Alessandro Balestrino

Endogenous Fertility and the Design of Family Taxation

The paper innovates on the existing optimal taxation literature by taking fertility as endogenous, and allowing for households to be differentiated by their ability to raise children, as well as by their ability to raise income. In a context where the government cannot observe personal abilities, fertility behaviour conveys a great deal of information about those characteristics, which helps to relax the self-selection constraints on re-distribution. Bi-dimentional household differentiation introduces the possibility that re-distribution will be from households with low utility to households with high utility, and that it may be optimal to accentuate or reverse the sign of laissez-faire utility inequality. Contrary to popular belief, we find that it is not necessarily optimal for the tax system to be so designed that an additional child would lighten the tax burden on his or her parents. If it is, the optimal policy may include an unusual mix of taxes on number of children, subsidies on child-specific commodities, income support for low-wage households, and positive marginal income tax rates for all.

Kind of Black: The Musicians' Labour Market in Italy

It is estimated that only 5% of musicians in Italy are regularly employed. In an attempt at understanding such a peculiar situation, we build a theoretical model of the musicians’ labour market in which we embed the main institutional features of the Italian system. We notice how the presence of taxation incentivates the formation of a black market for musicians and discourages talented agents from becoming full-time musicians in all second-best economies. In Italy both tendencies are particularly strong, and further exacerbated by the presence of an actuarially unfair pension system for musicians. These inefficiencies might be corrected by a two-fold policy: the reform of the pension system, and the introduction of a sufficiently large unemployment benefit for musicians. We notice that the first step, while highly desirable, is unlikely to be politically feasible in the current Italian institutional setting. The second step, which has a general interest for any second-best economy, is instead viable under certain circumstances.

The Desirability of In‐kind Transfers in the Presence of Distortionary Taxes

A standard argument in welfare economics maintains that private goods should not be publicly provided, because cash transfers are always superior to in-kind transfers. However, this conclusion does not hold in second best economies. A strong case for the desirability of in-kind transfer in the presence of distortionary taxes has been made in various recent contributions. Here, we survey the arguments provided in these papers, using a common theoretical framework which enables us to present more clearly the similarities and the differences among the various papers. The use of a common formal model helps us to show how the rationale for public provision of private goods is sensitive to the form of the tax system. It also helps us to provide an explanation why mandatory and non-mandatory in-kind transfer schemes have the same effects on social welfare. Finally, we offer some considerations on the relevance of the theory of in-kind transfers for policy action. Copyright 1999 by Blackwell Publishers Ltd

Mixed Tax Systems and the Public Provision of Private Goods

In contrast to what used to be conventional wisdom among economists,several recent contributions have shown that in-kind transfersschemes can be welfare-improving in the presence of distortionarytaxes (usually, linear taxes or a general income tax). In thisnote, we extend previous work by considering the most generaltax system compatible with reasonable information constraints,i.e. a mix of linear indirect and non-linear direct taxes. Threemain results are noted. We find that in the presence of a mixedtax system (as opposed to the non-linear income tax alone): i) not only encouraged but also discouraged goods satisfy a conditionfor the desirability of public provision; ii) there is a tendencyfor the optimal level of in-kind transfers to be lower; iii)there is a basic equivalence between uniform and income-contingentin-kind transfers. We also show how previous results can be derivedas special cases of ours and others have to be modified to accountfor the mixed tax system.

Imperfect Tax Compliance and the Optimal Provision of Public Goods

Our aim in this paper is to investigate whether the presence of imperfect income tax compliance affects the optimal provision of public goods within a framework in which public expenditure is financed by a general income tax that also accomplishes redistributive goals. We first derive the income tax structure, and then a generalized Samuelson rule. We argue that, under imperfect income tax compliance, it is desirable to distort public--good supply downwards, in the sense that the sum of marginal rates of substitution between public and private consumption must exceed their marginal rate of transformation. Copyright Blackwell Publishing Ltd and the Board of Trustees of the Bulletin of Economic Research 2003

Doing Wonders with an Egg: Optimal Re-distribution When Households Differ in Market and Non-Market Abilities

The paper studies non-linear income taxation and linear commodity taxation in a household production context with households differentiated by market and non-market ability. In such a setting, there is an efficiency motive for re-distribution which is independent from the usual equity motive, and operates also when the social planner is indifferent to utility inequality. As a consequence, some of the policy prescriptions applicable to the case in which households differ in market ability only do not hold when households differ also in non-market ability. For instance, re-distribution is not necessarily from high- to low-wage households, and it is not necessarily true that the marginal rate of income tax should be zero for high incomes and positive for low incomes. In some cases, re-distribution may accentuate rather than lessen utility inequality, and can reverse the direction of income inequality relative to the laissez-faire equilibrium. Furthermore, contrary to Atkinson-Stiglitz, it may be optimal to use indirect and direct taxation simultaneously even when the utility function is separable in commodities and labour. Copyright 2003 Blackwell Publishing Inc..

Public Provision of Private Goods and User Charges

This paper deals with the question whether uniform provision of a purely private good should be implemented at the social optimum, in a second best economy where personalised lump-sum transfers are not feasible, but no market failure exists. The answer is that it depends on the balance of private and social gains and losses from public provision: necessary conditions for the optimality of uniform provision are derived and discussed. The sensitivity of these conditions to changing rules for the choice of the user charge is also investigated, and it is suggested that public provision is most likely to be optimal when it is free of charge. Finally, it is emphasized that the assumption that a perfect substitute for the publicly provided good is not available plays a crucial role in obtaining the above results.

User charges as redistributive devices

In this model, a mix of public and private provision of private goods arises naturally in the economy. We characterize the social optimum in the presence of a linear tax/public expenditure system and show how a user charge can be welfare- or Pareto-improving, when the users are the poor. The charge discourages the rich from opting into the public program and allows the policymaker to restructure the tax/expenditure system in a way that is beneficial for the poor. If the ensuing welfare gain is large enough to outweigh the loss for the remaining users, a charge is desirable. Copyright 1999 by Blackwell Publishing Inc.

Time, Self-Selection and User Charges for Public Goods

Many public goods generate utility only when combined with a time-input. Important examples include road networks and publicly provided leisure facilities. If it is possible to charge for the time spent using the public good it is generally a second-best Pareto optimal policy to do so even in the absence of congestion. An optimal linear user charge is analyzed within a standard optimum income-tax framework. Second-best public good provision in the presence of a user charge is also characterized and factors that influence the direction of optimal distortion of the public good supply are identified.

On the Optimal Fiscal Treatment of Family Size

Should a benevolent social planner subsidise family size? Typically, contributions assuming exogenous fertility yield an a¢rmative answer, while those assuming endogenous fertility do not reach de…nite conclusions. We re-examine the endogenous fertility model, and …nd that when redistribution is accomplished mostly using non-income taxes, there is indeed a case for subsidising the number of children, as long as poor families tend to have more children. Instead, when redistribution is pursued prevalently using a non-linear income tax, the above rationale for children subsidisation disappears. We …nally argue that whether children are a tax asset or a tax liability depends however on all the policy instruments, and not only on the tax treatment of family size.