Alejandro Justiniano

Investment shocks and the relative price of investment

We estimate a New-Neoclassical Synthesis model of the business cycle with two investment shocks. The first, an investment-specific technology shock, affects the transformation of consumption into investment goods and is identified with the relative price of investment. The second shock affects the production of installed capital from investment goods or, more broadly, the transformation of savings into future capital input. We find that this shock is the most important driver of U.S. business cycle fluctuations in the postwar period and that it is likely to proxy for more fundamental disturbances to the functioning of the financial sector. To corroborate this interpretation, we show that the shock correlates strongly with interest rate spreads and that it played a particularly important role in the recession of 2008.

Macroeconomic Effects of Federal Reserve Forward Guidance

A large output gap accompanied by stable inflation close to its target calls for further monetary accommodation, but the zero lower bound on interest rates has robbed the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) of the usual tool for its provision. We examine how public statements of FOMC intentions—forward guidance—can substitute for lower rates at the zero bound. We distinguish between Odyssean forward guidance, which publicly commits the FOMC to a future action, and Delphic forward guidance, which merely forecasts macroeconomic performance and likely monetary policy actions. Others have shown how forward guidance that commits the central bank to keeping rates at zero for longer than conditions would otherwise warrant can provide monetary easing, if the public trusts it. ; We empirically characterize the responses of asset prices and private macroeconomic forecasts to FOMC forward guidance, both before and since the recent financial crisis. Our results show that the FOMC has extensive experience successfully telegraphing its intended adjustments to evolving conditions, so communication difficulties do not present an insurmountable barrier to Odyssean forward guidance. Using an estimated dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model, we investigate how pairing such guidance with bright-line rules for launching rate increases can mitigate risks to the Federal Reserve’s price stability mandate.

Credit Supply and the Housing Boom

The housing boom that preceded the Great Recession was due to an increase in credit supply driven by looser lending constraints in the mortgage market. This view on the fundamental drivers of the boom is consistent with four empirical observations: the unprecedented rise in home prices and household debt, the stability of debt relative to house values, and the fall in mortgage rates. These facts are difficult to reconcile with the popular view that attributes the housing boom to looser borrowing constraints associated with lower collateral requirements. In fact, a slackening of collateral constraints at the peak of the lending cycle triggers a fall in home prices in our framework, providing a novel perspective on the possible origins of the bust.

An Estimated Small Open Economy Model of the Financial Accelerator

This paper develops a small open economy model in which entrepreneurs partially finance investment using foreign currency-denominated debt subject to an external finance premium. We use Bayesian estimation techniques to evaluate the importance of balance sheet-related credit market frictions for emerging market countries by incorporating the financial accelerator mechanism. We obtain a sizable value for the external finance premium, which is tightly estimated away from zero. Our results support the inclusion of the financial accelerator in an otherwise standard model that-acting through balance sheets-magnifies the impact of shocks, thereby increasing real and financial volatility. Copyright 2006, International Monetary Fund

The Chicago Fed DSGE Model

The Chicago Fed dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model is used for policy analysis and forecasting at the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago. This article describes its specification and estimation, its dynamic characteristics and how it is used to forecast the US economy. In many respects the model resembles other medium scale New Keynesian frameworks, but there are several features which distinguish it: the monetary policy rule includes forward guidance, productivity is driven by neutral and investment specific technical change, multiple price indices identify inflation and there is a financial accelerator mechanism.

Forward Guidance and Macroeconomic Outcomes Since the Financial Crisis

This chapter studies the effects of FOMC forward guidance. We begin by using high-frequency identification and direct measures of FOMC private information to show that puzzling responses of private-sector forecasts to movements in federal funds futures rates on FOMC announcement days can be attributed entirely to Delphic forward guidance. However, a large fraction of futures rates’ variability on announcement days remains unexplained, leaving open the possibility that the FOMC has successfully communicated Odyssean guidance. We then examine whether the FOMC used Odyssean guidance to improve macroeconomic outcomes since the financial crisis. To this end we usean estimated medium-scale New Keynesian model to perform a counterfactual experiment for the period 2009:Q1–2014:Q4, in which we assume the FOMC did not employ any Odyssean guidance and instead followed its reaction function from before the crisis as closely as possible while respecting the effective lower bound. We find that a purely rule-based policy would have delivered a shallower recession and kept inflation closer to target in the years immediately following the crisis than FOMC forward guidance did in practice. However, starting toward the end of 2011, after the Fed’s introduction of “calendar-based” communications, the FOMC’s Odyssean guidance appears to have boosted real activity and moved inflation closer to target. We show that our results do not reflect Del Negro, Giannoni, and Patterson’s (2015) forward-guidance puzzle.