Dominance and the Logic of Electoral Design in Mexico’s Transition to Democracy:

This paper discusses the role of electoral institutional design in Mexico’s transition to democracy. Our argument is that electoral rules facilitated party dominance through two mechanisms: electoral rules disproportionately rewarded existing majorities and, at the same time, discouraged potential majorities from forming. More specifically, the rules rewarded parties that could win a majority of the vote in single-member districts; but at the same time, rewarded minority parties with seats from multi-member districts, mitigating Duvergerian incentives to coordinate behind a single challenger. In the short run, seats from multi-member districts benefited opposition parties by significantly reducing entry costs; in the long run, however, these seats helped sustain party dominance, by discouraging coordination among opposition parties and voters.

Endogenous Institutional Change in the Mexican Senate

This article studies the endogenous transformation of the Mexican Senate. Changes in the electoral rules for the Senate composition are explained as an effort by the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) politicians to protect their majority in a broader strategy of division and cooptation of its opponents. That strategy expanded seats for the opposition while reducing risks for the incumbent party. The article calculates, through Monte Carlo simulations, counterfactual scenarios for the composition of theMexican Senate under alternative electoral rules. Those simulations highlight the inherent uncertainty involved in institutional design. In spite of the demise of the PRI in the 2000 presidential election, the Senate will afford in the foreseeable future veto power to the hitherto hegemonic party.

Living in Fear: The Dynamics of Extortion in Mexico’s Criminal Insurgency

Why do drug trafficking organizations sometimes prey on the communities in which they operate, but sometimes provide assistance to these communities? What explains their strategies of extortion and cooptation toward civil society? We argue that the level of territorial contestation among armed criminal groups explains variation in coopting and coercing civil society. Using new survey data from Mexico, including list experiments to elicit responses about potentially illegal behavior, the paper measures the prevalence of extortion and assistance among drug trafficking organizations. In general, our experiments find higher extortion rates than those reported in national victimization surveys. In support of our theory, then, these data show that territorial contestation among rival organizations produces more extortion, and, in contrast, uncontested municipalities provide the most assistance.

Mexico: Designing Electoral Rules by a Dominant Party

The very long-term ruling party of Mexico, the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), has developed a number of electoral reforms since the early 1960s by achieving successive compromises with the opposition parties. On the one hand, electoral fraud was reduced and electoral competition was increased through a very slow and gradual process of successive reforms. On the other hand, the PRI crafted electoral rules aimed at protecting its own dominance. Basically, plurality rule in single-member districts was kept in place while adding proportional representation in multi-member district races for a minority of total seats. The PRI followed a divide-and-rule strategy, offering short-term electoral benefits to a fraction of the opposition, in exchange for rules that discouraged coordination among the opposition parties and which would eventually make the incumbent party more difficult to dislodge. Opposition political actors abided by the new rules in the expectation of generating greater political openings. But it was not until the 1997 congressional elections that the PRI lost its absolute majority in seats and not until the 2000 presidential election that an alternative candidate finally won.

Caught in the crossfire: the geography of extortion and police corruption in Mexico

Since 2002, the Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law (CDDRL) at Stanford University has collaborated widely with academics, policymakers and practitioners around the world to advance knowledge about the conditions for and interactions among democracy, broad-based economic development, human rights, and the rule of law. The mission of CDDRL is to understand how countries can overcome poverty, instability, and abusive rule to become prosperous, just, democratic, and well-governed states. This concern for the overall trajectory of national development—and for the intricate links among the economic, political, legal, social, and health dimensions of development—sets CDDRL apart from other research centers. gratefully acknowledged. We thank Rafael Gimenez and Lorena Becerra from the polling unit of the Mexican Office of the President for collecting the Survey on Public Safety and Governance in Mexico (SPSGM) used in this research. Neither those individuals, nor the institutions they are affiliated to, are responsible for the opinions and analysis contained in this chapter. All errors remain our own.