Alexander Kalb

Voter Involvement, Fiscal Autonomy and Public Sector Efficiency: Evidence from German Municipalities

Social and/or political involvement within the population is often argued to enhance public sector performance. The underlying idea is that engagement fosters political awareness and interest and increases the public’s monitoring ability. Still, weak fiscal autonomy can undermine voters’ interest in and demand for an efficient production of public services. In our contribution, we test whether and how voter involvement in the political sphere is related to government performance – in terms of its efficiency – using a broad panel of German municipalities. Our results suggest that voter involvement indeed has a positive impact on cost efficiency. Crucially, however, this efficiency-enhancing effect of voter involvement is significantly positively affected by local governments’ fiscal autonomy.

Value for money? German local government efficiency in a comparative perspective

In this article, we investigate the cost efficiency of German local governments in the state of Baden-Württemberg in 2004 using a stochastic frontier approach. Besides being the first study on German data, we add two elements to the literature. First, we provide a comparative perspective, allowing us to embed our results in the broader literature. Second, unlike most previous studies, we explicitly account for exogenous or nondiscretionary influences when estimating municipal efficiency scores. The results suggest that disregarding such exogenous factors can lead to significant and systematic bias in the estimated inefficiency levels. Particularly, underestimation of efficiency occurs for municipalities with high tourist activity, while the reverse is true for municipalities with high unemployment.

Sovereign Bond Market Reactions to Fiscal Rules and No-Bailout Clauses – The Swiss Experience

We investigate the political determinants of risk premiums which sub-national governments in Switzerland have to pay for their sovereign bond emissions. For this purpose we analyse financial market data from 288 tradable cantonal bonds in the period from 1981 to 2007. Our main focus is on two different institutional factors. First, many of the Swiss cantons have adopted strong fiscal rules. We find evidence that both the presence and the strength of these fiscal rules contribute significantly to lower cantonal bond spreads. Second, we study the impact of a credible no-bailout regime on the risk premia of potential guarantors. We make use of the Leukerbad court decision in July 2003 which relieved the cantons from backing municipalities in financial distress, thus leading to a fully credible no-bailout regime. Our results show that this break lead to a reduction of cantonal risk premia by about 25 basis points. Moreover, it cut the link between cantonal risk premia and the financial situation of the municipalities in its canton which existed before. This demonstrates that a not fully credible no-bailout commitment can entail high costs for the potential guarantor.

The Impact of Intergovernmental Grants on Cost Efficiency: Theory and Evidence from German Municipalities

In this paper we use a simple bureaucracy model of fiscal illusion to analyze the impact of intergovernmental grants on the cost efficiency of local jurisdictions. We find that a higher degree of redistribution within a system of fiscal equalization or an increase in the amount of grants received by a local jurisdiction leads to an extension of organizational slack or X-inefficiency in that jurisdiction. This theoretical prediction is tested by conducting an empirical analysis using a broad panel of German municipalities. The results of the empirical analysis are consistent with the theoretical findings and therefore support the existence of a negative incentive effect of intergovernmental grants on local authorities cost efficiency.

Sovereign risk premia: The link between fiscal rules and stability culture

There is a growing empirical literature studying whether permanent constraints on fiscal policy, such as fiscal rules, reduce sovereign risk premia. Nevertheless, it remains an open question whether these rules are effective genuinely or just because they mirror fiscal preferences of politicians and voters. In our analysis of European bond spreads before the financial crisis, we shed light on this issue by employing several types of stability preference related proxies. These proxies refer to a countrys past stability performance, government characteristics and survey results related to general trust. We find evidence that these preference indicators affect sovereign bond spreads and dampen the measurable impact of fiscal rules. Yet, the interaction of stability preferences and rules points to a particular potential of fiscal rules to restore market confidence in countries with a historical lack of stability culture.

Sovereign Risk Premia: The Link between Fiscal Rules and Stability Culture

There is a growing empirical literature studying whether permanent constraints on fiscal policy, such as fiscal rules, reduce sovereign risk premia. Nevertheless, it remains an open question whether these rules are effective genuinely or just because they mirror fiscal preferences of politicians and voters. In our analysis of European bond spreads before the financial crisis, we shed light on this issue by employing several types of stability preference related proxies. These proxies refer to a countrys past stability performance, government characteristics and survey results related to general trust. We find evidence that these preference indicators affect sovereign bond spreads and dampen the measurable impact of fiscal rules. Yet, the interaction of stability preferences and rules points to a particular potential of fiscal rules to restore market confidence in countries with a historical lack of stability culture.

What Determines Local Governments' Technical Efficiency? The Case of Road Maintenance

Kalb A. What determines local governments cost-efficiency? The case of road maintenance, Regional Studies. This paper investigates the determinants of local governments cost-efficiency in road maintenance for a panel of German counties using a broad variety of estimation approaches. More specifically, efficiency indices were calculated using non-parametric and parametric reference technologies, and were examined by estimating and comparing four different regression models. The results show that the disposable income of the counties citizens, intergovernmental grants and the municipalities payments to the counties influence efficiency negatively. Concerning political variables the results show weak evidence that efficiency decreases with an increasing share of seats of left-wing parties in the county council.

Local Governments in the Wake of Demographic Change: Efficiency and Economies of Scale in German Municipalities

German municipalities are expected to suffer from (often significant) population losses in the upcoming decades. We assess these local governments? vulnerability to the fiscal consequences of this demographic decline through two means (using a sample of 1021 municipalities in the state of Baden-Wurttemberg). First, we consider local government cost efficiency. This indicates that there is a substantial divergence in efficiency despite a homogeneous institutional setting, leaving at least some – mainly smaller – municipalities vulnerable to adverse demographic/financial shocks. Secondly, we estimate the elasticity of local government cost functions to population size. We find that costs rise (fall) underproportionally with population size for small municipalities, whereas this is less the case for larger municipalities. This implies that especially small municipalities are vulnerable to increasing cost pressures under declining population. The overall implication is that large German municipalities (over 10.000 inhabitants) will more easily be able to cope with the expected population decline than smaller ones, supporting a case for boundary reviews or more extensive inter-communal cooperation.

Local Government Efficiency in German Municipalities

This article evaluates German local governments’ cost efficiency using a sample of 1,021 municipalities in the state of Baden-Württemberg for the year 2001. We thereby concentrate on overall or ‘global’ efficiency scores—rather than estimate efficiency for one particular service—and explicitly account for exogenous or non-discretionary influences. The latter not only corrects for influences possibly beyond the control of local policy-makers, but also allows some indication of the determinants of such ‘global’ efficiency. Our results indicate that there is a substantial divergence in efficiency across municipalities despite a homogeneous institutional setting. As especially smaller municipalities appear less efficient, these results support a case for policy programmes aimed at boundary reviews or more extensive inter-communal cooperation among small municipalities.ZusammenfassungDieser Beitrag evaluiert die Effizienz öffentlicher Leistungserstellung auf Basis der Datengrundlage von 1.021 Kommunen im Bundesland Baden-Württemberg im Jahr 2001. Dabei konzentrieren wir uns auf die Ermittlung von „globalen“ Effizienzindikatoren anstelle der Effizienzanalyse bestimmter öffentlicher Dienstleistungen und berücksichtigen explizit exogene Umfeldbedingungen. Letzteres berücksichtigt den Einfluss von Faktoren, die sich der Kontrolle der lokalen politischen Akteure entziehen und macht Einblicke in die Determinanten der „globalen“ Effizienz möglich. Unsere Ergebnisse deuten darauf hin, dass es trotz eines homogenen institutionellen Umfelds eine erhebliche Divergenz der Effizienz zwischen den Kommunen gibt. Weil besonders kleinere Kommunen als weniger effizient erscheinen, unterstützen diese Ergebnisse politische Bemühungen zur Überprüfung des räumlichen Zuschnitts von Gemeinden oder einen Ausbau der interkommunalen Kooperation unter den kleinen Kommunen.

Die Zweckentfremdung des kommunalen Kassenkredits – eine rechtlich-ökonomische Analyse

Abstract The volume of short-term liquidity credit (“Kassenkredit”) of the German municipalities has increased rapidly in the last two decades. This development suggests that this debt instrument has been diverted from its original purpose, namely as an instrument of bridging short-run liquidity shortfalls. In this paper we analyze the reasons for this development - from a legal and institutional perspective on the one hand, and from an economic perspective on the other hand. One key result of the analysis is that this development is partly due to the lacking intervention of municipal supervision institutions from the L¨ander (German Federal States). Obviously, the Länder tolerate the abuse of the Kassenkredit in order to avoid more open types of debt. In addition, we investigate how the introduction of the doubly-entry bookkeeping in the municipalities affects the (improper) use of short-term liquidity credits. Finally, we point to the potential of the municipal Kassenkredit as a loophole in the new German constitutional debt brake.