Alexander Broadie

Kant's Treatment of Animals

Some of the greatest writers on moral philosophy have claimed that their theories about morality do not run counter to the moral views of ordinary men, but on the contrary are an elucidation of such views, or provide them with a sound philosophical underpinning. Aristotle, for example, made it quite clear that he could not take seriously a moral view that was at odds with the heritage of moral wisdom deeply imbedded in his society. His doctrine of the mean was based on a philosophical consideration of such wisdom. And Immanuel Kant thought that his moral philosophy articulated the moral views of ordinary men.

Kant and the Maltreatment of Animals

In Philosophy 51, October 1976, 471–472, Professor Tom Regan takes ud to task for our attack on Kants theory concerning the moral status of animals. The ground of Regans criticism is that ‘… it is clear that Kant does not suppose, as… Broadie and Pybus erroneously assume that he does, that the concept of maltreating an animal, on the one hand, and, on the other, the concept of using an animal as a means, are the same or logically equivalent concepts’ (p. 471). Regan argues that Kant does not say that we should avoid treating animals as a means. Rather, he claims, Kants view is that we have an indirect duty not to maltreat animals, since in maltreating them we treat, or run the risk of treating, as a mere means rationality in ourselves or in others.

Aristotle, Adam Smith and the Virtue of Propriety

Adam Smiths ethics have long been thought to be much closer to the Stoic school than to any other school of the ancient world. Recent scholarship however has focused on the fact that Smith also appears to be quite close to Aristotle. I shall attend to Smiths deployment of a version of the doctrine of the mean, shall show that it is quite close to Aristotles, shall demonstrate that in its detailed application it is seriously at odds with Stoic teaching on the passions, and particularly with their teachings on anger, and shall conclude that on a central issue of ethics Smith is a good deal closer to Aristotelian than to Stoic thinking.

Kant and Direct Duties

The Aim of this paper is to argue the case for a moral philosophical doctrine which, while Kantian in spirit and in much of its detail, permits an easier accommodation with certain widely held moral judgments than Kants theory allows. The point at issue is Kants doctrine of direct duties, namely, that any duty is ultimately to a person; indirectly a duty may be to a non-person, but if the duty in question has moral force it is by virtue of the fact that it is sanctioned or underpinned by a duty to a person. To take a conspicuous example: Kant does not believe animals to be persons, for he holds that a person is essentially rational and that animals lack rationality. Yet he accepts that we have certain duties with regard to animals, in particular a duty not to maltreat them. Kants solution to this problem is to say that our real duties are to persons, and that it is by virtue of our duties to persons that we are morally required to set restrictions on our behaviour towards animals. It is for the sake of people that we must be kind to animals and never treat them cruelly.

The moral philosophy of Maimonides.

Maimonides (1135-1204) wrote extensively on moral philosophical matters. In his three main works, the Commentary on the Mishnah, the Mishneh Torah, and the Guide of the Perplexed, he developed a far-reaching ethical system which is Aristotelian and yet is also greatly dependent upon the Rabbinic tradition. In this paper it is argued that Maimonides presents an effective synthesis of these apparently disparate traditions.

Hutcheson on Connoisseurship and the Role of Reflection

Francis Hutcheson’s concept of reflection unites his teachings on aesthetics and morals. Here I shall examine the concept and shall then offer an account of the way in which Hutchesonian reflection relates to a Hutchesonian concept of freedom of will. Hutcheson has very little, almost nothing, to say on freedom of will, but I believe that his account of reflection provides a clue to his likely position on freedom, and here I have in mind freedom in relation to our aesthetic no less than to our moral consciousness. Human acts are perceived as virtuous and works of nature and of art are perceived as beautiful. This fact has motivated philosophers, including Hutcheson, to search for criteria of rightness in respect of both sorts of perception. Hutcheson is also interested in the question of why we make mistakes in such judgements and he seeks an explanation in terms of a fundamental principle governing the operation of the mind, namely our propensity to associate ideas one with another. Hutcheson’s concept of association of ideas follows Locke’s rather closely. In the course of Locke’s chief statement on the association of ideas, which occurs in the fourth edition of the Essay – there had been no sustained discussion in the preceding editions – he affirms that there are ideas which have a ‘natural correspondence one with another’, a correspondence which is ‘founded in their peculiar beings’. He adds:

Aquinas's philosophical theology

Knowledge and Faith in Thomas Aquinas. John I. Jenkins. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1997. pp. 267. £35.00 hb. ISBN 0–521–58126–5. The Cambridge Companion to Aquinas. Norman Kretzmann and Eleonore Stump. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1993. pp. 302. £12.95 pb. ISBN 0–521–43769–5. The Metaphysics of Theism: Aquinass Natural Theology in the Summa Contra Gentiles I. Norman Kretzmann. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1997. pp. 302. £35.00 hb. ISBN 0–19–823660–3. Thomas Aquinas: God and Explanations. C. F. J. Martin. Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press, 1997. pp. 212. £40.00 hb. ISBN 0–7486–0901–6. Theories of Cognition in the Later Middle Ages. Robert Pasnau. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1997. pp. 330. £37.00 hb. ISBN 0–521–58368–3.

James Dundas on Seneca, Descartes and the Fall

James Dundas, first Lord Arniston (c.1620-1679), was a Scottish law lord who left at his death a 313-page manuscript entitled Idea philosophiae moralis which has only recently come to light. In this paper, there is a brief account of his life and work, followed by a discussion of his response to Seneca and to Descartes regarding the extent to which happiness is something that we can achieve by an act of will. Dundas deploys the Calvinist doctrine of the Fall to explain the difficulties in our way when we exert our will in the attempt to secure happiness.

John Mair on the Writing of Theology

John Mair (c.1467-1550), major Scottish philosopher, logician and theologian of the Pre-Reformation period, wrote a brief dialogue on the task of the theologian. The two protagonists in the dialogue were young Scots, David Cranston and Gavin Douglas, with Douglas representing renaisssance humanism and Cranston resisting this stance. Mair shows himself a man of the old order but well-informed about and not entirely hostile to the new.

Duns Scotus on ubiety and the fiery furnace

During the medieval period a good deal of philosophy was done in the course of answering theological questions concerning divine omnipotence. Here I shall take up one such question, which since the Middle Ages has received very little attention, if any, and shall examine the philosophical considerations that seem inevitably to arise as soon as the question is asked. The philosopher with whom I shall be principally concerned is John Duns Scotus, and the principal text on which I shall be focused is Question Eleven in his Quaestiones Quodlibetales, a work composed in 1306 or 1307, and based on a disputation he conducted in Paris. The question concerns the fact that, speaking generally, each body is in a place, and that, as we would say, the place that a body is in is where the body is. This way of speaking suggests that the concept of whereness or ubiety (ubietas), is relational, for it relates on the one hand a body and on the other the place the body is in. The concept of divine power may be brought to bear in discussions of relations of any type for it can be asked whether God can maintain in existence the extremes of a given relation without also maintaining the relation between them. The obvious answer is that he cannot, and that there is therefore a limit to divine power. Consider the case of two white things. Each stands to the other in a relation of likeness or similitude, and it is impossible for God to make two