Alexander Baturo

Dynamics of regime personalization and patron–client networks in Russia, 1999–2014

Many comparative scholars classify personalist regimes as a distinct category of nondemocratic rule. To measure the process of regime personalization, and to distinguish such a process from overall authoritarian reversal, is difficult in comparative context. Using the Russian political regime in 1999–2014 as a case study, we examine the dynamics of regime personalization over time. Relying on original data on patron–client networks and expert surveys assessing the policy influence of the key members of the ruling coalition, we argue that having more clients, or clients who are more powerful, increases the power of patrons – and that where the patron is the ruler, the resulting measure is an indication of the level of personalization of the regime. We trace regime personalization from the changes in political influence of the presidents associates in his patron–client network versus that of other elite patron–client networks. We find that as early as 2004, the Russian regime can be regarded as personalist, and is strongly so from 2006 onward.

Office or Officeholder? Regime Deinstitutionalization and Sources of Individual Political Influence

How to separate the office from the officeholder is one of the most difficult questions in the empirical study of institutions and leadership. We argue that provided there is an indicator for the overall individual influence among members of the political elite and there is sufficient variability among individuals taking the same office, being promoted and demoted into different offices over time, we can separate latent individual and institutional components of influence at an aggregate, regime level. Our latent variable model thus provides a new tool to measure the degree of regime deinstitutionalization. Using expert surveys that assess the ranking of the top political actors in Russia from 1994 to 2011 and restricting personal effects to those that are constant over time, we find that on average office dominates individual by the order of two. We discuss regime deinstitutionalization in comparative perspective, demonstrate the generalizability by analyzing Ukraine, and account for patronage networks.

Understanding state preferences with text as data: Introducing the UN General Debate corpus:

Every year at the United Nations (UN), member states deliver statements during the General Debate (GD) discussing major issues in world politics. These speeches provide invaluable information on governments’ perspectives and preferences on a wide range of issues, but have largely been overlooked in the study of international politics. This paper introduces a new dataset consisting of over 7300 country statements from 1970–2014. We demonstrate how the UN GD corpus (UNGDC) can be used as a resource from which country positions on different policy dimensions can be derived using text analytic methods. The article provides applications of these estimates, demonstrating the contribution the UNGDC can make to the study of international politics.

Democracy, Development, and Career Trajectories of Former Political Leaders:

One of the obstacles to democratic development is the reluctance of political leaders to leave office. This article argues that alongside democratic constraints and accountability, leaders’ career concern—specifically, the possibility of post-tenure careers—is an important factor behind their rotation in office. While literature exists about leaders’ exit and fate, we lack a systematic understanding of their careers and whether former rulers retire, remain in politics, or pursue civil service, business, international, or non-profit careers after leaving office. Drawing on the new data on the prior- and post-tenure occupations of leaders from 1960 to 2010, the article explains how democracy, personal background, and the economy influence what ex-leaders can do, and why. In turn, over time the post-tenure careers of prior rulers may strengthen the precedent behind the institutional routinization of the rotation in office norm—an important component of democratic consolidation.

When Do Family Ties Matter? The Duration of Female Suffrage and Women’s Path to High Political Office

While the percentage of female heads of state in the world has increased to around 10 percent in the 2010s, a female president or prime minister still remains an exception. Recent scholarship has proposed a number of explanations behind this phenomenon, but there exist important gaps. The contribution of this paper is threefold. First, we use new and comprehensive data to undertake a systematic examination of the differences in the personal, education, and career backgrounds between female and male effective political leaders from 1960 to 2010. We find that female leaders are as qualified as men. Second, because the phenomenon of female leadership is still a rare occurrence, we argue that this fact must be accounted for in empirical modeling. Third, we show that many female leaders tend to acquire the necessary resources, support, and name recognition through political dynasties. To that end, women leaders need to rely on family ties more than men do. However, the importance of such connections attenuates when female suffrage has been in place for longer, and citizens are more open to women in politics.

Is there a ‘revolving door’ to the private sector in Irish politics?

ABSTRACT The connections between Irish politicians and the private sector are the subject of constant speculation, particularly in the post Celtic Tiger period. However, there is little systematic evidence whether publicised cases of such ties represent the exception to the rule, or if they are symptomatic of a larger problem. In this paper we focus on one aspect of the public–private nexus and investigate whether a revolving door – the movement of individuals between public and private sectors – exists in Ireland. Using evidence from originally collected data on former TDs from 1989 to 2016, we find that almost one third of ex-politicians are in the private sector; however, many merely return to their previous occupations as solicitors or small business owners. Still, 11 per cent turn to consulting, lobbying or corporate board membership. We find that former cabinet ministers, the representatives of FF, PD and FG parties, as well as TDs who do not run and lose are more likely to join the corporate sector. We additionally compare former TDs with ex-officials in the civil service. Finally, placing Ireland in a comparative context, we find that the extent of the revolving door problem here is lower than in other democracies.

Why do authoritarian regimes adopt bicameralism? Cooptation, control, and masking controversial reforms

ABSTRACT The adoption of bicameralism in the world is increasingly an authoritarian phenomenon: while the percentage of bicameral democracies is in decline, there has been a steady increase in bicameral non-democracies. What makes non-democracies turn to bicameralism? We argue that bicameralism may serve as a means of post-conflict reconciliation or control of the legislature when the opposition gains seats in the lower chamber. We also propose a novel explanation whereby the introduction of bicameralism helps to mask a set of more controversial constitutional reforms. Drawing on a new dataset on second chambers from 1945 to 2016, we find that bicameralism is more likely to be adopted during years when formal presidential term limits are in place or when leaders are in their last term. This is because bicameralism is often a by-product of broad institutional reform that assists in justifying and legitimating the need for constitutional revision and in masking the extension of presidential term limits. The findings improve our understanding of institutions and institutional origins in dictatorships.