Lisa Grazzini

Fiscal Coordination and Political Competition

This contribution investigates fiscal coordination in the framework of two countries asymmetric in respect of their capital-labor endowment. When tax policies are decided by majority voting inside each country, and they are not coordinated at a supranational level, factors of production are inefficiently allocated, at equilibrium. Our main result shows that fiscal coordination, via a minimum capital tax, does not always lead to a Pareto-improvement for the median voters welfare, with respect to the noncooperative outcome. Copyright 2003 Blackwell Publishing Inc..

Taxing market power

We investigate the effectiveness of tax and transfer policies in correcting market distortions when the economy is imperfectly competitive. We perform this analysis in the context of an exchange model representing a bilateral oligopoly situation, which constitutes a particular example of a Shapley-Shubik strategic market game.

Strategic multilateral exchange and taxes

This contribution investigates the effictiveness and welfare implications of fiscal policies in a context of multilateral trade, when traders behave strategically. The present approach deals simultaneously with two aspects of fiscal policies: collecting resources for redistributive purposes and correcting distortions related to imperfectly competitive behaviour.

Revenue Equalization Systems in a Federation with Tax Evasion

We analyse how vertical or horizontal fiscal equalization affects the overprovision of local public goods due to vertical fiscal externality, when there is tax evasion. The regional governments overspending incentive is examined both in case of a fiscal equalization based on pretax earned income and reported taxable income.

Federalism with Bicameralism

Abstract We analyse how bicameralism can affect national fiscal policies in a federal country when vertical and horizontal externalities interact. Conditions are provided to show when, at equilibrium, the two chambers agree or disagree on the choice of a national capital tax rate, depending on whether or not the pivotal voter in the two chambers is the same.

Spillover Effects in a Federal Country with Vertical Tax Externalities

We analyze how spillover effects may affect the choice of a federal tax rate in a federal country with vertical tax externalities. Our main result shows the conditions under which the federal tax rate with spillover effects is lower or higher than the federal tax rate without spillover effects. The effects of vertical tax externalities can be modified by the reaction of the federal government to the horizontal externality due to spillover effects.

The Importance of the Quality of Education: Some Determinants and its Effects on Earning Returns and Economic Growth

The aim of this paper is to provide a selective overview on the role played by the quality of education versus the quantity of education. After a presentation of some possible effects of the quality of education on both individual earnings and growth, the paper analyses some important school inputs and institutional characteristics of the education system which have been examined in the economic literature and could affect education achievements