Alberto Vannucci

Corruption and anti-corruption: The political defeat of ‘Clean Hands’ in Italy

The apparent triumph of the ‘revolution of the judges’ (which in the early 1990s led to talk of a ‘Second Republic’ in Italy) proved to be of short duration. Between the mid-1990s and the early 2000s the question of political corruption was intentionally demoted as a political priority by means of a ‘bi-partisan’ agreement. The ‘Clean Hands’ investigations do not seem to have led to the moral regeneration of Italian politics: available indicators on the diffusion of corruption instead signal high and constant levels. ‘Clean Hands’ opened a window of opportunity for overcoming the various ‘anomalies’ of Italian politics, but the political class was unable or unwilling to seize the moment. Not only is the balance sheet of actions against corruption rather meagre, but profound divisions have emerged in the relationship between the judiciary and the ‘new’ political class.

The Hidden Order of Corruption : An Institutional Approach

Contents: The hidden order of corruption: an introduction The governance structures of corrupt exchanges Corruption as a normative system Bureaucratic corruption Political actors in the governance of corrupt exchanges The entrepreneurial management of corrupt exchanges Brokers in corruption networks: the role of middlemen Organized crime and corruption: mafias as enforcers in the market for corrupt exchange Snowball effects: how corruption may become endemic Conclusion: anticorruption policy and the disarticulation of governance structures in corrupt exchanges Bibliography Index.

The resources of corruption: Some reflections from the Italian Case

This article focuses on the resources used in corrupt exchanges and the complex network of actors involved. The empirical analysis is drawn from research into the Italian case, and is based on judicial investigations, a newspaper-based data bank, and interviews. Defining corruption as a market for political rent, the analysis focuses on the “commodities” which flow from the public to the private sectors (in particular, influence over political decisions and information) and those which flow in the opposite direction (such as bribes, influence on the mass media etc.). Resources which corrupt agents use to reduce the costs of “producing” corrupt services are also explored as well as the risks involved in hidden exchange.

Disasters and Corruption, Corruption as Disaster

This chapter analyzes the role played by corruption in post-disaster contexts. Data show growth in both natural and man-made disasters and in humanitarian response provided by bilateral and multilateral donors. These events have become more frequent and also cause more deaths. Moreover, the data demonstrate a strong relation between the impact of these disasters on the standards of living and the prior level of corruption of the country. The severity of disasters is a consequence of corruption, but the opportunities for corruption are also increased in post-disaster situations. Several factors contribute to frustrating the transparency and accountability of decision-making processes during humanitarian crises. We include all these factors in a “formula of corruption”. Despite the growing importance of this issue, the international community has responded to these crucial problems only tentatively. We review those international treaties that have addressed the issue of corruption at the international level. These treaties are preliminary instruments to fight corruption, even if they are not specifically designed to fight this plague in post-disaster contexts. This lack of institutional response has caused civil society and NGOs to take independent measures. For this reason, several NGOs have recommended the implementation of further action in order to map and prevent corruption.