Charles L. Evans

Nominal rigidities and the dynamic effects of a shock to monetary policy

We present a model embodying moderate amounts of nominal rigidities which accounts for the observed inertia in inflation and persistence in output. The key features of our model are those that prevent a sharp rise in marginal costs after an expansionary shock to monetary policy. Of these features, the most important are staggered wage contracts of average duration three quarters, and variable capital utilization.

Some Empirical Evidence on the Effects of Shocks to Monetary Policy on Exchange Rates

This paper investigates the effects of shocks to U. S. monetary policy on exchange rates. We consider three measures of these shocks: orthogonalized shocks to the federal funds rate, orthogonalized shocks to the ratio of nonborrowed to total reserves and changes in the Romer and Romer index of monetary policy. In sharp contrast to the literature, we find substantial evidence of a link between monetary policy and exchange rates. Specifically, according to our results a contractionary shock to U. S. monetary policy leads to (i) persistent, significant appreciations in U. S. nominal and real exchange rates and (ii) significant, persistent deviations from uncovered interest rate parity in favor of U. S. interest rates.

Sticky price and limited participation models of money: A comparison

Abstract We provide new evidence that models of the monetary transmission mechanism should be consistent with at least the following facts. After a contractionary monetary policy shock, the aggregate price level responds very little, aggregate output falls, interest rates initially rise, real wages decline by a modest amount, and profits fall. We compare the ability of sticky price and limited participation models with frictionless labor markets to account for these facts. The key failing of the sticky price model lies in its counterfactual implications for profits. The limited participation model can account for all the above facts, but only if one is willing to assume a high labor supply elasticity (2 percent) and a high markup (40 percent). The shortcomings of both models reflect the absence of labor market frictions, such as wage contracts or factor hoarding, which dampen movements in the marginal cost of production after a monetary policy shock.

Chapter 2 Monetary policy shocks: What have we learned and to what end?

Abstract This chapter reviews recent research that grapples with the question: What happens after an exogenous shock to monetary policy? We argue that this question is interesting because it lies at the center of a particular approach to assessing the empirical plausibility of structural economic models that can be used to think about systematic changes in monetary policy institutions and rules. The literature has not yet converged on a particular set of assumptions for identifying the effects of an exogenous shock to monetary policy. Nevertheless, there is considerable agreement about the qualitative effects of a monetary policy shock in the sense that inference is robust across a large subset of the identification schemes that have been considered in the literature. We document the nature of this agreement as it pertains to key economic aggregates.

Monetary policy and the term structure of nominal interest rates: evidence and theory

This paper explores how exogenous impulses to monetary policy affect the yield curve for nominally risk-free bonds. We identify monetary policy shocks using three distinct variants of the identified VAR methodology. All three approaches imply similar patterns for the effect of monetary policy shocks on the term structure: A contractionary policy shock induces a pronounced positive but short-lived response in short term interest rates, with a smaller effect on medium-term rates and almost no effect on long term rates. Because of their transitory impact, monetary policy shocks account for a relatively small fraction of the long-run variance on interest rates. The response of the yield curve to a monetary policy shock is unambiguously a liquidity effect rather than an expected inflation effect. We then ask whether a dynamic stochastic equilibrium model that incorporates nominal rigidities can replicate these patterns. We find that the limited participation model of Lucas (1990), Fuerst (1992), and Christiano and Eichenbaum (1995), is broadly consistent with the data, provided modest adjustment costs are imposed on monetary balances available to satisfy households cash-in-advance constraint.

Productivity shocks and real business cycles

Abstract Productivity shocks play a central role in real business cycles as an exogenous impulse to macroeconomic activity. However, measured Solow-Prescott residuals do not behave as an exogenous impulse. Rather, econometric evidence provided in this paper indicates that (1) money, interest rates, and government spending Granger-cause these impulses, and (2) a substantial component of the variance of these impulses (between one quarter and one half) is attributable to variations in aggregate demand. These results are robust to a number of econometric issues, including measurement errors, specification of the production function, and certain forms of omitted real variables.

Money, Sticky Wages, and the Great Depression

This paper examines the ability of a simple stylized general equilibrium model that incorporates nominal wage rigidity to explain the magnitude and persistence of the Great Depression in the United States. The impulses to our analysis are money supply shocks. The Taylor contracts model is surprisingly successful in accounting for the behavior of major macroaggregates and real wages during the downturn phase of the Depression, i.e., from 1929:3 through mid-1933. Our analysis provides support for the hypothesis that a monetary contraction operating through a sticky wage channel played a significant role in accounting for the downturn, and also provides an interesting refinement to this explanation. In particular, both the absolute severity of the Depressions downturn and its relative severity compared to the 1920-21 recession are likely attributable to the price decline having a much larger unanticipated component during the Depression, as well as less flexible wage-setting practices during this latter period. Another finding casts doubt on explanations for the 1933-36 recovery that rely heavily on the substantial remonetization that began in 1933. Key Words: Dynamic General Equilibrium Model, Sticky Wages

Economic Determinants of the Nominal Treasury Yield Curve

We study the effect of different types of macroeconomic impulses on the nominal yield curve. We employ two distinct approaches to identifying economic shocks in VARs. Our first approach uses a structural VAR due to Gali (1992). Our second strategy identifies fundamental impulses from alternative empirical measures of economic shocks proposed in the literature. We find that most of the long-run variability of interest rates of all maturities is driven by macroeconomic impulses. Shocks to preferences for current consumption consistently induce large, persistent, and statistically significant shifts in the level of the yield curve. In contrast, technology shocks induce weaker and less robust patterns of interest rate responses, since they move real rates and expected inflation in opposite directions. Monetary policy shocks are the only macroeconomic shocks with a consistent and significant impact on the slope of the yield curve. We find no evidence that fiscal policy shocks induce any significant interest rate responses.

Macroeconomic Effects of Federal Reserve Forward Guidance

A large output gap accompanied by stable inflation close to its target calls for further monetary accommodation, but the zero lower bound on interest rates has robbed the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) of the usual tool for its provision. We examine how public statements of FOMC intentions—forward guidance—can substitute for lower rates at the zero bound. We distinguish between Odyssean forward guidance, which publicly commits the FOMC to a future action, and Delphic forward guidance, which merely forecasts macroeconomic performance and likely monetary policy actions. Others have shown how forward guidance that commits the central bank to keeping rates at zero for longer than conditions would otherwise warrant can provide monetary easing, if the public trusts it. ; We empirically characterize the responses of asset prices and private macroeconomic forecasts to FOMC forward guidance, both before and since the recent financial crisis. Our results show that the FOMC has extensive experience successfully telegraphing its intended adjustments to evolving conditions, so communication difficulties do not present an insurmountable barrier to Odyssean forward guidance. Using an estimated dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model, we investigate how pairing such guidance with bright-line rules for launching rate increases can mitigate risks to the Federal Reserve’s price stability mandate.

Data Revisions and the Identification of Monetary Policy Shocks

Monetary policy research using time series methods has been criticized for using more information than the Federal Reserve had available in setting policy. To quantify the role of this criticism, we propose a method to estimate a VAR with real-time data while accounting for the latent nature of many economic variables, such as output. Our estimated monetary policy shocks are closely correlated with a typically estimated measure. The impulse response functions are broadly similar across the methods. Our evidence suggests that the use of revised data in VAR analyses of monetary policy shocks may not be a serious limitation.