Alexander L. George

The “Operational Code”: A Neglected Approach to the Study of Political Leaders and Decision-Making

In the past two decades the field of international relations studies has become increasingly diversified and is now marked by sharp differences over questions of scope, method, and theory. This heterogeneity, however, should not be allowed to obscure broad agreement on some fundamental propositions of overriding importance. One of these is the feeling shared by traditionalists and scientifically-oriented investigators alike, and by many academic scholars as well as sophisticated policymakers, that the way in which the leaders of nation-states view each other and the nature of world political conflict is of fundamental importance in determining what happens in relations among states.

Deterrence and Foreign Policy

The article by Christopher Achen and Duncan Snidal in this issue, however provocative some of its observations, has the merit of raising an important question: How should we think about the relationship between deductive theories of deterrence on the one hand and, on the other, research on deterrence that is at the same time empirical and oriented toward theory? While forcefully defending the deductive form of theory, Achen and Snidal also clearly dissociate themselves from the extreme position that it is a self-contained enterprise that need not take empirical research seriously. Rather, they recognize that empirical case studies are capable of contributing, and, indeed, have to some extent already contributed, to the development of theory, perhaps even to the kind of deductive theory they favor.

Assessing Presidential Character

Shortly after James Forrestal resigned as Secretary of Defense in late March 1949, the nation was shocked to learn that he was under treatment for a severe mental illness. Within a few months Forrestal committed suicide. This tragic occurrence, coming after Forrestals highly successful career in government, directly challenged the long-standing mental-health mythology prevalent in Washington. The essence of the myth, as noted by Albert Deutsch at the time, was the belief that “no Very Important Person, under any circumstances, can possibly suffer from a psychosis.” The denial of this possibility in official Washington was of a piece with widely shared beliefs that to suffer a mental illness was a disgrace that automatically and permanently rendered one unfit for public office.

The Need for Influence Theory and Actor-Specific Behavioral Models of Adversaries

This article discusses problems of employing deterrence and coercive diplomacy in intra-state conflicts, drawing on those aspects of experience with these strategies during the Cold War relevant for dealing with intra-state conflicts, and adding some reflections on problems of employing these strategies in the post-Cold War environment. The special characteristics of intra-state conflicts, identified in this analysis, call attention to the need for several types of indirect deterrence and coercive diplomacy. Emphasis is placed on including deterrence and coercive diplomacy within a broader influence framework that considers the utility and sometimes the necessity for coupling these strategies with positive initiatives. This article outlines a basic requirement for effective use of these strategies, namely the need to replace the simplistic assumption that adversaries are “rational, unitary” actors with more specific “actor-specific behavioral models” essential for understanding and attempting to influence different adversaries.

Research Note/ Issues in Wilson Scholarship: References to Early "Strokes" in the Papers of Woodrow Wilson

Any evaluation of Woodrow Wilsons neurological status prior to his severe stroke in the fall of 1919 is necessarily speculative. The patient is not available for examination, many of his medical records are missing, and some of the records most critical to diagnosis are known to have been destroyed. The published memoirs and the unpublished diary of Cary T. Grayson, Wilsons physician from the time he entered the White House until his death in 1924, are helpful, but the data are largely anecdotal and say little about Wilsons health prior to 1912. Surviving letters and other documents containing Wilsons own frequent references to his health and other peoples observations about it are suggestive but not conclusive. Why, then, should three nonhistorians trouble historians with an article on

Some Guides to Bridging the Gap

Editors Note: The Forum in this issue reports on a seminar held at the Mershon Center, Ohio State University, November 19, 1993. The seminarfocused on the recently published book by Alexander L. George entitled Bridging the Gap: Theory and Practice in Foreign Policy (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 1993; 170 pp.;

US-Soviet Global Rivalry: Norms of Competition

14.95, in paper). After an introduction by Alexander George, representatives from the academic and policy communities commented on the book and responded to questions from the audience. Those participating, in addition to George, were General John C. Galvin (Retired), former Commander of NATO Forces in Europe and now at the U.S. Military Academy; Edward A. Kolodziej, Professor of Political Science, University of Illinois; and Joseph Kruzel, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for European and NATO Policy. Bridging the Gap has as its theme encouraging better communication and closer collaboration between academic scholars who study foreign policy and practitioners who conduct it (p. xvii). George argues that scholarly knowledge has an indirect impact on policy making. It serves as an input to policy analysis and facilitates diagnosis of the policy problem as well as understanding contextualfactors that influence the nature of the problem. He is concerned about three types of knowledge in his book: conceptualizations of strategies, generic knowledge, and actor-specific behavioral models. Conceptual models of strategies provide frameworks for understanding the nature and general requirements for designing an effective strategy (p. 137). Generic knowledge builds on past experience and systematic examinations of history in identifying when particular strategies will be more or less effective. Actor-specific knowledge refers to the development of an accurate image of the opponent in the current situation. George is interested in how these three types of knowledge contribute to statecraft or the development and management of relationships with other states in ways that will protect and enhance ones own security and welfare (p. xxiv). In whatfollows, we present abridged versions of the comments and responses to questions made during the seminar.

Knowledge for Statecraft Lecture Given by the Winner of the Johan Skytte Prize in Political Science, Uppsala, October 3, 1998

This paper examines alternative approaches for developing norms of competition that might help to avoid war-threatening confrontations between the superpowers. Analysis of the abortive Nixon-Brezh nev experiment with general principles and of subsequent efforts to devise general codes of conduct to regulate the US-Soviet global competition suggests that such approaches are not workable. The paper argues that more attention should be given by the superpowers to a case-by-case approach that focuses on the relative interests of the two sides in each specific area. The paper outlines a typology of competi tive games that takes into account differences in the relative balance of interests between the US and the Soviet Union in various parts of the globe and points out the implications of these differences for norms of competition. Norms based upon relative interests, however, cannot be expected to work relia bly in all instances because the superpowers often experience difficulty in determining their interests in a particular area and in communicating their interests to each other in a timely and reliable way. The pa per notes the efforts the superpowers have made in recent years to develop a diplomatic mechanism for frequent discussions of regional problems and suggests how these bilateral discussions could be im proved and made more useful.

Presidential personality and performance

The occasion of receiving the Johan Skytte Prize in Political Science is perhaps an appropriate occasion to recall the origins of my interest in developing knowledge for statecraft. During the course of my years as a member of the RAND Corporation in Santa Monica, I became aware that much academic research on international relations was not providing the type of theory and knowledge needed for dealing with the challenges the United States was facing during the Cold War. I felt it necessary to undertake the challenging task of devising a new approach for producing the type of knowledge that would come closer to meeting the needs of policy makers who were trying to avoid getting into dangerous war-threatening crises and, when such crises nonetheless occurred, to manage and terminate them without triggering escalation to war.