Aleks Szczerbiak

Explaining lustration in Central Europe: a ‘post-communist politics’ approach

Lustration, the vetting of public officials in Central Europe for links to the communist-era security services, has been pursued most systematically in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. Prior attempts to explain the pursuit or avoidance of lustration focused on the differing experiences of communist rule or transition to democracy. A closer examination finds that although the three countries in question had very different histories, there were identical demands for lustration in the early 1990s. These demands were translated into legislation at different times and varied considerably in the range of offices affected and the sanctions imposed. This article offers an explanation of this variation by focusing on the dynamics of post-communist political competition. We find that the passage of a lustration bill depended on the ability of its most ardent advocates to persuade a heterogeneous plurality of legislators that the safeguarding of democracy required it. Sussex European Institute, Arts A Building, University of Sussex, Falmer, Brighton BN1 9SH, UK Assistant to György Schöpflin MEP, ASP 12E216, European Parliament, Rue Wiertz, B-1047 Brussels, Belgium

The Politics of European Referendum Outcomes and Turnout: Two Models

This survey briefly examines the EU accession process for the countries included in this collection and considers the distinctive features of this set of referendums, particularly the comparatively high levels of Yes vote and low levels of turnout. It argues that, although they represent a distinctive sub-type of European referendum, they can be used as a basis to draw at least tentative comparative and theoretical conclusions. Consequently, it then posits causal models that both provide an analytical framework for this collection and, more broadly, attempt to explain the results and turnout in these and, potentially, other (European) referendums.

Polish Public Opinion: Explaining Declining Support for EU Membership

This article examines the changing patterns of support for EU membership in Poland, the largest of the central and east European applicant states. It argues that we should not be surprised that Poles have become increasingly cynical about EU membership since accession negotiations began and examines the particular concerns that underpin Polish Euroscepticism. However, the overall level of support remains high, and it is apathy and low turnout that pose a greater threat than outright rejection in a future referendum on EU accession.

‘Social Poland’ Defeats ‘Liberal Poland’? The September–October 2005 Polish Parliamentary and Presidential Elections

The 2005 Polish parliamentary and presidential elections were held on separate days, but the two campaigns ‘contaminated’ each other and the presidential contest largely overshadowed the parliamentary. The dominant issue during much of the campaign was probity in public life, and parties competed on their ability to tackle corruption effectively. The conservative Law and Justice party and its presidential candidate Lech Kaczyński emerged as unexpected winners by framing the contest as choice of a ‘social-solidaristic’ or a ‘liberal’ vision of Poland. The underlying ideological divisions between Polish parties appear to be in some flux, as do the social bases of their support, and a realignment of the dimensions of party competition is one possible outcome. However, this apparent ‘social versus liberal’ dichotomy will not necessarily provide a long-term basis for political alignments in the country, and the old ‘post-communist’ historical and cultural divide apparently remains a significant orientation point for a substantial number of voters.

The Birth of a Bipolar Party System or a Referendum on a Polarizing Government? The October 2007 Polish Parliamentary Election

The 2007 Polish parliamentary election is best understood as a plebiscite on the polarizing government led by the right-wing Law and Justice party and its controversial ‘Fourth Republic’ political project. The liberal-conservative Civic Platform opposition won because it was able to persuade Poles that voting for them was the most effective way of removing this government from office. The election also indicates that the ‘post-communist divide’ that dominated and provided structural order to the Polish political scene during the 1990s is passing into history and certainly means a more consolidated Polish party system. However, Poland still has very high levels of electoral volatility and low electoral turnout, together with low levels of party institutionalization and extremely weak links between parties and their supporters. This means that it is too early to say whether the election also marks the emergence of a stable Polish party system based on a new bipolar divide between two big centre-right groupings with the confinement of the left to the status of a minor actor.

Europeanisation, euroscepticism and party systems: Party‐based euroscepticism in the candidate states of Central and Eastern Europe

Abstract In this article, we assume that we can usefully examine the emergence of party‐based Euroscepticism in the party systems of the candidate states and that we can account for (some of) the differences between the states by looking at their party systems. In order to do this we begin by offering a definition of Euroscepticism that differentiates between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ variants. We map these types of Euroscepticism in parties in the candidate states of central and Eastern Europe. Looking at the nature of party systems we suggest that there is a need to rethink how we conceptualise and categorise them if we are to extend our Western models to central and Eastern Europe, and we offer some suggestions of how this might be done. Using these models of party systems in relation to the candidate states of central and Eastern Europe we examine how this relates to the incidences of party‐based Euroscepticism and reflect on the issues involved in applying West European models to East European cases.

Poland's Unexpected Political Earthquake: The September 2001 Parliamentary Election

The September 2001 parliamentary election represented a political earthquake that may lead to a major restructuring of the party system. The communist successor formation, the Democratic Left Alliance, was returned to office after a four-year gap, and the post-Solidarity groupings that had formed the previous governments were soundly beaten. Very few commentators had foreseen such a result, or certain other surprises. The biggest of all was the success of two radical-populist groupings that emerged at a very late stage in the campaign. The over-arching theme of this election was a backlash against the political establishment in general and incumbents in particular, and it has left the Polish party system unstable and unbalanced. The Democratic Left Alliance appears to have confirmed its hegemony on the left, but it is unclear what alternatives are likely to crystallize on the fractious and unstable centre-right over the next few years.

History trumps government unpopularity: the June 2003 Polish EU accession referendum

This analysis explains why Poles voted overwhelmingly to join the EU and how the 50% turnout requirement was achieved fairly easily. It argues that most Poles appeared to accept the historical significance of the referendum and de-coupled the issue of EU membership from that of confidence in an extremely unpopular government. This occurred because most key political and social actors, including the opposition parties, called for a Yes vote, while, at the same time, a vigorous campaign by pro-EU civic organisations presented a ‘non-political’ face to the campaign. Although the No camp made tactical errors and had difficulties staying focused on its main arguments, lack of both access to the public media and a convincing or attractive alternative made it extremely difficult for them to mount an effective campaign. At the same time, the stability of the opinion polls in the years leading up to the referendum suggested that most Poles had already made their minds up about the issue well in advance. In spite of the low levels of trust in political parties, partisan cues appeared to be a better predictor of referendum voting behaviour than socio-economic and demographic factors.

Conclusion: towards a model of (European) referendums

This conclusion evaluates the causal models set out in the introduction to this collection and considers whether, in the light of the 2003 accession referendums, they require modification. On the basis of this examination we argue that the results of EU accession referendums appear to demonstrate that the key factors determining the results are the consequences of: (a) underlying mass attitudes in combination with (b) cues provided by elites. The variance in the levels of turnout in the EU accession referendums appears to be predominantly the consequence of: (a) the general levels of electoral turnout specific to countries in combination with (b) the level of contestation of the European issue. Consideration is then given to the generalisability of the models to other referendums, on both European and non-European issues. Finally, we look ahead to whether these countries are likely to repeat the experience of direct democracy when determining their attitudes towards other European issues.

Polish euroscepticism in the run-up to EU accession

Recent years have seen increasing Polish cynicism about the EU that has led to a significant fall in support for membership and the emergence of a sizeable bloc of anti-EU public opinion. Support was bound to fall once it became apparent that conforming to EU norms would involve negative economic and social consequences as well as benefits. Even more significantly, the crack in the previously overwhelming pro-EU elite consensus and the subsequent politicisation of the debate on EU membership have also chipped away at public support. However, support for Polish EU membership appears to have stabilised at a relatively high level. Even though parties critical of or even opposed to EU membership performed well in the most recent September 2001 parliamentary election it would be wrong to interpret this as a kind of Eurosceptic backlash given that, by virtually any measure, the EU was not a salient campaign issue.