Paul Taggart

A touchstone of dissent: Euroscepticism in contemporary Western European party systems

With the recent acceleration of the integration process of the European Union there has been a rise in political parties expressing either scepticism or outright criticism of the nature of the integration process. Using a four-fold differentiation between single issue, protest, established parties and factions within parties, the first part of the article presents an overview of Euroscepticism within EU member states and Norway. This reveals the diversity of sources of Euroscepticism both in ideology and in the types of parties that are Eurosceptical but with a preponderance of protest parties taking Eurosceptical positions. The second part of the article is an attempt to map Euroscepticism in West European party systems through a consideration of ideology and party position in the party system. The conclusions are that Euroscepticism is mainly limited to parties on the periphery of their party system and is often there used as an issue that differentiates those parties from the more established parties which are only likely to express Euroscepticism through factions. Party based Euroscepticism is therefore both largely dependent on domestic contextual factors and a useful issue to map emergent domestic political constellations.

New populist parties in Western Europe

This article addresses the electoral success of far right political parties in West European party systems and suggests that there is a new type of party ‐ the New Populist. Differentiating between neo‐fascism and the New Populism is instructive in two senses. First, it reveals that the current wave of comparative electoral success is more associated with the New Populism than neo‐fascism. Second, it demonstrates that there are certain parallels between the New Politics and the New Populism thereby suggesting that changes in the contemporary far right may well be telling indicators of changes in West European societies that are deeper set than a simple resurgence of racist and anti‐immigrant sentiment.

Populism and representative politics in contemporary Europe

In this paper I apply the definition of populism that I laid out in P. Taggart, Populism (Buckingham: Open University Press, 2000) and argue that recent developments in Europe provide a fertile ground for the emergence of populism. Europe is taken to in its widest sense to include the European Union as well as the ‘wider Europe’. The argument of the paper is that populism will emerge (and has already appeared) in many different forms and will appear as a series of fractured instances. Combined with the self‐limiting effects of populism this means that populism will not amount to a wider ‘European’ force but its appearance does highlight dilemmas of representative politics in Europe.

Populism and the pathology of representative politics

The study of populism is, like the phenomenon itself, limited in scope and duration, and somewhat episodic. It seems that populism acquires a certain intellectual currency at irregular intervals but lacks staying power. In consequence, populism is one of the most widely used but poorly understood political concepts of our time. This is a deficiency because, as I shall argue, it provides us with a useful tool for understanding the pathology of representative politics. Populism is not a universal concept that, once unlocked, will enable us to decipher all other political debates, but it is a useful secondary concept that, if used sensitively and systematically, will enable us to understand populist movements, and which will, perhaps more importantly, allow us to understand essential elements in the politics of representation.

*Keynote Article: Questions of Europe - The Domestic Politics of the 2005 French and Dutch Referendums and their Challenge for the Study of European Integration

No abstract available.

The Politics of European Referendum Outcomes and Turnout: Two Models

This survey briefly examines the EU accession process for the countries included in this collection and considers the distinctive features of this set of referendums, particularly the comparatively high levels of Yes vote and low levels of turnout. It argues that, although they represent a distinctive sub-type of European referendum, they can be used as a basis to draw at least tentative comparative and theoretical conclusions. Consequently, it then posits causal models that both provide an analytical framework for this collection and, more broadly, attempt to explain the results and turnout in these and, potentially, other (European) referendums.

Europeanisation, euroscepticism and party systems: Party‐based euroscepticism in the candidate states of Central and Eastern Europe

Abstract In this article, we assume that we can usefully examine the emergence of party‐based Euroscepticism in the party systems of the candidate states and that we can account for (some of) the differences between the states by looking at their party systems. In order to do this we begin by offering a definition of Euroscepticism that differentiates between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ variants. We map these types of Euroscepticism in parties in the candidate states of central and Eastern Europe. Looking at the nature of party systems we suggest that there is a need to rethink how we conceptualise and categorise them if we are to extend our Western models to central and Eastern Europe, and we offer some suggestions of how this might be done. Using these models of party systems in relation to the candidate states of central and Eastern Europe we examine how this relates to the incidences of party‐based Euroscepticism and reflect on the issues involved in applying West European models to East European cases.

Dealing with populists in government: aframework for analysis

There is growing research on populist actors and their impact on the democratic system, but little has been written on how to deal with populist actors in government. To respond to this question, in this article we develop a theoretical framework that distinguishes three levels of analysis. First, we identify the set of domestic and external actors that can try to cope with the coming into power of populist forces. Second, we offer an overview of the different strategies that can be employed to react against populist actors in government. Third, we argue that it is important to consider the timing of the reactions. In addition, we also present a brief summary of the articles that are part of this special issue.

Conclusion: towards a model of (European) referendums

This conclusion evaluates the causal models set out in the introduction to this collection and considers whether, in the light of the 2003 accession referendums, they require modification. On the basis of this examination we argue that the results of EU accession referendums appear to demonstrate that the key factors determining the results are the consequences of: (a) underlying mass attitudes in combination with (b) cues provided by elites. The variance in the levels of turnout in the EU accession referendums appears to be predominantly the consequence of: (a) the general levels of electoral turnout specific to countries in combination with (b) the level of contestation of the European issue. Consideration is then given to the generalisability of the models to other referendums, on both European and non-European issues. Finally, we look ahead to whether these countries are likely to repeat the experience of direct democracy when determining their attitudes towards other European issues.

The New Populism and the New Politics

The suggestion that West European countries are still confronting the ‘frozen’ party systems of the 1920s seemed somewhat tenable in the 1960s when it was first postulated (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967). Since that decade, the rise of the new social movements, the new left, the New Politics, the new right and the decline of old voting patterns, old class constellations and even old political systems, renders such suggestions less sustainable. Given the history of the last three decades this is hardly surprising.