Alex McAvoy

Structure coefficients and strategy selection in multiplayer games.

Evolutionary processes based on two-player games such as the Prisoner’s Dilemma or Snowdrift Game are abundant in evolutionary game theory. These processes, including those based on games with more than two strategies, have been studied extensively under the assumption that selection is weak. However, games involving more than two players have not received the same level of attention. To address this issue, and to relate two-player games to multiplayer games, we introduce a notion of reducibility for multiplayer games that captures what it means to break down a multiplayer game into a sequence of interactions with fewer players. We discuss the role of reducibility in structured populations, and we give examples of games that are irreducible in any population structure. Since the known conditions for strategy selection, otherwise known as

Autocratic strategies for iterated games with arbitrary action spaces

\sigma

The general form of Hamilton’s rule makes no predictions and cannot be tested empirically

σ-rules, have been established only for two-player games with multiple strategies and for multiplayer games with two strategies, we extend these rules to multiplayer games with many strategies to account for irreducible games that cannot be reduced to those simpler types of games. In particular, we show that the number of structure coefficients required for a symmetric game with

Effects of motion in structured populations

d

Supplementary material from "Effects of motion in structured populations"

d-player interactions and