Alberto Rinaldi

The Structure of Italian Capitalism, 1952 1972: New Evidence Using the Interlocking Directorates Technique

The paper explores the structure of Italian capitalistic system by focusing on the relationships between financial banks, insurances and holdings- and industrial firms in Italy during the period 1952-72 through the analysis of the interlocks that existed between them. By an interlock is meant the link created between two firms when an individual belongs to the board of directors of both. The analysis is based on a database -Imita.db- containing data on over 300,000 directors of Italian joint stock companies for the years 1952, 1960 and 1972. After showing a descriptive statistics of the firms and the directors included in the database, the paper develops a network connectivity analysis of the system. This is integrated by a prosopographic study about the big linkers, defined as those directors cumulating the highest number of offices in each benchmark year. The paper confirms that Italian capitalism maintained substantial peculiarities in the period investigated. In particular, it argues that interlocks played an important role in guaranteeing the stability of the positions of control of the major private firms and their connections with State owned firms. In 1952 and 1960, the system, centred on the larger electrical companies, showed the highest degree of cohesiveness. That centre dissolved after nationalisation of the electricity industry in 1962 and was replaced by a less strong and cohesive one, hinged on banks, insurances and the major finance companies.

The only way to grow? Italian Business groups in historical perspective

ABSTRACT This article analyses the dynamics of business groups (BG) formation and diffusion in Italy in the twentieth century. It shows that BGs is not an organisational form which characterizes only developing countries or economies in their very early stage of development. Indeed, in its evolution from a peripheral country to one of the most advanced economies, Italy has been constantly populated by BGs. One striking feature of the Italian corporate system is that BGs are present not only among large firms, but also in almost all the other forms of enterprise: cooperative firms, municipalised companies, state-owned enterprises (SOEs), and fast-growing medium-sized firms. Thus, BG seems to be the ‘only way to grow’ for Italian firms or, at least, the easiest way to reach a reasonable size. BG as a governance system looks particularly flexible, adapting itself to different ownership, market conditions and local contexts. In absence of obstacles of legal or fiscal nature, this flexibility is probably the main reason for its resilience.

Industrial Policy and Artisan Firms (1930s-1970s)

Taking an historical perspective, this unique book highlights the evolution of the many diverse forms of business enterprise, and discusses the contribution of these different types of firm to the economic growth of Italy.

Directors and syndics in corporate networks: Argentina and Italy compared (1913-1990)

Abstract This article analyses the evolution of corporate networks in Argentina and Italy from 1913 to 1990, using an interlocking directorates technique applied to six benchmark years and the largest 25 banks and 100 non-financial companies in both countries. The descriptive statistics of the companies and directors in the sample provide input for a network connectivity analysis of the two systems, integrated with historical and structural analyses. Furthermore, this article provides the first assessment of syndics – special auditors for firms – to the network analyses. Relying on a recently established analytical framework, the authors show that the Argentine and Italian corporate networks exhibit different structures and evolutions over time. This research broadens the extant analytical framework by exploring how syndics contribute to corporate networks and how the interaction of macro, meso, and micro levels affects the evolution of syndicatures in the two countries. Finally, the detailed taxonomy of syndics offers evidence of companies’ selection strategies and the historical uses of syndicature as a governance mechanism.

Capital Inflows, Current Accounts and Investment Cycle in Italy: 1861-1913

By relying on a new dataset, this paper presents an econometric strategy to test the Fenoaltea’s thesis with regard to both the genesis of current account fluctuations and of the investment cycle. We perform a Granger causality test that shows that the persistent current account deficits in the years from unification from WW1 were generated by variations in capital inflows, as pointed by Fenoaltea, and not by the dynamics of the GDP, as claimed by the Bonelli-Cafagna model. Finally, this paper supports the Fenoaltea’s thesis that these capital inflows prompted a general investment cycle which included both construction and industrial investments